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There is broad international recognition of the importance of entrepreneurship
for economic growth and development. Yet we still know relatively little about
the entrepreneurial process. Existing economic theories are often based on con-
straints that are external to the entrepreneur and their enterprise, with financial
constraints receiving perhaps the most attention. I propose that individuals’ en-
dowment and accumulation of entrepreneurship-specific human capital, which
I term Entrepreneurial Human Capital (EHC), constitutes a crucial and largely
overlooked factor in entrepreneurial dynamics. I build models that capture the
relevant mechanisms, and test them using a unique panel dataset from Indone-
sia.
I begin by revisiting the evidence for financial constraints to household-level
enterprise activity. I introduce a new test to the literature using semiparametric
econometric methods, and additional tests based on positive wealth shocks. I
uncover important heterogeneity in financial constraints, particularly in show-
ing that financing is not the binding constraint to enterprise activity over most
percentiles of the wealth distribution.
In the remaining two chapters I test variants of a model of dynamic EHC ac-
cumulation. First I exploit a unique natural experiment that provides exogenous
assignment of relatively high-ability individuals into self-employment. I find
that individuals who unexpectedly entered self-employment have remarkable
occupational persistence, along with earnings dynamics, which are consistent
with a theory of EHC accumulation. I also exploit the exogenous nature of the
occupational shock to provide causal evidence for an economically-significant
value of entrepreneurial experience. Secondly, I develop a full dynamic theory
of EHC accumulation through learning-by-doing. The theory explains the bifur-
cation between subsistence entrepreneurs, who get caught in an EHC poverty
trap, and opportunity-oriented entrepreneurs. I test the model with panel data
techniques.
Together the results provide complementary support for the concept of EHC
and its importance for entrepreneurial dynamics. The results suggest that pol-
icymakers who intend to stimulate entrepreneurial activity should be put less
of a focus on financing provision for low-skill individuals, and give greater at-
tention to individuals with high entrepreneurial potential, particularly early in
their careers.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
There is growing recognition the world over that vibrant entrepreneurial
activity is crucial for economic growth and development. This importance is
particularly salient during a time of globalization, when increased competition
puts pressure on enterprises at the same time that greater opportunities also
present themselves. This level of attention makes our relative lack of knowledge
of the entrepreneurial process all the more surprising, and the relative ineffec-
tiveness of numerous policy interventions all the more troubling ([Shane, 2008],
[Lerner, 2009]). A central component of policy design meant to stimulate (or at
least not inhibit) entrepreneurship is an understanding of the key factors be-
hind the entrepreneurial process.1 We generally assume that the absence or
impediment of certain key factors in entrepreneurs, in their enterprises and ex-
ternally, will constrain entrepreneurial activity. This attention to constraining
factors makes it crucial to understand what the core factors are and how to in-
fluence them. In this dissertation, I focus on the role of a key internal constraint
to entrepreneurship, the accumulation of entrepreneurship-specific skill. I point
out that this factor has received relatively less attention in the formal academic
literature, and present evidence for its crucial importance in understanding en-
trepreneurial activity and dynamics.
Existing entrepreneurial and business policy often takes a static view of en-
1In this dissertation I employ a rather broad definition of entrepreneurship, including most
activities related to the startup and ongoing operation of enterprises. However, it will be impor-
tant throughout to distinguish subsistence and opportunity-oriented entrepreneurship. The former
refers to the observation that many individuals become self-employed not to pursue a meaning-
ful business opportunity, but rather because of low opportunity cost (in particular, lack of wage
employment opportunities). The latter refers to individuals who start a business to pursue a
meaningful entrepreneurial opportunity.
1
trepreneurs and their firms. Internal capabilities are taken as given, rather than
allowing for a dynamic process of entrepreneurial development. This static ap-
proach often drives a search for short-term solutions, and leads to policies fo-
cused on singular, external constraints to enterprise activity. The external factor
that has received the most focus is financing constraints. Such static approaches
parallel the most common academic approaches to the conceptualization of
entrepreneurship. The dominant thinkers in economics on entrepreneurship
– in particular Schumpeter, Knight, Kirzner and their more mathematically-
inclined followers – primarily frame entrepreneurship as an event, seeing the
entrepreneurial tendency as being derived from a fixed trait such as risk prefer-
ences or alertness to opportunity. There is relatively little attention, particularly
in the academic economics literature, to the process of entrepreneurial learning
dynamics.2
In this dissertation I take some steps in the direction of formalizing and
providing empirical evidence for a stock of accumulated entrepreneurial skill,
which I term Entrepreneurial Human Capital (EHC). EHC constitutes special-
ized, entrepreneurship-specific skills, knowledge and other human capital en-
dowments, such as skills in sales, negotiation, product development, risk judg-
ment ([Shane, 2003]), and entrepreneurial social capital. Regardless of one’s in-
nate talent, the accumulation of EHC is crucial to entrepreneurial outcomes. I
argue that EHC (1) constitutes a central factor behind entrepreneurial activity,
(2) that the dynamics of EHC accumulation are crucial to understanding en-
trepreneurial dynamics more broadly, and (3) that certain stylized facts about
entrepreneurial activity that have been interpreted as evidence for other con-
2A notable exception to the lack of attention to entrepreneurship-specific human capital is
the work of work of Schultz (e.g., [Schultz, 1980]), but his work has received relatively little
mainstream attention. Much more recently [Bruhn et al., 2010] points out the lack of attention to
entrepreneurship-specific human capital in the economics literature.
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straints (financing, in particular) might in fact be driven primarily by EHC.
Throughout the dissertation I build models in the traditional occupa-
tional choice framework, which captures the incentive to self-select into self-
employment with wage employment as the opportunity cost. I extend the stan-
dard framework, where appropriate, to incorporate EHC accumulation. While
such applied modeling constitutes a contribution to the theoretical modeling
of entrepreneurship, it is not of great independent theoretical interest. Rather,
the central contribution of the dissertation is to subject the models to empirical
testing.
A probable important factor behind the lack of understanding of the en-
trepreneurial process is the lack of good data on entrepreneurial dynamics.
Though most economists recognize entrepreneurship as a crucial economic ac-
tivity, it is notoriously difficult to study empirically in part because data ac-
quired prior to important entrepreneurial events (hence allowing before-after
comparisons and analysis of dynamic processes) are difficult to come by. Since
entrepreneurial activity is relatively rare, a large-population dataset is needed
in order to have sufficient sample size to identify a sufficient number of en-
trepreneurs from the relatively small proportion available in a population sam-
ple. Unfortunately, datasets with sufficiently large cross-sections tend to have
little information relevant to entrepreneurship, because entrepreneurial activ-
ity is almost always of secondary importance to organizations with the where-
withal to conduct surveys with relatively large sample sizes.
I employ a unique, large-scale, household panel dataset from Indonesia,
the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS), which enables me to significantly
overcome these core data challenges. The IFLS provides a large cross-section,
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close to 10,000 households, observed across 4 panel rounds over 15 years. Be-
cause self-employment activity is more pervasive in developing countries, self-
employment activity received an unusual amount of attention in the IFLS sur-
vey questionnaires, particularly in the two most recent rounds. Due to the
uniqueness of the data on an international scale, I argue that the findings are
more broadly instructive, while at the same time the analysis provides a num-
ber of contributions to the relatively shallow literature on developing-country
entrepreneurship.
The analysis consists of 4 chapters that can be organized into three main
parts. First, because the dissertation is focused on a single dataset, the IFLS,
Chapter 2 provides a reasonably comprehensive overview of the IFLS. Chapter
2 is particularly focused on issues relevant to this dissertation – enterprise activ-
ity and employment activity. Second, Chapter 3 revisits the evidence on finan-
cial constraints to household-level enterprise activity in the developing-country
setting. These findings frame the remainder of the dissertation by pointing to
important unexplained variation in entrepreneurial choices and outcomes that
cannot be accounted for by financing constraints alone. Finally, the two sub-
sequent chapters (Chapters 4 and 5) provide two approaches to modeling and
empirical testing for EHC as a relatively unexplored channel to explain varia-
tion in enterprise dynamics and outcomes.
More specifically, in Chapter 3 I provide new evidence on financial con-
straints to household-level enterprise activity in the developing-country set-
ting by conducting two classes of tests of financial constraints. The most ba-
sic model of occupational choice in which entrepreneurial activity is poten-
tially constrained by financing predicts a positive relationship between wealth
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and enterprise activity, which is most pronounced for less-wealthy households.
First, I study the relationship between lagged household wealth, enterprise
startup and capital allocation activity, employing a flexible, semiparametric,
discrete-response framework that improves on the existing applied literature.
I find little relationship between wealth and enterprise activity over the lower
50 percentiles of the wealth distribution, which provides initial evidence that
financing is not the key constraint to enterprise activity for less wealthy house-
holds.
Second, I study the relationship between positive income shocks (both ex-
pected and unexpected) and enterprise activity. If households are credit con-
strained then access to such cash flows should serve to alleviate the credit
constraints, generating correlation between income flows and entrepreneurial
choices and outcomes. Yet I find that such positive income shocks, even unex-
pected ones, show relatively little relationship to enterprise choices, and in any
case the noticeable effects are relatively concentrated amongst wealthier house-
holds. This again suggests that financing constraints are not the primary driver
of enterprise outcomes. I close Chapter 3 with some exploratory evidence on
other potential factors behind the variation in enterprise outcomes.
To move from arguing that financing constraints might not be the key driver
of entrepreneurial dynamics for most individuals and households, to convinc-
ingly arguing that EHC is the key explanation, I need to grapple with two key
challenges: difficulties in directly measuring EHC (particularly in the observa-
tional data I have available in the IFLS), and the fact that human capital accumu-
lation involves individual choices that introduce the potential for endogeneity
in occupational selection and mistaken inferences based on proximate factors.
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The remaining two chapters grapple with these challenges through two empir-
ical approaches. First, by exploiting a unique natural experiment that approx-
imates the ideal experiment one might wish to conduct to identify the effects
of EHC, and second through using dynamic panel and mathematical modeling
techniques to impose useful structure on the data in order to draw inferences.
In Chapter 4 of the dissertation I study entry and persistence in self-
employment amongst a cohort of individuals in Indonesia who enter during
the 1997-98 East Asian financial crisis. If we entertain the thought experiment
regarding what the ideal experiment would be to identify the effects of EHC, it
involves randomized assignment of EHC to individuals. While such an experi-
ment is clearly not feasible, perhaps the next best thing is to identify an exoge-
nous source of selection into self-employment, which effectively ”exogenously
assigns” EHC to individuals through forced learning-by-doing.
I argue that the 1997-98 East Asian crisis provides this kind of natural exper-
iment. In contrast to the effects of large, unexpected shocks in other countries,
the crisis in Indonesia seems to have largely pushed individuals closer to the
upper end of the wage distribution (i.e., those working in formal sector, higher-
skill jobs) into informal self-employment. This turns out to provide a unique
setting in which to test the predictions of a theory of EHC that allows for corre-
lation between ability in waged employment and self-employment, as individ-
uals who would otherwise not get exposure to self-employment are forced to do
so. The sub-population is of particular interest because it would tend to include
a greater proportion of individuals with higher entrepreneurial potential, who
might not otherwise obtain entrepreneurial experience due to relatively high
opportunity costs to initial experimentation with self-employment.
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In order to test the theory and distinguish it from alternatives, I carry out
analysis on two important outcomes for the new entrants. First, I study en-
trepreneurial persistence – the propensity of individuals who enter during the
crisis to remain in self-employment in the years after. A static perspective to-
ward entrepreneurship would predict that such individuals should re-integrate
into the workforce soon after the crisis ends, as their static human capital en-
dowment must be better suited to wage-sector employment, and all that is
needed is for sufficient demand to return in the formal wage-earning sector.
What I find is that self-employment is highly (and as I show with more rigor-
ous econometric methods, robustly) persistent amongst crisis-period entrants
– 78% remain in self-employment 10 years later, when the average observed
10-year persistence rate is 46%. While this finding is initially surprising, it is
less so in light of a theory of EHC accumulation. Under such a dynamic theory
the accumulation of a stock variable like EHC could change long-run occupa-
tional choice incentives. Furthermore, if we assume a concave learning curve,
the marginal choice effects would be strongest for individuals with little prior
experience.
In order to further distinguish the theory of EHC, I secondly study earnings
dynamics amongst the crisis-period entrants and again I find evidence that is
most consistent with the theory of EHC accumulation.
In Chapter 5 I build on evidence from both the preceding chapters and from
the emerging literature outside economics on the dynamics of entrepreneurial
learning to develop a dynamic microeconomic theory of entrepreneurial hu-
man capital accumulation through learning-by-doing. This theory can be seen
as building on theoretical work such as [Buera, 2009], extending the canonical
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dynamic model of occupational choice under credit constraints to include a dy-
namic theory of entrepreneurial human capital accumulation. I first develop the
formal dynamic programming model, with the key mechanism being the nature
of the learning process, in which the accumulation of EHC is an S-shaped func-
tion of a measure of the ”complexity” of the enterprise that an individual is
running. I show that this mechanism qualitatively predicts the stylized findings
in the data – low-ability, low-wealth households will operate simple enterprises
and hence get ”stuck” running simple enterprises, while higher-potential indi-
viduals get on a dynamic path of EHC accumulation that leads to intermittent
financing constraints.
I then carry out quantitative analysis of the model. I employ panel data
techniques on the full IFLS dataset to study the relationship between earnings
and various measures of entrepreneurial experience. After using various tech-
niques to check robustness, I confirm a stable and economically-significant pos-
itive earnings dynamic that is particularly strong among individuals running
relatively more complex enterprises and hence consistent with the theory.
Taken together, these dissertation chapters provide varied evidence for the
mechanisms behind entrepreneurial human capital accumulation, and demon-
strate their central importance in explaining entrepreneurial dynamics. These
chapters demonstrate important nuance in parsing out different cohorts of the
self-employed, with a large, relatively poor cohort of individuals having little
access to sources of entrepreneurial skill acquisition. This points to a ”poverty
trap” in entrepreneurial skill affecting much of the population.3 In constrast to
3To my knowledge this particular form of poverty trap mechanism is novel, though it is
related to important literature in the economics of development. A couple of seminal pa-
pers ([Banerjee & Newman, 1993], [Azariadis & Drazen, 1990]) generate poverty traps out of
factors external to the individual agent – individual credit constraints, and social externalities
in human capital, respectively. [Galor & Zeira, 1993] incorporates individual-level human cap-
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those facing a poverty trap, the relatively select group of higher-potential indi-
viduals have a greater tendency to be constrained by financing, yet still depend
crucially on the dynamics of entrepreneurial learning.
Such ideas are only beginning to receive serious attention in the broader
academic and policy communities, and they have fundamental implications for
policy design, particularly in developing countries. This is particularly true in
light of emerging evidence that draws into question the overall effectiveness
of microfinance as a policy intervention meant to overcome credit access con-
straints ([Banerjee et al., 2009], [Karlan & Zinman, 2010]). The research in this
dissertation suggests that (1) credit access might not be the most pressing con-
straint to enterprise entry and development for most potential entrepreneurs,
and (2) policies must be tailored to the constraints faced by particular groups,
with greater attention to the nature of the entrepreneurial development process.
Efforts to reduce and remove individual, external constraints on an ad hoc basis
have often been less effective than expected, and a strong potential explanation
is that the dynamics of entrepreneurial development are more important than
particular static constraints.
ital costs as part of the explanation, though external constraints are still needed to generate
traps, particularly in the long-run. The closest to the work in this dissertation is perhaps in
[Dasgupta & Ray, 1986], which formalizes nutritional traps, as deficiencies in internal abilities
perpetuate exactly because such deficiences make independent advancement more difficult.
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CHAPTER 2
THE INDONESIA FAMILY LIFE SURVEY: BACKGROUND, KEY
VARIABLES, AND BUSINESS ACTIVITY
2.1 Introduction
In this Chapter I provide an introduction to the main dataset that will be em-
ployed in the remaining chapters of this dissertation, the Indonesian Family Life
Survey (IFLS). The Chapter has four main objectives.
First, I provide background information and context for the dataset, dis-
cussing the data collection process and the reliability of the data. Secondly, I
describe the raw variables that are available in the IFLS, in particular in rela-
tion to the key issues in this thesis: enterprise activity and labor market em-
ployment activity, with particular interest in self-employment activity. I then
proceed to provide some descriptive information on the raw variables, includ-
ing summary statistics. Third, I go on to discuss the construction of variables
that will be used in later chapters of the thesis, in particular the measures of
wealth, self-employment experience and education that I construct. I then pro-
vide summary statistics on these constructed variables. Fourth, I provide some
preliminary descriptive analysis of self-employment and enterprise activity in
the IFLS. I compute variance-covariance matrices that summarize correlations
between the main variables in the dataset and I also provide some selected non-
parametric descriptive analysis of some of the key bivariate relationships.
In this Chapter I argue that the IFLS is ideally suited for the primary research
questions in the dissertation, which are focused on understanding the key fac-
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tors behind the emergence and growth of enterprises at the household level.
This suitability is due both to the quality of the data collected and the breadth
of information available on micro- and small-business activity. This Chapter ad-
ditionally contributes to our knowledge of household-level enterprise activity,
by presenting descriptive evidence from a large, representative sample from an
important developing country, Indonesia. While some of the findings in this
Chapter are consistent with earlier literature, they also frame the work in the
later chapters that supplements or even contradicts existing evidence in the lit-
erature.
2.2 Overview of the IFLS
The IFLS has been collected as a longitudinal household and community sur-
vey project in Indonesia. There have been data collection rounds in 1993-94,
1997 (with a minor round on 25% of the sample in 1998 in response to the East
Asian crisis), 2000-01 and 2007-08.1 Round-by-round statistics on sample size
are summarized in Table A.1. The original 1993 round of the survey (IFLS1) tar-
geted data collection on 7000 households, and obtained just over 7200. It was
designed to be representative of 83% of the Indonesian population, following a
cluster sampling method of selecting individual villages or regions of cities with
urban over-sampling, and then selecting households from population rosters.
1Various organizations have been involved in designing and collecting the IFLS: Lembaga
Demografi, University of Indonesia (IFLS1-IFLS2), RAND (IFLS1-IFLS4), UCLA (IFLS2), the
Population Research Center, University of Gadjah Mada (IFLS3), the center for Population and
Policy Studies of the University of Gadjah Mada (IFLS4) and Survey METRE (IFLS4).
There is an extensive list of funding bodies, including USAID, the WHO, the NIA, and the
UN; the complete list see: http://www.rand.org/labor/FLS/IFLS/teamfund.htm
For more details on survey design, see [Strauss et al., 2004], [Frankenberg & Thomas, 2000],
and [Frankenberg & Karoly, 1995].
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The survey has 313 initial locations in 13 of 27 provinces of the country. A map
of Indonesia, with the IFLS provinces indicated with a darker shade, is provided
in A.1. 2 It generally covers the wealthier provinces in the country, which serves
both to generate high population coverage (since the wealthier provinces have
higher population densities) and simplify the data collection process by operat-
ing in locations with better infrastructure. The survey covered and continues to
cover all of Java (the most populous island and economic center, which includes
the Special Capital City District of Jakarta), four provinces in Sumatra, part of
west Nusa Tenggara (including Bali) and the provinces of South Sulawesi and
South Kalimantan.3
Subsequent rounds have involved resampling the original households, and
then sampling split-offs from the original households where possible. Split-offs
might occur due to marriage, coming of age and moving out, or other family
breakup. Attrition has been relatively minor, at around 5% between rounds,4
which matches or improves upon the attrition rates in longitudinal surveys in
OECD countries, and reduces concerns about bias from non-random attrition.
The tracking effort has involved diligently following household splits outside of
the original sample provinces when possible. New households that do not root
in the original IFLS1 sample households are not incorporated into new rounds.
As of the 2000 round (IFLS3) the dataset covers just over 10,000 households, and
over 15,000 by the 2007-08 round (IFLS4).
2The public use version of the IFLS does not allow villages to be identified by name, in order
to protect respondent privacy. Province identifiers are provided for each village.
3There has been discussion of extending the geographical scope of the IFLS in a new data
round in 2012 or 2013, perhaps extending as far east as Papua.
4The exact attrition statistics are given in [Strauss et al., 2009]. In IFLS2 94.4% of IFLS1 house-
holds were re-contacted, while in IFLS3 the re-contact rate of IFLS dynasty households was
95.3%. In IFLS4 the re-contact rate of IFLS1 dynasty households was 93.6%, though the re-
contact rate on target households was 90.6% (i.e., some IFLS1 dynasty households led to more
than 1 sample household, of which all might not be successfully contacted). Overall 90.3% of
IFLS dynasty households appear in all four waves, or died along the way.
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Data are collected at the individual, household, and community level and
these three sources can be matched together. As noted, the original random-
ization occurs at the level of selecting villages or portions of cities within the
survey provinces. Community-level data are collected from key informants in
the village, and cover issues from infrastructure to social services like health and
educational institutions to key events in the location such as natural disasters.
The second level of randomization involves selecting households within
the locations. Once households are selected, they are invited to participate in
an extensive household survey. There are various portions of the survey, one
part of which pertains to the household itself (generally directed to the house-
hold head), and then sections directed toward adult members of the household,
women who have experienced pregnancy, and children under the age of 15. On
average about 3 people per household are individually interviewed. The sur-
veys are quite extensive and may take 1-2 days to complete at the household
level. The individual surveys contain rich information on a plethora of individ-
ual and household characteristics, including education, employment, income
and assets, migration, health, and individual and household shocks. Since the
full breadth of the survey is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I will focus
below on the sections that are relevant to the analysis in the subsequent chap-
ters.
Brief Historical Context
The IFLS has been collected during a period of economic change and political
upheaval in Indonesia. When the survey was first initiated, Indonesia had gone
through a period of relatively steady economic growth, with per capita income
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rising more than fifteenfold from the 1960s until the early 1990s. It appeared
that Indonesia was ready to join the group of middle-income countries. Then in
1997 a major currency crisis spread throughout south-east Asia, with Indonesia
arguably the worst-hit nation. GDP contracted 12-15% in 1998, a shock on the
order of the Great Depression in the United States. The formal financial system
was especially hard-hit, with many banks going insolvent.
In the years after the crisis Indonesia went through major political and eco-
nomic restructuring. President Suharto’s resignation in May, 1998 led to demo-
cratic elections and policy changes on a number of fronts, including industrial
policy and banking. A major decentralization of political powers first came into
force in 2003. The effects of this policy are still being studied, but there seem
to have been geographically variable outcomes in terms of local governance
effects, with effective leaders emerging in some regions and less desirable out-
comes in others.
In the most recent years Indonesia has returned to a path of steady economic
growth of approximately 6% per annum. Though it falls outside the scope of
the IFLS, the country seems to have weathered the 2008 Global Financial Crisis
relatively well, managing to avoid the massive negative shock experienced in
most countries. Observers have suggested that this success can be attributed to
the reforms introduced after the previous crisis.
The IFLS is ideally placed to provide rich micro-evidence on household out-
comes during a time of change. Such drastic economic and policy changes can
also be exploited as sources of variation of key variables of interest, and indeed
such an empirical approach will be pursued in subsequent chapters in this dis-
sertation.
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The Data Collection Process and Reliability of the Survey
The IFLS has been designed, collected and cross-checked at high international
standards, especially in comparison to many longitudinal developing-country
datasets of its time.5 The original Principal Investigator was Paul Gertler, cur-
rently Li Ka Shing Distinguished Professor of Economics at UC-Berkeley Haas
School of Business. A number of survey design experts at RAND Corporation
and Lembaga Demografi, University of Indonesia, contributed to the question-
naire design and implementation, along with fieldwork and data entry. There
has been a steady stream of papers that make use of the IFLS over the years.6
Preparation for an individual survey round takes 1-2 years. This involves
updating the content of the survey, field testing, arranging logistics, and hiring
and training the survey team. For the most recent rounds the fieldwork has been
based at SurveyMETRE in Yogyakarta. SurveyMETRE is a professional survey-
ing company that was formed by Indonesia-based experts who had been hired
as consultants on previous ILFS rounds. Surveyors are generally recent college
graduates from top universities (indeed, Yogyakarta is home to some of the top
universities in Indonesia). The potential surveyors are over-recruited, to allow
for culling down to select the best performers during the training process, and
to provide a pool of backup surveyors should problems arise with the chosen
team.
At the household level surveys are conducted by a pair of surveyors, typ-
ically with one team member leading the discussion, and the second team
5Much of the discussion in this section is based on a conversation with Bondan Sikoki, the
field director of many of the IFLS rounds and the Director of Survey METRE.
6For a full public listing, see: http://www.rand.org/labor/FLS/IFLS/papers.html. Looking
at just the most recent 5 years, for example, the page lists 7 working papers or publications from
2011, 16 from 2010, 20 from 2009, 12 from 2008, and 10 from 2007.
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member recording the data. A group of surveyor pairs is dispatched to each
province, with a head surveyor overseeing the survey efforts in the region. In
the most recent rounds the data collection process has been converted to an elec-
tronic format, with new field data immediately uploaded to a central data com-
pilation hub in Yogyakarta. This live process of data transmission allows ini-
tial data verification procedures to be carried out while the survey team is still
in the field, hence tremendously lowering the cost of re-collecting data when
anomalies arise. Individual respondent households are paid for their time for
participating in the survey. This has generally been an in-kind payment (e.g., a
clock); in the most recent round the value was approximately 40,000 Indonesia
rupiah per household (about $4 US).
The survey is generally carried out in the 313 target villages first. Then fur-
ther tracking is carried out within-province and even in provinces outside the
original scope of the IFLS. While this effort is very diligent, which is reflected
in the remarkably low attrition rate in the survey, there is inevitable attrition.
Attrition can still result from failure to locate households, mortality, and refusal
to respond to the survey.7
In spite of its reputation as a top-quality developing country panel dataset,
the IFLS does have its weaknesses. No matter how careful the survey, mea-
surement error is inevitable, especially in a survey that collects self-reported,
recall data that spans decades in some cases. One of the greatest strengths of
the IFLS, its comprehensiveness, can also be a weakness when it leads to re-
spondent fatigue and a greater chance of erroneous or inaccurate response.8 An
7Anecdotally I know that there was high respondent refusal amongst Chinese respondents
during IFLS4 in North Sumatra, where much government mistreatment has been occurring in
the years since decentralization.
8I have heard anecdotal reports to this effect, namely that some respondents can become
quite exhausted by the end of the interview sessions.
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additional great strength of the IFLS, the sample size, can also become a key
weakness, due the need for greater decentralization of the survey effort. This
means that individual survey teams operate with limited direct supervision,
leading to questions about overall effort and diligence.9 These issues are com-
mon to such survey projects and are probably less severe than elsewhere, yet
they are worth keeping in mind.
The IFLS and the Study of Enterprise Activity
There are a number of reasons why the IFLS is promising as a data source to
look at household-level enterprise activity, as opposed to other data sources that
one might consider. First, there is often a selection problem present in firm-level
data, with selection biased toward successful firms, and selection biased toward
formal-sector firms. This is often because firm-level datasets do not include
information on enterprises as of some minimum size cutoff point, for example
firms with less than 20 employees as is the case with the primary manufacturing
dataset available in Indonesia. In principle, the IFLS includes information on all
businesses started at the household level, regardless of survival trajectory.
Second, it is difficult or impossible to look at the entry process with firm-level
data, especially if one wants to have information on the individual entrepreneur
prior to entry. The IFLS allows for many connections to be drawn between in-
dividual and household characteristics and enterprise activity, including when
the business is not even in operation. These connections are particularly sharp
in the case of household enterprises, where there is almost always one primary
9I have heard anecdotal reports both about significant variation in surveyor effort, and a sig-
nificant incident in IFLS4 in which some data were falsified. Fortunately the latter incident also
became a proof of the survey’s verification safeguards, as the problematic data were identified,
removed and re-collected.
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individual in charge of the enterprise, so that inferences on individual charac-
teristics and choices can be clearly drawn out.
Third, the panel structure of the data allows for the inclusion of fixed effects
in panel regressions, to account for unobserved heterogeneity in location and
in time. Finally, the dataset is large enough (in the cross-sectional sense) that
the subset of individuals participating in non-farm enterprises is significant, as
summarized in Table A.2. There we see that a large number of enterprises are
reported in the dataset, with over 30% of households operating at least one en-
terprise in each survey round.10
One concern that might arise about the use of the IFLS is that the businesses
would be overly concentrated in a few locations, particularly Jakarta and other
major economic hubs. Unsurprisingly, such geographic concentration holds in
the case of large, formal-sector and public-sector enterprises. Table A.2 illus-
trates that in fact there is considerable geographic variation in the location of
the generally smaller, informal-sector enterprises in the IFLS, and they are rela-
tively evenly distributed across the IFLS provinces. This suggests that the eco-
nomic geography of informal sector enterprises is more fitting with the overall
population distribution, rather than showing high geographic clustering. Also
notable here is that capital levels are quite significant–in the year 2000 based on
purchasing power parity terms, $500 in Indonesia is equivalent to about $6000
in the US. In addition, the employment numbers (which sum the number of un-
paid, usually household workers, paid workers, and the entrepreneur) indicate
that the data allows for a significant look at enterprises beyond single-proprietor
microenterprises. An exciting feature of the IFLS is the opportunity to analyze
firms on either side of the margin between micro, subsistence enterprises and
10The largest number of enterprises attributed to any individual household is seven.
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firms which begin to provide wage employment demand.
At the same time, very few of the IFLS firms will be growth-oriented firms
that would continue to show substantial growth and move into the medium- or
large-firm segment of the firm-size distribution. For policy purposes, practically
by definition, growth-oriented firms are of particular interest for employment
demand.
An additional drawback of the IFLS is that it is difficult to estimate pro-
duction function models, for three reasons. First, the dataset does not contain
yield data, rather only revenue/profit data. Hence quantity of output is entan-
gled with the sale price of output. While the vast majority of the production
literature suffers from the same drawbacks, this is still worth noting. Second,
the main firm-level data are only collected within the four main survey-round
years, with the possibility that the key variables change substantially within the
intervening years (assuming the firm doesn’t exit). An annual survey would be
preferable in this sense. The third concern is the lack of detailed data on inputs.
This has two components. While the data on stock variables (capital, labor) is
quite good, the capital data is provided in monetary, rather than quantity, terms.
Also, there is relatively little information on flow inputs and inventories.
I look at the distribution of firms by industry in Figure A.2 in the Appendix.
Clearly the largest number of firms are in Restaurant and Food Sales, Non-Food
Sales, or Transport Services in 2000, with a roughly similar pattern seen in 2008.
While these activities have large numbers of enterprises, many of the other ac-
tivities claim dozens if not hundreds of members.
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2.3 Key Aspects of the Data Relevant to the Study of Occupa-
tional Choice and Microbusiness Activity
In this section I provide an in-depth review of the contents of the survey that are
most relevant to the analysis in the later chapters. I focus on two subsections of
the larger IFLS questionnaire: (1) household-level questionnaire on enterprises,
(2) individual-level questionnaire on labor market outcomes. A much broader
summary of the full range of variables available in the IFLS is summarized in
the Appendix B.
Summary of Non-Farm Enterprise Subsection of the IFLS
Information on non-farm enterprises is elicited at the household level. Hence
these data are collected from a primary respondent who is the household head
or an appropriate person 18 years of age or older who is able to answer the
questions. The questionnaire appears in Book II of the survey, section NT.11
The nature of the data collected on enterprises has changed over time, both
on the extensive and intensive margins. On the extensive margin, IFLS4 and
IFLS3 elicit information on all household enterprises, while IFLS2 and IFLS1
only elicit information on the ”primary enterprise.” This can be seen in Table
A.1, and it means censoring of observations in IFLS2 and IFLS1 that can affect
the analysis that can be conducted. On the intensive margin, the enterprise sur-
vey has incorporated more questions over time, and the precision of the data
collection has improved. For example, the more recent rounds have included
11Book II also includes a section for Farm Business (UT). I do not describe this section of the
survey since I do not employ it in my analysis.
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questions on topics such as business registration and permits. Regarding preci-
sion of data collection, the questionnaire makes of tree-based elicitation of val-
ues, to reduce non-response.12
The Content of the Questionnaire: Non-farm Enterprises The questionnaire
for non-farm enterprises can be summarized as follows:
Ownership and Operational Responsibility.
• Whether business is owned entirely by the household: yes/no.
• Percentage ownership share if answer to prior question is ’no’.
• Whom outside the household shares ownership of the business (if any),
and report of whom within the household shares ownership.
• Report of which household members are primarily responsible for run-
ning the business.
Business Type and Location.
• Type of business.
• Field of work of business (one of 17 categories).
• Whether the business operates outside of the home: yes/no.
Registration and Permits.
12For example, if the repondent is asked about the capital stock in their enterprise, they will
first be allowed to report a specific value. If they are unable, they are then given a choice of
reporting that the value falls above or below 20 million Rupiah. In the latter case they are
subsequently asked if the value is above or below 40 million Rupiah and in the former case they
are asked if it is above or below 10 million Rupiah. This approach reduces the missing data
problem by allowing for some information extraction.
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• Types of permits the enterprise applied for.
• Whether or not the permits were issued: yes/no.
• Time taken to obtain permits, and cost of obtaining permits.
Business Characteristics: Startup
• Start date, how many household members/unpaid workers at startup,
how many paid workers at startup, (total) startup capital, source of capital
(5 categories: household saving, family, other partners, loans from bank,
loans from others).
Business Characteristics: Shut-down
• Whether the business is still operating and, if not: household/unpaid
workers in month before shut-down, how many paid workers in month
before shut-down.
Business Characteristics: Current
• Number of household/unpaid workers during last four weeks, number of
paid workers in last four weeks.
• Assets: total value of all land, building, four-wheel motor vehicles, other
vehicles, other non-farm equipment connected to the enterprise.
Earnings and Sales
• Net profit generated in the last 12 months.
22
• Total revenue in last 12 months (including produce used for own con-
sumption).
• Total expenses spent by the household for the business in the last 12
months.
• Products from the business consumed by the household.
• Money out of the business used for the household.
• Amount of money left over from the business (money or saving).
• Total procurement of goods used in business in last 12 months.
• Total sales of the business in last 12 months.
• Total revenue of rents or shared profit of the goods used in the business in
the last 12 months.
Summary Statistics: Non-farm Enterprises Summary statistics on these vari-
ables are presented in Tables A.3 to A.5.13 The table is generated from values
available from IFLS4, which contains the largest number of variables and largest
sample size, 6186 firms. The tables outline three enterprise types: enterprises
with no employees (i.e., single proprietorship), enterprises only employing fam-
ily/unpaid employees, and enterprises employing waged employees. There are
2711, 2326, and 1149 enterprises in each of these categories, respectively. This
stratification provides a natural division of enterprise cohorts and allows us to
better understand the heterogeneity in the sample.
Ownership and Operational Responsibility.
13Some of the variables are omitted, either because they are discussed elsewhere in this Chap-
ter, or they are difficult to summarize in a table (e.g., because they are categorical variables with
a large number of categories).
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Perhaps not surprisingly, enterprise ownership is almost universally con-
centrated within the household for the smaller enterprises in the sample. Only
amongst enterprises that have paid employees do we observe a significant pro-
portion (10%) that share ownership with individuals outside the household. For
the 169 enterprises which have shared ownership, across all three enterprise
type cohorts the median ownership share is 50%. The average household own-
ership share is around 40%.14
Business Type and Location.
The majority of enterprises operate outside the home, with 80%, 70% and
80% for the single proprietorships, family/unpaid worker and paid worker cat-
egories, respectively.
Registration and Permits.
Overall, less than 10% of IFLS4 enterprises had ever applied for permits.
Unsurprisingly, this activity is again skewed toward larger enterprises, with
about 30% of paid employee-hiring enterprises applying for permits.
Of those that did apply for permits, the most common were: permit to
own/start business (151), commerce permit (150), other permit (113) and neigh-
borhood permit (29). All remaining permit combinations had less than 20 ob-
servations (most just one observation). It appears that firms that applied for
permits universally received them. This could suggest under-reporting of ap-
plication failure. The reported permit costs appear to be driven by some ex-
14Although it is not reported here, I have analyzed operational responsibility in other work.
I find that the vast majority of enterprises in IFLS4 and IFLS3 are operated either by the head
of household or their spouse (over 90% and over 70%, respectively). Next is the child or child-
in-law of the respondent, respondent’s parents, and parent’s-in-law. It is relatively rare to have
siblings, grandchildren or grandparents operating the enterprise.
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treme, outlier observations in the upper tail. The other quartiles show much
lower values, and generally rise across complexity in enterprise type. Without
correction for permit type the data should not be over-interpreted, but the ap-
plication costs seem significant relative to other firm size measures like capital
stock.
Business Characteristics: Startup
The data on startup size begins to suggest the tremendous density of very
small firms, most with no employees. Even if we focus only on firms that em-
ploy paid workers, at the 95th percentile of this conditional distribution a firm
only starts up with 9 total employees, including the entrepreneur. The distribu-
tion is highly leftward-skewed on size.
The data on capital stock is similar, with a highly leftward-skewed distri-
bution in all three firm type categories. It is notable that startup capital is
nearly identical across the distribution for the first two type categories: sin-
gle proprietorships and firms with family/unpaid employees. Yet firms with
family/unpaid employees have double the starting labor complement. This is
consistent with the business not being very capital intensive, with a production
function that doesn’t display significant synergy between capital and labor. The
businesses that hire paid employees, however, are much more capital intensive.
5% (more than 100 firms) have a capital stock greater than $6400 USD equiva-
lent.
A third interesting variable is the source of startup capital (which is unfor-
tunately only available in IFLS4). Frequency counts for these are as follows:
Household savings alone (2781), family alone (2134), both of these (181), loans
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from bank (165), and other owners/partners (112). All remaining individual
sources or combinations have less than 100 observations. Clearly, capital for
these enterprises primarily comes from own saving and family. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, the relative frequency of these sources does not greatly change if we
look only at firms with greater than 5 employees, or with greater than $1000
USD in assets. This is suggestive that household and family wealth and social
capital can be extremely important in overcoming credit-market imperfections.
Business Characteristics: Shutdown
In practice the data on characteristics of firms at shutdown are clearly not
fully reported. While the year-to-year attrition rate seems to be close to 50% in
some years, in IFLS4 (2008) we only have 151 reports on firm shutdown (we
would expect the number to be in the thousands). It is not clear what might be
causing this missing data problem; perhaps cultural norms against reporting on
failure, or perhaps in the case of informal enterprises respondents don’t think
about a formal shutdown procedure.
What we do observe is that self-reported shutdown is reported only amongst
enterprises starting with no employees. Perhaps surprisingly, the size distribu-
tion of such enterprises at shutdown appears to first-order stochastically dom-
inate that of the continuing firms. It is hard to tell why this might be the case
without further available information. One explanation, which is also consistent
with the overall low level of self-reporting on business shutdown, is that those
self-reporting shutdown are dominated by individuals who go into retirement.
Retirement might be a stage when a survey respondent would have a clearer
concept of deliberate shutdown, and such enterprises might tend to be slightly
larger if they are more mature and not unwillingly driven out of the market.
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Business Characteristics: Current
For the current state of enterprises we have data on labor employed and
capital stock. The distribution of labor employed looks similar to the levels at
startup for enterprises with no employees, and enterprises that only employ
household members. In terms of labor supply, on average these enterprises do
not show very much change in size. This could be indicative of a total lack of
constraints and uncertainty on the one hand – firms are able to start at their
optimal size and remain there. On the other hand, it could be indicative of
extreme constraints – firms start as large as they can, and are totally unable
to grow beyond that. The latter explanation seems slightly dubious given the
freedom that firms have to reinvest profits in the enterprise, but the descriptive
evidence is not conclusive.
A more vibrant story is painted by the distribution of capital stock. First,
within the current distribution of capital, we see a lot of variation by firm size.
The average firm with no employees currently has about 814 USD equivalent in
capital, while for firms with family/unpaid employees the value is 867 and for
firms with waged employees it is 5786. Looking at percentiles the distributions
for enterprises with no employees and those with only family/unpaid employ-
ees are not so different, though the latter appears to show moderate stochastic
dominance over the former. Consistent with the larger average capital stock, the
distribution of capital within the subset of enterprises with waged employees is
strongly first-order stochastically dominant of the other two distributions. The
95th percentile of capital stock in the two simpler enterprise categories would
not even be at the 75th percentile of the distribution for firms hiring waged em-
ployees.
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Another way to look at capital stocks is to compare the distribution of capital
at startup to current levels. Note that this comparison is not biased by selection
because only surviving firms report, though it does bunch up firms of various
ages. Quite consistently across the enterprise size categories we see that capital
tends to roughly double from startup levels. We again see a strong right-tail ef-
fect, with the largest changes quite dramatic – in some cases increases in capital
stock on the order of 500%.
These results are interesting on two levels. First, capital stocks seem to in-
crease quite a lot. Perhaps lack of access to financial capital is not such a con-
straint for these firms. Second, and contrastingly, it is puzzling that capital stock
quantities would change so much, while labor employment quantities would
change so little. This is consistent with the explanation that the marginal rev-
enue product of additional labor is low if the household has trouble incorporat-
ing additional labor that is outside the local social network (due to monitoring
and effort-inducement challenges). If the enterprise exhausts easily-available
labor on startup, it may be the case that increasing the capital intensity of the
existing workforce is the best way to improve returns.
Earnings and Sales
The data on earnings and sales is quite consistent with the data on capi-
tal stocks. Values for the two simpler enterprise types, single proprietorships
and those only with household/family workers, are quite similar in mean and
moments, though the values for household/family tend to slightly first-order
stochastically dominate the single proprietorships. Returns for enterprises hir-
ing outside wage workers are generally quite significantly larger, with an im-
pressive upper tail. We can also quickly see the pervasiveness of missing data
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problems for other variables – revenues, sales, expenses, etc. This massive at-
trition introduces potential bias that makes it very hard to look at these other
variables.
The data on usage of earnings (products consumed, returns used by house-
hold, returns left over) again follows similar patterns across the enterprise types.
What is notable, and perhaps surprising, is the number of 0 values for these
variables. Up to 50% or more households report 0 values for these variables,
which is interesting given that we might expect uniformly high integration of
the household with the enterprise. One potential explanation is that such obser-
vations are concentrated amongst enterprises producing services, or producing
goods that are not for direct household use.
Summary of Labor Activity Subsection of the IFLS
The section of the IFLS on labor market activity is quite extensive. It includes
information on job search activity, recent work activity, the primary and sec-
ondary employment of an individual (including recall data going back to the
previous IFLS round), and additional employment-related information such as
on retirement, pension and health insurance. Below I focus on the key variables
under labor market activity that are related to self-employment, which I make
use of in later chapters.
I will not provide summary statistics of these variables in the present chap-
ter, either because the useful summary statistics will come from aggregations
of these variables (as with enterprise experience) in a subsequent subsection, or
because these variables will be more usefully discussed and analyzed later in
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the thesis.
The Content of the Questionnaire: Labor Activity Relevant to Self-
Employment Primary and Secondary Job Details15
• Employer’s product, sector, number of employees (including a categorical
variable).
• Category of employment (includes self-employed with no employees, self-
employed with unpaid family worker/temporary worker, self-employed
with permanent worker).
• How much net profit did you gain last month, after taking out all your
business expenses? Followed by categorical variables if necessary (greater
or less than 1 million Rupiah per month, then greater or less than 10 mil-
lion, or greater or less than 500 thousand Rupiah).
• Approximately how much net profit did you gain last year, after taking out
all your business expenses? Followed by categorical variables if necessary
(greater or less than 12 million Rupiah per year, then greater or less than
80 million, or greater or less than 6 million Rupiah).
Recall Data on Primary and Secondary Occupation
• Recall data goes back year-by-year, always at least as far back as the year
of the most recent IFLS round.
15The same questions are asked for both the individual’s self-reported primary and secondary
occupations (where occupations are ranked according to where the respondent spends the most
time). In this thesis I focus on the primary occupation almost exclusively.
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• Includes a subset of the questions above, including employer details, oc-
cupation type (types of self-employment, or other).
Additional Employment Information
• Questions about the individual’s first job, including age, employer, infor-
mation on employer, hours worked, the occupational category, and ap-
proximate wage/salary.
2.4 Constructed Variables and Indices: Definition and Sum-
mary Statistics
In the subsequent chapters I will work with a number of constructed variables,
including measures of wealth, work experience, and education. In this section
I discuss the construction and definition of these variables, and how they are
computed from raw variables in the IFLS. I also discuss the construction of a
price deflator index variable that I construct in order to make panel variables
with values expressed in terms of prices comparable over time.
Household Wealth
I construct the measures of household wealth based on comprehensive set
of self-reported household asset values, including both enterprise wealth and
direct household assets, in Book 2 of the survey. The interview for Book 2 is con-
ducted with a representative member of the household, generally the household
head or the most responsible alternative household member. In the subsequent
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analysis I use household wealth as an aggregate variable, and also disaggre-
gate wealth slightly into liquid and illiquid asset holdings (i.e., total wealth =
liquid wealth + illiquid wealth). I generally use the lagged value of wealth in
regressions, in order to avoid simultaneity bias in regression analysis.
The assets contributing to each measure are as follows:
Liquid wealth. Household poultry, household vehicles, household appli-
ances, savings/certificate or deposit/stocks, receivables, jewelry, household
furniture and utensils, other household assets, business four-wheel motor ve-
hicles, business other vehicles, business other non-farm equipment.
Illiquid wealth. House and land occupied by household, other
house/building, non-farm land, business land, business building.
The measures are constructed by summing each of these values, and then
deflating them as appropriate with the price deflator used throughout the sur-
vey.
Self-employment Experience
As already noted, the IFLS provides detailed information on individual’s
occupations on a year-by-year basis. Most importantly, these measures distin-
guish three categories of self-employment: running an enterprise with no em-
ployees, running an enterprise with only family/temporary workers, or run-
ning an enterprise with waged employees. Hence I construct measures of self-
employment experience by summing across years of experience in each of these
three categories.16 For each IFLS survey round, an individual self-reports on
16While the IFLS distinguishes between experience in primary and secondary enterprises, I
exclusively construct measures based on primary occupations, due to the additional compli-
cations raised by incorporating secondary occupations (more incomplete records, the need to
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year-by-year occupational status at least as far back as the most recent previ-
ous round. Hence the experience measures can be constructed in a very direct
way for the years covered by survey rounds. Because the recall portion of the
survey inquires about whether a given occupation continued from year-to-year
(including running a particular enterprise), I further stratify the measures to
distinguish years of experience in running one’s current enterprise, and total
experience running previous enterprises.
To make this clearer, let me provide a simple example. Suppose Iwan ap-
pears in rounds 3 and 4 of the IFLS (in 2000 and 2008, respectively). Suppose he
enters the workforce in 1998, running a single proprietorship from 1998-2002,
then goes to work in a company for three years, then starts a new business in
2005, first alone, then with two paid workers as of 2007, which he continues to
run when the survey is collected in 2008. Then as of 2008, he would be recorded
as having six years of total single proprietorship experience, and two years of
experience running his current enterprise with paid employees.
The construction of the experience variables becomes more challenging in
cases in which individuals are not covered by the annual recall in survey
rounds. For years that exceed the coverage of the survey (in particular, years
preceding 1988, the earliest year as of which year-by-year occupational data are
available), there are two main sources of information. First, in IFLS1 (1993) there
was more useful recall data collected on work histories, at 5-year intervals. In-
dividuals are queried about their place of work on an annualized basis back to
1988, then at 5-year intervals for the preceding 20 years. Beyond that, each sur-
vey round contains information on an individual’s first place of employment,
which is particularly helpful in constructing total work histories for individu-
weight experience in primary and secondary occupations by hours spent, etc.).
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als who don’t appear in IFLS1. In order to back out experience values I look at
what the individual was doing at the beginning and end of a non-yearly recall
period, and assign the full period to one category or split the period between
two categories as appropriate.
So to summarize, I construct 6 variables for enterprise experience, stratify-
ing across current/total experience, and single proprietorship, enterprise with
family/temporary workers, and enterprise with paid (outside) workers:
1. Years of experience in running a current (active) single proprietorship.
2. Total years of experience in running single proprietorships.
3. Years of experience in running a current (active) enterprise with fam-
ily/temporary workers.
4. Total years of experience in running enterprise with family/temporary
workers.
5. Years of experience in running a current (active) enterprise with paid (out-
side) workers.
6. Total years of experience in running enterprise with paid (outside) work-
ers.
Education
The measures of education are constructed by summing total years of edu-
cation. The IFLS provides a detailed section on education in Book 3A, including
dummy variables for which level of education the individual reached (primary,
secondary, tertiary, etc.) and how many years were spent at each level. The ed-
ucation experience is further stratified by school types – private, public, special
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Islamic schools, etc. I make no corrections for quality or level and take no notice
of school type–my measures are purely sums of total years of education.
Price Index
I use a price index that deflates all of the nominal monetary prices (almost
always expressed in terms of Rupiah, the Indonesian national currency, in the
IFLS) to a comparable value across years. This is taken from national consumer
price indices that I obtained from International Monetary Fund statistical ex-
tracts, which use 2005 as the base year.
When currency conversions are made (into US dollar terms), I use the a con-
versation rate applicable to each survey round.
Summary Statistics: Constructed Variables
Summary statistics on selected constructed variables are contained in the Ap-
pendix.
Household Wealth
A graph depicting the log of wealth (in US dollars) is given in Figure A.3 in
the Appendix. The log transformation pulls the distribution into a fairly normal
shape, with a higher peak around the median of the distribution.
If we look at the raw numbers on wealth, broken down by liquid and illiq-
uid, we see that total wealth is dominated by illiquid wealth, covering about
80% of total wealth over most percentiles of the wealth distribution in the year
2000. Average wealth is 26.3 million Rupiah, or about 2630 USD at the time,
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with a standard deviation of about 103 million Rupiah. The median of the dis-
tribution is 6.22 million Rupiah (or about 620 USD) and the 95th percentile of
the distribution is almost 100 million Rupiah (or nearly 10,000 USD).
Liquid and illiquid wealth tend to have about a 20/80 division of these val-
ues, though there tend to be more zeroes at the lower end of the illiquid wealth
distribution, indicating households that aren’t in possession of assets catego-
rized as illiquid.
Self-employment Experience
The summary statistics on self-employment experience are presented in Ta-
ble A.6. The table aggregates year-by-year counts of individuals’ primary oc-
cupation over the full panel available in IFLS (1988-2008). Hence an individual
could be represented multiple times (at most, 20 times) in the counts. Here
the enterprise types follow the codes occasionally used elsewhere in the thesis
(1=no employees, 2=only family/unpaid employees, 3=waged employees).
In line with other evidence on enterprise activity in IFLS, the largest num-
ber of observations come from experience with enterprises with no employees
(over 17,000), with experience in enterprises with only family/unpaid employ-
ees close behind (over 14,000). Far fewer observations come from enterprises
with waged employees (over 600). It appears that individuals tend to acquire
longer experience profiles in the two simpler enterprise types compared to the
type employing waged employees, both in the mean (over 6 years to over 4
years) and looking at the percentiles. This is consistent with greater mobility for
individuals capable of running more complex enterprises, along with greater
turnover faced in that sector.
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What we also see in the lower three rows for each enterprise type is that there
is mobility between the various enterprise type categories. About 10% of indi-
viduals currently running enterprises with no employees have experience in the
other two enterprise categories, while the amount is about 20% for individuals
currently running enterprises with unpaid/family employees and about 25%
for individuals with waged employees. We also see that years of experience in
the other enterprise categories is not insignificant, either. This seems to suggest
the presence of a fair amount of ”serial entrepreneurship”, with an important
cohort of individuals acquiring enterprise experience across various enterprise
sizes and types.
Education
Descriptive evidence on education, stratified by individuals running enter-
prises in the three type categories, is included in Table A.7. The averages are
consistent with the idea that most informal-sector enterprises are run by indi-
viduals with low education levels. This is particularly true of enterprises that
don’t employ wage workers, with a little over 2 years of education on average.
The results are even starker if we look at the percentiles – over 75% of individ-
uals running the two simpler enterprise types have no education at all, with
the average level of education apparently driven by a relatively small subset
of individuals with a fair amount of education. Education levels seem slightly
higher amongst individuals running enterprises with waged employees, with
12 years of education falling at the 75th percentile of the distribution. The
evidence is consistent with [Porta & Shleifer, 2008] who show that most small,
informal-sector enterprises are run by individuals with low education levels.
They use that evidence to draw doubts on the potential of most informal-sector
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entrepreneurs to run relatively large, formal-sector enterprises.
2.5 Descriptive Analysis of Enterprise Activity in the IFLS
In this section I present further descriptive analysis of enterprise activity in the
IFLS. I begin with two large tables of correlations between the variables de-
scribed in previous section. I then proceed to provide some descriptive, non-
parametric evidence providing further nuanced evidence on the distribution
relationships between key variables for financial capital and human capital.
Tables of Correlations
Enterprise Variables I provide correlations between all of the main variables
on individual enterprises in Tables A.8 to A.11, with values drawn from 2008
and one from 2000, respectively. In the interest of brevity, I will focus the discus-
sion on Tables A.8 and A.9 exclusively. To be clear, the variables are all specific to
a given enterprise within a given household. Hence a single household may be
represented multiple times in the statistics, if it holds multiple enterprises. I will
generally focus the discussion on correlations of at least |0.1|, unless a weak cor-
relation is particularly notable. The exception is cases in which strong correla-
tions are trivial, primarily because one variable (e.g., number of family/unpaid
employees) is a component of another variable (e.g., total employees).
I proceed column-by-column, to ease exposition.
An enterprise being fully family-owned is interestingly negatively correlated
with the amount of family labor and the amount of land invested in the en-
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terprise, when we might expect the opposite. It is interesting that full family
ownership is weakly related to whether the enterprise runs outside the home
– we might expect a negative correlation between the two if having non-family
owners makes outside operation more likely.
The labor correlations if an enterprise operates outside the home are not sur-
prising: we would expect less family workers to be involved and more outside
wage workers in this case. Also unsurprising is that such enterprises have a
larger capital stock, primarily driven by buildings and vehicles. Interestingly,
rural enterprises and those outside Java are more likely to operate outside the
home. Perhaps this is because of lower population densities in rural areas and
outside Java, so the enterprise needs to go ”where the market is.”
Surprisingly, having a business permit is very weakly correlated with all of
the other enterprise variables. This is particularly surprising in regards to capi-
tal stock, which is if anything (very weakly) negatively correlated with having a
permit. While only about 5% of enterprises have permits overall, we would ex-
pect these to be the more significant enterprises, both because the law impinges
on enterprises with 10+ employees, and larger enterprises would be more sus-
ceptible to enforcement of permit regulations.
I next look at the three startup labor measures. It is notable that household
labor and wage labor at startup are weakly negatively correlated, indicating that
they are substitutes rather than complements. Unsurprisingly the startup val-
ues of labor are strongly positively correlated with current levels of the same.
While household/unpaid labor at startup is correlated with current net profit,
waged labor is highly positively correlated with current capital levels (0.42) and
net profit (0.44). Enterprises that startup with more waged workers are also
39
likely to show a strong increase in capital stock (0.21). While all of this evi-
dence is correlational, it is consistent with evidence in Chapter 3 of the the-
sis about much steeper earnings improvements seen amongst enterprises with
waged employees.
The amount of startup capital is unsurprisingly highly positively correlated
with a number of measures of business size and success, including current cap-
ital levels, number of employees, and current returns. Interestingly, there is a
fairly strong negative correlation between startup capital and the propensity to
show a change in capital since startup (-0.29). This may be indicative of het-
erogeneous credit constraints on enterprises, with some able to startup close to
the optimal capital level, while others are not able to do so (though they are
apparently able to subsequently converge to the optimal level).
The evidence on current labor employment is consistent with that for startup
labor. First, there is negative correlation within the labor categories – fam-
ily/unpaid labor appears to substitute for waged labor. Second, while current
family/unpaid labor is very weakly correlated with measures of capital stock
and returns, waged labor shows a strong correlation with a number of such
measures. Current waged labor is also fairly strongly correlated with a posi-
tive change in capital stock, indicating a complementary between the two, and
perhaps constraints preventing the optimal level of capital from being reached
initially.
The next six columns pertain to capital stock. Unsurprisingly capital stock
values tend to be positively correlated with each other, indicating complemen-
tarities, though there is tremendous variation in the level of correlation, some-
times as low as zero, sometimes close to 0.7. Interestingly quantity of capital
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is weakly correlated to the average return to capital, seemingly consistent with
CRS production technology. On the other hand, a number of capital stock mea-
sures are quite strongly positively correlated with average returns to labor, in-
dicating fairly strong complementarity between the two.
Finally, we have a number of returns measures and constructed measures.
Perhaps most surprising here is that average returns to capital show little re-
lationship to other variables, while average returns to labor are quite strongly
positively correlated with the returns measures. The remaining correlations are
relatively unsurprising, including the strong tendency (0.44) of Javanese enter-
prises to be urban.
Household Enterprise Activity I provide a table of correlations amongst
household and enterprise activity variables across Tables A.12 and A.13. Where
an individual is referred to (i.e., for demographic variables such as age, educa-
tion, etc.) it is always the household head who is recorded. I will generally focus
the discussion on correlations of at least |0.1|, unless a weak correlation is par-
ticularly notable. The exception is cases in which strong correlations are trivial,
primarily because one variable (e.g., number of family/unpaid employees) is a
component of another variable (e.g., total employees).
I proceed column-by-column, to ease exposition.
The first set of variables are choice variables summarizing various
enterprise-activity choices. First, we have a variable for whether a household
started up an enterprise (and did not own one previously). I ignore unsurpris-
ing correlations within these outcome variables themselves (amongst which we
naturally expect high correlation). The first interesting thing to note, although
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the correlation is rather weak, appears to be a story about suboptimal overcapi-
talization of enterprises amongst households new to enterprise activity: there
is a positive correlation (0.06) between first-ever enterprise startups and the
capital stock in the enterprise, but a negative correlation with current capital
stock. This story even persists, though more weakly, for households that had
prior experience. Quite interestingly, there is very little correlation of enter-
prise activity with lagged values of household wealth. We see that education of
household head is actually positively correlated with propensity to start an en-
terprise, which is somewhat surprising if we think that most enterprise startup
activity comes from subsistence self-employment. Of further interest is a neg-
ative correlation with measures of household labor supply (male and female).
This relationship persists, though at slightly weaker level, for households that
already owned an enterprise previously.
Next come measures capturing enterprise returns and capitalization. Un-
surprisingly, total net enterprise returns are quite strongly positively correlated
with measures of capital invested in the enterprise, lags of household wealth,
and education of the household head. Also unsurprising is the fairly strong
positive correlation of household wealth and the amount invested in the enter-
prise. This can be contrasted with the lack of correlation noted above between
entry and wealth – what these results suggest is that household wealth mat-
ters much more for the intensive margin (how much to invest in the enterprise)
than the extensive margin (whether to start an enterprise at all). It is interesting
to contrast this finding with the role of education of the household head, which
shows a notable positive correlation on both the intensive and extensive margin.
The next three columns summarize measures of household wealth, includ-
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ing an aggregated measure, and then a breakdown to liquid and illiquid capital.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, household wealth is positively correlated with house-
hold size and household head education.
The subsequent three columns summarize measures of household size. Most
of the correlations are trivial based on reasonable expectations for demograph-
ics, though it is interesting that urban households have significantly more fe-
male, adult household members. Also interesting is that household heads with
experience with more complex enterprises are likely to have more male adult
members. This is consistent with evidence from other settings in which it seems
that having more male household members allows enterprises to expand due to
having more available supervisory labor.
The subsequent four columns summarize characteristics of the household
head: age, education, gender and whether married. None of the correlations
seem particularly interesting, other than for demographic purposes. Finally, we
have four columns of measures of enterprise experience of the household head,
and then two final variables capturing urban location and Java location. Most
notable is that total years of experience is negatively correlated with experience
in each of the three enterprise categories. This is puzzling at first, but makes
sense in light of a simple adding-up condition: if individuals have many years
of experience in one particular enterprise type, all things equal they should have
fewer years of experience in another enterprise type. Hence the sample is likely
segmented between two types of individuals: ones with many years of experi-
ence in one enterprise type, and ones with many years of total overall experience
(spread across the types). The latter group, with lots of years of total experience,
will have years of accumulated experience likely to be negative correlated with
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experience in the other categories, which have individuals who are more spe-
cialized.
Non-parametric analysis
This section summarizes some descriptive results that are generated with bi-
variate non-parametric methods. The first set of figures focus on the relation-
ship between wealth and enterprise startup activity, while the second set focus
on the relationship between enterprise experience and the propensity to further
engage in enterprise activity. The graphs are generated using a non-parametric
Lowess17 tri-cube smoother, which overweights relatively close observations in
generating the value of the function.
Wealth and enterprise activity Graphs summarizing bivariate relationships
between (lagged) wealth and enterprise activity are presented in Figures A.4
and A.5. Figure A.4 presents the relationship between wealth and enterprise
startup amongst urban households in the IFLS, while Figure A.5 presents the
same for rural households. The three sub-figures in each figure look at different
subsets of households, corresponding to the lower 50, lower 75, and lower 99
percentiles of the wealth distribution.
These graphs capture the relationship between household wealth in 2000,
17Lowess stands for ”locally weighted scatterplot smoothing.” It involves fitting low-degree
polynomials to the observations near to a particular datapoint using weighted least squares
through a nearest neighbors algorithm.
The tri-cube smoother specifically uses the weighting function:
w (x) =
(
1 − |x|3
)3
I [|x| < 1] ,
where x captures the distance between the particular datapoint and another point in question.
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and the propensity to start enterprises in 2001-2008 (and have them survive
until 2008). Almost uniformly I find a relatively weak relationship between
wealth and the propensity to startup. If we look at households below the 50th
percentile of the wealth distribution, we see almost no relationship between
wealth and the propensity to startup, except perhaps at the very lower end. This
is surprising if we think that relatively poor households are most constrained by
financing in their ability to pursue enterprise activity. Looking up to the 75th
percentile, we do see somewhat of a positive relationship between wealth and
enterprise startup, though it is still weak. Looking all the way up to the 99th
percentile most of the graph appears flat again, and there is even a negative
relationship for rural households.
Human capital (experience and enterprise activity) Graphs summarizing bi-
variate relationships between human capital (measured in terms of experience,
as discussed above) and enterprise activity are presented in Figures A.6 and A.7.
Each Figure is broken into three sub-images. The first looks at the relationship
between entrepreneurial experience of the individual running the business and
propensity to start an enterprise for experience in enterprises with no employ-
ees, while the latter do the same in relation to experience with enterprises with
only family/unpaid employees and enterprises that employ wage workers.
While experience could be proxying for a number of things, including out-
comes orthogonal to human capital such as accumulated capital stock, the story
presented by these figures is consistent with a story about human capital accu-
mulation. The propensity to continue to engage in enterprise activity is quite
strongly increasing in experience, and this relationship is strongest for individ-
uals running enterprises that employ wage workers. According to the theories
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to be presented later, these are the individuals most likely to accumulate signif-
icant entrepreneurial experience. The individuals who are likely to be the most
mobile also show great persistence, as success appears to beget success. We will
look at this suggestive evidence more rigorously in later chapters.
2.6 Conclusion
In this Chapter I provide an overview of the Indonesia Family Life Survey, par-
ticularly in relation to enterprise and employment activity, which will receive
much more detailed attention as this thesis proceeds. I describe how the IFLS
is a rich source of information on individual and household-level enterprise ac-
tivity.
I also provide some initial, descriptive evidence on enterprise activity in the
IFLS. What we see is consistent with a few different theories: that many in-
formal sector enterprises are run by lowly-educated individuals, that the set of
growth-capable small enterprises is relatively small, that enterprises face impor-
tant constraints in their ability to startup and grow, and that the accumulation
of human capital specific to enterprise activity through experience (learning-by-
doing) may be an important factor in enterprise outcomes.
In the remainder of the thesis I develop these themes in much more detail.
In Chapter 3 I focus on the question of who really is constrained by financ-
ing, and who might be constrained by other factors. In Chapter 4 I focus on a
particular factor outside of financing, by developing and testing a theory of en-
trepreneurial human capital accumulation. In Chapter 5 I provide further tests
based on a fully dynamic version of the primary model.
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CHAPTER 3
CREDIT MISPLACED? TESTING FOR HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL FINANCIAL
CONSTRAINTS TO ENTERPRISE ACTIVITY
3.1 Introduction
Across developing countries roughly half of the workforce is primarily self-
employed. Since such enterprises account for such a large proportion of the
active labor force, their outcomes have welfare implications on a large scale. Yet
the vast majority of such enterprises are small, often with no employees, and fail
to grow. Hence there is tremendous interest in the factors that shape the forma-
tion and performance of such enterprises. A key focus of the academic literature
on this topic has looked at the role of financing (or lack thereof) as a stimulant or
a constraint to enterprise activity, particularly in light of the international spread
of microfinance as a means of alleviating financing constraints to small-scale en-
terprise activity. Recent, large-scale randomized trial studies have drawn into
question the effects of microfinance in stimulating small-scale enterprise activ-
ity ([Banerjee et al., 2009], [Karlan & Zinman, 2010]). In this paper I take a step
back from the microfinance-focused literature and present a number of tests of
financial constraints to small-scale, developing-country enterprise activity, em-
ploying an unusually rich household panel survey from Indonesia. I delve into
the heterogeneity across the self-employment distribution, testing the hypothe-
sis that most low-wealth households are not primarily financing-constrained in
their enterprise activities.
Financing constraints are difficult to empirically identify in observational
data, because they involve both supply-side and demand-side factors that are
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difficult to disentangle.1 The supply of financing – whether by a bank, a non-
bank financial institution, an angel investor or one’s family or friends – de-
pends on the potential lender’s opportunity cost of capital and belief in the
promise of the potential borrower’s project and chance of repayment. On the
other hand, the demand for financing depends on the potential borrower’s own
beliefs about project quality, aspects of the borrowing contract such as pricing,
timing, and collateral conditions (which raise the prospect of risk rationing),
and the opportunity cost of capital to the owner. Because of these concerns, I do
not look directly at financing flows coming from lending-and-borrowing activ-
ity. Rather, I study financial transfers of which the timing is exogenous to the
recipient household.
The empirical tests are derived from an extended version of the standard
model of financing-constrained occupational choice.2 This standard model in-
volves looks at the choice between waged employment and self-employment
of an individual with fixed values of wealth and entrepreneurial ability, and a
fixed value of access to outside financing. I extend the model to allow for two
types of potential entrepreneurs – a low-ability type and a high-ability type. I
motivate this with evidence from my primary dataset and other studies, which
point to significant heterogeneity among the self-employed. It has been sug-
gested (e.g., [Schoar, 2010]) that the set of self-employed might be best charac-
terized as a mixture of ”subsistence” and ”opportunity-oriented” individuals.
The subsistence (low-ability) types have low opportunity costs to entering self-
employment, and would probably be pulled into wage work by greater oppor-
tunities in that activity. The high-ability (opportunity) types start a business to
1[Karlan & Zinman, 2009] provide an innovative approach to disentangling some of these
factors in the context of consumer lending.
2A full exposition is given in [Evans & Jovanovic, 1989].
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pursue a genuine entrepreneurial opportunity, and may have a relatively high
opportunity cost to doing so. The main result in the model is to show that
the high-ability types may actually be relatively more constrained by financing,
even though they are likely to be wealthier and more able to self-finance. While
perhaps not profound, this result contrasts sharply with results derived from
this model in existing literature.
I then examine the possibility that wealthier households are relatively more
financing-constrained, and other predictions of the theoretical model, on a
large-scale household panel dataset that has been collected over 15 years in In-
donesia. I study two types of outcomes: decisions to startup enterprises and run
enterprises (extensive margin), and the capital invested in the enterprise (inten-
sive margin). The latter outcome is particularly notable; while many datasets
have information on occupation and hence allow for the study of extensive mar-
gin effects, far fewer match individual variables to enterprise variables, and in
particular capital investment in the enterprise, allowing for the study of inten-
sive margin effects. For example, [Bianchi & Bobba, 2010] study the effect of
plausibly exogenous financing shocks due to the Mexican Opportunidades pro-
gram on enterprise formation, but cannot analyze capital investments. Hence it
is not clear if enterprises are formed due to financing constraints or as a more-
desired occupation to be enjoyed while excess funds are available.
I study the First, I study the relationship between assets and wealth as stock
variables, and enterprise decisions. These stock variables provide a long-run
measure of the household’s financing base, which can be thought of as a rela-
tively broad measure of liquidity. Such resources might be directly employed in
financing an investment, or used as collateral to obtain additional financing. If
49
financing matters for enterprise outcomes, then we would expect a high corre-
lation between such wealth measures and enterprise activities.
In order to deal with simultaneity concerns between enterprise activity on
the one hand and measurement of wealth and assets on the other, I employ
lagged values of asset and wealth variables, as in other studies using similar
methods (e.g., [Paulson & Townsend, 2004], [Hurst & Lusardi, 2004]). In order
to more flexibly study the relationship between wealth and enterprise activity
across the wealth distribution, I employ a novel semiparametric technique that
allows me to improve on previous tests in the literature by more flexibly esti-
mating the role of wealth in enterprise outcomes. The semiparametric approach
allows me to identify a clear non-linear effect–over the lower 60 percentiles of
the wealth distribution there is little relationship between lagged wealth and
future enterprise activity. As of about the 60th percentile wealth becomes a key
factor, and then tails off again at the upper tail of the wealth distribution.
Second, I study the relationship between income shocks and the same en-
terprise decisions. While assets provide a positive, long-term measure of a
household’s financial base, income provides a more direct measure of tempo-
ral shocks. This analysis takes on two strands. First, I study liquidity-based
tests that exploit data on income shocks that are potentially anticipated. These
include exogenous transfers such as conditional and unconditional cash trans-
fers, and other sources of government transfers. As I discuss in the context of
the theoretical model, if a household is unconstrained by financing then the tim-
ing of such transfers should not be related to enterprise decisions. On the other
hand, if there is a correlation between the two, then it suggests that households
are forced to depend on such financing sources in order to undertake enterprise
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activities.
The second income-based test exploits plausibly-exogenous transfers
through sources such as bonus payouts, insurance payouts and lottery payouts.
Here the transfers are more clearly unanticipated. While the decision to engage
in activities that make such transfers accessible might certainly be correlated
with individual characteristics, since the receipt of such payouts is random we
expect that the timing of such receipts is exogenous, and hence provides a ran-
domized source of exogenous variation in financing. Again, what we expect is
that financing-constrained households would be responsive to such transfers.
An additional goal of the paper is to look at heterogeneity in the response
to income shocks, particularly on the wealth dimension. This is motivated by
papers such as [Banerjee et al., 2009] and [Karlan & Zinman, 2010], which find
that the effects of financing shocks on enterprise activity are smaller for poorer
households, even though returns to capital tend to be higher in firms run by
poorer households. Hence an additional goal of this paper is to provide evi-
dence across the wealth distribution and over time regarding the role of income
shocks. While the simplest version of a theory of financing constraints pre-
dicts that wealthier households should be less responsive to wealth transfers,
all things equal, there is actually suggestive evidence that this prediction does
not hold – that in fact wealthier households are sometimes more responsive.
The analysis in this paper is related to a large, emerging literature on fi-
nancing constraints and household enterprise activity in developing coun-
tries. [de Mel et al., 2008] find 55-63% annualized returns by providing random
shocks of $100-200 USD in cash or in kind to microenterprises in Sri Lanka, with
the sample limited to firms with no paid employees and a maximum capital
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stock of $1000 USD. [Udry & Anagol, 2006] calculate returns on investment in
pineapple production in Ghana, finding mean returns as high as 250% per an-
num, on plots of a fraction of a hectare. The observation that some enterprises
appear to have high returns to physical capital and yet many fail to grow has
been interpreted by a number of papers as evidence for financial constraints
(e.g., the review [Banerjee & Duflo, 2010]). In theory, enterprises should equal-
ize the marginal cost of capital with its marginal return, which implies that if
the smallest firms have the highest marginal returns they should be the most
responsive to positive financing shocks. Hence these seminal papers and others
have been interpreted to indicate that there are significant financial constraints
to developing country enterprise activity.
Yet, clearly, high marginal returns do not necessarily imply financial con-
straints – it may be that unmeasured human capital constitutes an addi-
tional, valuable stock of capital in the enterprise, for example ([Naude, 2008],
[Udry & Anagol, 2006]).3 Also, access to capital in itself might be symptomatic
of insufficient human capital. Indeed, [Ikhwan & Johnson, 2009] present evi-
dence showing that potential entrepreneurs in Indonesia significantly under-
estimate their access to financial capital (as verified by assessments from bank
loan officers).4 While lack of access to capital from formal financial institutions
might be evidence for financing constraints, it is also consistent with an efficient
financial market that selects reasonably well on ability for many self-employed
([McLeod, 1980]), at least in expectation ([Ghatak et al., 2007]).
Others have argued that finding high returns to capital might be due to
the fact that exogenous assignment of financing can act as a guide to sub-
3[Udry & Anagol, 2006] acknowledge that “(t)hese returns are not adjusted for risk. . . [and]
it is not possible to distinguish the returns to entrepreneurship from those to capital”.
4See also [Astebro & Bernhardt, 2005].
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jects on how to allocate investment, overinflating the estimated treatment effect
([Bruhn et al., 2010]). Even in the US or other developed economies with appar-
ently more efficient credit markets, the majority of micro and small enterprises
are self-funded or are initially unable to raise capital from formal financial in-
stitutions. There is also little evidence on the dynamics of micro and small en-
terprise returns – it may be that returns are quite volatile over time and while
some enterprises could have high average returns today, this could be quite dif-
ferent later. It is an open question why, if the finding that average returns are
well above the market interest rate truly represents a financing distortion, why
the self-employed do not leverage such high returns to own-save and increase
the stock of enterprise capital.
Hence it is still an open question to what extent financing constraints are ac-
tually binding. This Chapter contributes to the literature by providing evidence
on financing constraints generated from natural exogenous variation available
in observational data. It exploits a dataset of unique scope and timespan rel-
ative to existing studies, which allows a more nuanced picture to be derived
about financing constraints across the wealth distribution. It provides a theoret-
ical rationale for the possibility that less wealth households might actually be
less constrained by access to finance, and provides empirical evidence in sup-
port of this hypothesis from a number of approaches.
The paper proceeds as follows. I begin by presenting descriptive evidence
on entrepreneurial heterogeneity in Section 3.2. This motivates a simple model
of financing-constrained occupational choice that highlights the occupational
choice effects of wealth and asset stocks on the one hand, and windfall income
flows on the other, in Section 3.3. I then further discuss the data in Section 3.4.
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In Section 3.5 I present wealth and asset-based tests of financing constraints,
while in Section 3.6 I present income shock-based tests. In light of the results in
Sections 3.5 and 3.6, in Section 3.7 I present some additional evidence on the fac-
tors behind entrepreneurial choice going beyond financial constraints. Section
3.8 concludes, while tables, figures and additional derivations are presented in
Appendix B.
3.2 Descriptive Evidence: Wealth, Income and Enterprise
Choices
In this section I provide descriptive evidence about the nature of heterogeneity
in enterprise activity. This evidence is strongly suggestive of the hypotheses that
I study in more rigorous empirical frameworks later in the Chapter; namely, that
it is important to distinguish subsistence and opportunity-oriented enterprise
owners, and financing is not the primary constraint to enterprise activity for
most households.
The evidence is based on the primary dataset that I will make use of for
the later analysis in the paper, which is a large-scale household survey dataset
from Indonesia that I described in Chapter 2 and which I will describe further in
Section 3.4. First, I compare the earnings distributions for wage employed and
self-employed individuals, showing that the wage earnings distribution first-
order stochastically dominates the net profit distribution for self-employment
over about the lower 90 percentiles of their supports. This finding is particu-
larly puzzling since we might expect a compensating differential in earnings
from self-employment due to its additional risks. Second, I provide descrip-
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tive evidence on capital holdings and average capital holdings, again providing
evidence for significant heterogeneity.
3.2.1 Opportunity and subsistence self-employment
I provide evidence that there is significant heterogeneity amongst micro and
small enterprise owners. In particular, I argue for the distinction between
”subsistence” and ”opportunity-oriented” enterprise owners, to distinguish be-
tween those who have few alternative opportunities and hence are in some
sense ”forced” into self-employment, versus those who enter to pursue a mean-
ingful business opportunity.
First, in Tables A.3 to A.5, we see that most enterprises operate with negligi-
ble capital stock, with a relatively small proportion of enterprises operating with
considerable capital stock. More than 75% of microenterprises operate without
any significant business assets at all – they report zero holdings of land, build-
ings, machines and vehicles, usually just reporting small stocks of equipment
or other working capital. Similar patterns hold for other aspects of enterprises,
such as labor, employment, returns, etc. – there is dramatic skewness in the
distribution. This provides simple evidence for important heterogeneity in the
(realized) distribution of self-employed individuals and households.
I provide additional evidence for the subsistence-opportunity distinction
through studying the wage premium. Similar to studies from more developed
countries, I find that the wage employed have a significant earnings premium
over the self-employed over most of both earnings distributions. This can be
seen in Table B.1, which summarizes the value of earnings at a number of per-
55
centiles of each earnings distribution, focusing exclusively on individuals who
report the earnings corresponding to their self-reported primary occupation,
Up to the 90th percentile the Wage earnings distribution first order stochas-
tically dominates the Net profit distribution. At the 90th percentile the two dis-
tribution functions cross, at $162 USD per month. Above the 90th percentile the
earnings distribution from enterprise activity quite dramatically exceeds that
from Wage employment, nearly doubling in value as of the 99th percentile.
Similar evidence from more developed economies has been interpreted as
a puzzle in the existing literature, because we would in general expect to see
that the differential should go the other way ([Hurst & Lusardi, 2004]). Self-
employed individuals should be compensated for presumably taking on greater
risk, and hence over most if not all of the earnings distribution there should be
an earnings premium for the self-employed. Hence such evidence has been
used to motivate the idea that entrepreneurs have very strong preferences for
non-tangible entrepreneurial benefits, such as independence, or behavioral bi-
ases, but I argue that in the developing country setting there is a more intu-
itive explanation. In a less developed economy there is generally a surplus of
labor, much of which gets allocated to subsistence enterprise activity. Hence
there are some individuals who are self-employed due to a low opportunity
cost to self-employment, while a relatively small subset of individuals enter self-
employment to pursue an opportunity, at a relatively high opportunity cost.
Such heterogeneity amongst the self-employed is supported by other, re-
cent empirical literature. [de Mel et al., 2010] find that 2/3 to 3/4 of microen-
trepreneurs (individuals running enterprises with few, if any, employees) from
a survey sample in Sri Lanka have personality traits much more like those of
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wage workers than of larger firm owners. [Porta & Shleifer, 2008] study new
cross-country data on smaller-scale entrepreneurship that has been collected by
the World Bank in its Enterprise Surveys. They argue that there is a signifi-
cant division between individuals who operate informal sector enterprises and
those who operate formal sector enterprises, and that there is little prospect for
the vast majority of informal-sector self-employed to ”move up” and run formal
sector enterprises.
While the evidence on earnings distributions provides one source of prelimi-
nary evidence, in the remaining two subsections I focus on heterogeneity within
the set of enterprise owners.
3.2.2 Heterogeneous earnings dynamics
In Figure B.1 I non-parametrically plot experience-earnings (net profit) pro-
files across these three qualitative enterprise categories, using a Lowess tri-cube
smoother. The first group is the set of enterprises running with no employees,
the second group is the set of enterprises only employing family/temporary
workers, while the third is the set of enterprises that hire workers who are paid
a wage.
There we see that all three groups enjoy an average increase in earnings over
time as the sample is not corrected for selection on survivors. While perhaps
remarkably all three enterprise types start off with roughly similar earnings, the
rate of increase in earnings is substantially higher for those running the enter-
prises we would expect to be most complex (those that actually hire outside
wage workers). This observed bifurcation in returns is suggestive of the select
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group of individuals running more complex enterprises ”pulling away” from
the much larger group of individuals running enterprises in the other two cat-
egories. This is consistent with greater dynamism and perhaps even greater
ambition among the set of more complex enterprises, along with other explana-
tions such as more rigorous market selection pressures on larger firms.
It is interesting to note that while there seems to be a strong bifurcation of
fortunes amongst enterprises, this seems to similarly be the case amongst indi-
viduals, in Table A.6. Looking at the year 2008, for example, we see that 17%
of individuals currently running enterprises with waged employees had run an
enterprise with no employees in the past, and 15% had run one with house-
hold/unpaid workers (non-exclusive). In fact, 10% had run both types of en-
terprises, indicating a substantial proportion who had followed an incremental
entrepreneurial career trajectory – starting off with one of the simpler enterprise
types and then ”moving up”. Yet at the same time, these figures show that the
majority of individuals who end up running enterprises hiring waged workers
immediately jump into that form of enterprise activity.
3.2.3 Heterogeneity in the returns to capital
In the IFLS it is difficult to rigorously measure the marginal returns to physical
capital. However, I can provide suggestive evidence if we take average returns
to capital (net profits divided by the value of the stock of physical capital in the
enterprise) to be a reasonable proxy for marginal returns. This is a reasonable
proxy assuming a constant returns to scale production function.5 If we look
just at micro-firms with three or fewer employees, we see that in the 2008 cross-
5Existing work on smaller firms in Indonesia suggests that assuming CRS is reasonable.
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section 41% of enterprises have average returns to capital exceeding 10%, the
national interest rate. 10% have greater than 60% returns, while 5% have greater
than 108% returns. More detailed evidence is provided in Tables A.3 to A.5.
The row for ’Unit returns to capital (%)’ stratifies the same information by firm
type for 2008 – firms with no employees, only family/unpaid employees, or
those that hire waged employees. We see that, interestingly, the unit returns to
capital in enterprises with no employees stochastically dominate the other two
distributions. Indeed this is also true of unit returns to labor. And such firms
seem to have greater proportionate increases in capital over their life cycle, at
least at the upper end.
Greater returns to capital than some cost-of-capital benchmark is a necessary,
but not sufficient, condition to imply that firms should invest more in capital. It
may be that capital is lumpy – either physical capital itself, or the endowments
that labor that complement the capital. While physical capital might be quite
decomposable, it may be that moving from zero to one employee, for example, is
quite drastic for a microfirm. Acquiring the complementary capital to the extra
work could be relatively quite a significant step. Hence it might be optimal for
firms to operate with relatively high marginal returns to capital. Another issue
is volatility – to confidently invest in new physical capital, a firm would ideally
have the sense that they will make profitable use of the capital year-by-year. If
not, a bad year could wipe them out, even if one average they are better off
with more capital. As noted in the Introduction, heterogeneity in returns to
capital may also be indicative of heterogeneity in other endowments that are
less observable. Finally, it may be that poor households simply have higher
opportunity costs – they would rather invest new infusions of capital in other
ways, such as in immediate consumption, or education, or health.
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All in all what the evidence from the IFLS shows us is that there is tremen-
dous variation in average returns to capital across micro and small firms. Even
for those which seem to have returns which might justify greater investment,
there may be completely natural market and internal frictions, and dynamic
returns processes, which justify the current level of capital. A key goal of the
current paper is to provide more evidence on the drivers of heterogeneity in
enterprise investment activity.
3.3 A Simple Model of Credit-Constrained Occupational
Choice
In the previous section I provided evidence that suggests the following hypoth-
esis about small-scale entrepreneurial activity: the distribution of self-employed
individuals can be broadly characterized by two ”types” – low-ability types
who are largely involuntarily self-employed, and higher-ability types who have
a significant opportunity cost to engaging in self-employment, yet still do so.
In this section I outline a model of credit-constrained occupational choice
with this main hypothesis in mind, and describe the relevant predictions in the
context of this paper. In particular, I focus on predictions related to the role
of household wealth in enterprise choices, and positive financial shocks for the
same. The subsequent analysis will provide evidence on these relationships in
the context of the IFLS.
60
3.3.1 Outline of the Model
The standard model of occupational selection involving entrepreneurship has
the individual choose between assigning a single unit of labor between one
of two discrete occupations, wage work or self-employment.6 The solution to
the individual’s occupational choice problem involves identifying the returns
to each occupation, and then by simple comparison identifying which occupa-
tion has a larger return. The return to waged employment is denoted by a wage
parameter, w.
A standard version of the value function, R, for self-employment is as fol-
lows:
R(W, θi) =
max
k
p f (k, θi) − (k −W) r
s.t. 0 ≤ k ≤ λ (W, θi)
. (3.1)
Here W represents the household’s ex ante wealth, θi represents ”en-
trepreneurial ability”, p is the output price, f is the production function (taking
physical capital, k, and θi as inputs), and r represents the market price of capi-
tal. The subscript i indicates that θi can take one of two values: i = H refers to
higher-ability types, and i = L refers to lower-ability types, with θH > θL > 0. I
assume that f is strictly increasing in both arguments, jointly concave, with the
standard Inada conditions. It is notable that, for simplicity, I abstract from labor
as an input. λ is a credit constraint which will be explained shortly.
I denote the level of k chosen to solve the above problem by k¯ (θi). The ob-
jective function allows for two classes of capital allocations: (1) setting k¯ less
6Such a model has made prior appearances in papers such as [Lucas, 1978], [Kanbur, 1979],
and [Evans & Jovanovic, 1989].
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than W, in which case the household entirely self-finances business capital, with
residual wealth (W − k¯ > 0) earning return r, and (2) having k¯ greater than W, in
which case the household must be borrowing capital (quantity k¯−W > 0) at rate
r. There is a potential limit on the household’s ability to access outside capital
beyond its own endowment W, which is expressed by the constraint k ≤ λ (W, θi).
Defining λ as a function is the one departure in the model above from the stan-
dard literature.7 The mathematical properties of λ are as follows: λ is increasing
in both arguments (strictly in W), λ (W, θi) ≥ W (one can always self-finance), and
λ is concave in both arguments. Specifying the constraint with these properties
suggests that the ability to access outside capital depends on these endowments,
perhaps through having greater collateral (W) and/or greater reputation (θi).
Having defined the payoffs, the occupational choice problem can be ex-
pressed simply as follows:
max {R(W, θi),w} . (3.2)
If one wants to incorporate the role of risk and risk preferences in the model,
it is possible to add a stochastic variable in the production function and define a
utility function over returns. I abstract from this extension since the crux of the
analysis in this paper is at the relationship between financing and occupational
decisions, and good data on production risk are not available.
7Oftentimes λ is a parameter on W, with corresponding constraint λW, as in, e.g.,
[Evans & Jovanovic, 1989].
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3.3.2 Solution of the Model
The model can be solved by backward induction. First, we derive the solution to
the self-employment returns maximization problem. The key choice variable is
k. If the (unconstrained) optimal value of k, k∗ (θi),8 is greater than λ (W, θi), then
we set k¯ (θi) = λ (W, θi), and say that the financing constraint is binding.9 The
implication is that the individual would select a larger capital stock to employ
in the enterprise, were that to be available. If the constraint doesn’t bind, then
k∗ (θi) = k¯ (θi). Having solved for the optimal value of k, the value of R(W, θi) is
then fixed. The occupational choice is then simply a matter of comparing R(W, θi)
to w.
3.3.3 Predictions
In order to derive empirical implications of the single-agent model above, we
need to consider the population distributions of the variables of interest. A key
aspect of these models that often goes undiscussed is the relationship between
W and θi. Often the relationship between these variables goes unaddressed,
though the more reasonable assumption is that W and θi are fairly strongly pos-
itively correlated – on average it should be the case that more talented individ-
8The mathematical characterization of k∗ (θi) is that
p f1 (k∗ (θi) , θi) = r.
9The mathematical characterization of this case is that
p f1 (λ (W, θi) , θi) > r.
Notice that this condition formalizes the classic testable implication of a credit constraints model
– that the marginal revenue product of capital is strictly greater than the marginal cost of capital.
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uals would tend to have higher wealth.10 This same reasoning applies to the
wage, w – we would expect higher-ability individuals to have greater wage-
earning opportunities, all things equal (i.e., each individual has some underly-
ing ”basic talent” that is applicable across both enterprise activity and working
for a wage). Hence I assume that W, w and θi are all positively correlated in the
discussion below.
Wealth shocks and enterprise activity
The first implication of the model pertains to the relationship between positive
wealth shocks and enterprise activity choices (decision to enter, decision to in-
vest, etc.). Here let us assume that we are considering a specific individual (with
fixed θi, w, W) and that the individual faces a (positive) financial shock. In this
case the implication is clear – all things equal, the positive shock should make
the individual more likely to start a business, or to expand a given business.
Hence if financing constraints bind, at least for some individuals, we should ex-
pect to observe a higher-than-usual positive response in terms of intensive and
extensive margin enterprise choices in response to a positive wealth shock like
the receipt of government transfers or lottery winnings.
Of course, there is some subtly here. First, transaction costs imply that in-
dividuals may not be long-run financing constrained, but they can appear to
be constrained in the short-run if the cost of obtaining capital on their own
is higher than the marginal value of the needed capital. Hence a sufficiently
10[Buera, 2009] provides microfoundations for the correlation between W and θ by adding an
infinite-horizon dynamic extension to the standard model, allowing households to save over
time (and hence own-save out of financial constraints). Under this dynamic extension the corre-
lation between W and θ comes from the fact that higher-ability entrepreneurial types will have
an incentive to own-save in the presence of financing constraints, hence building up asset re-
serves corresponding to their ability level.
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small response to positive financing shocks might be uncovering basic transac-
tion cost frictions. Second, it is important to think about whether a transfer is
anticipated or not. If anticipated, an individual may actually make a business
activity response in advance of the transfer – for example, perhaps the credible
promise of an external financial transfer allows them to borrow funds from a so-
cial network member or money lender. This anticipatory effect could dampen
the inferred role of credit constraints if we only look at enterprise response after
the shock has been observed.
The second implication of the model pertains to the distribution of the effects
of wealth shocks in the model – namely, for which individuals do we actually
expect financing constraints to bind? This is the most novel prediction of the
theoretical analysis.
It can be the case that high-ability households are relatively more respon-
sive to positive financial shocks in terms of fixed capital investment. That is,
formally, it can be the case that (dk (θH) /dW) /k (θH) > (dk (θL) /dW) /k (θL).
This Proposition is somewhat surprising: it essentially says that high-ability
individuals would be relatively more responsive to positive financial shocks,
even though (with wealth correlated with ability) we would expect them to be
less likely to be bound by financial constraints, all things equal.
The possibility that the case outlined in the Proposition holds depends on
how the returns function varies in k versus how tight or slack the financing
constraint condition, 0 ≤ k ≤ λ (W, θi), is. In the extreme, suppose that the financ-
ing constraint is only binding for the high-ability household. This is possible if
there is a relatively large gap between θH and θL, and λ is relatively invariant
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in θi.11 In that case, k (θL) will be much smaller than k (θH), so it is possible that
k (θL) < λ (W, θL) while k (θH) > λ (W, θH), even though λ (W, θH) > λ (W, θL). The
value of k (θL) does not depend on wealth–the optimal value of the capital stock
only depends on the parameters of the profit maximization problem. Hence
even if there is a (positive) shock to W (for example, an exogenous transfer like
from a government program), the low-ability self-employed individual may not
respond by increasing capital stock. Meanwhile, since the high-ability individ-
ual actually faces a financing constraint, s/he will be responsive to the positive
wealth shock.
Although other cases are possible this extreme example is sufficient to il-
lustrate the claim in the Proposition. It is then an empirical question whether
such relationships between wealth, wealth shocks and enterprise choices will
be borne out in the data.
Note that the Proposition can be easily extended to the extensive margin
question of occupational choice. The relevant of the simple, static model be-
comes a bit more tenuous in this case, though, because realistic predictions may
rely on additional assumptions about the lumpiness of capital and the nature
of the household’s savings problem. As already discussed, the financing con-
straint can be critical in determining occupational choice–if it binds, it may drive
down returns in self-employment, R(W, θi), to the point that R(W, θi) < w. If the
credit constraint binds, then it is possible for a wealth shock to change the value
of R, which hence makes it possible to flip the inequality so that R(W, θi) > w. If
the credit constraint is only binding for the higher-ability household, then we
11To be complete, the result also relies on W not being too much larger for the high type than
the low type (so self-financing isn’t sufficient), and w not being too much larger for the high
type than the low type (so the high type actually has an incentive to enter self-employment and
realize the demanded capital level).
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can immediately see how occupational choice might change.
In addition, however, are two considerations. First, higher-ability and
wealthier households might be more likely to invest in firms that involve
lumpier forms of capital, such as buildings and machines. Hence credit con-
straints may bind on them in different ways – as long as credit constraints don’t
allow them to invest at the level of minimal efficient scale then they may be
deterred from investing. This consideration is not reflected in the model, and
in any case not empirically testable with the data at hand. Second, wealthier
households may be able to follow the strategy of starting an enterprise today,
even if it is initially not very profitable, then plow profits back into the business
to converge upwards to minimum efficient scale. The household’s ability to do
this depends on the nature of its savings problem, which is again not reflected
in the model and not easily tested.
In practice I will carry out empirical tests that consider both versions of the
Proposition in constructing dependent variables (intensive and extensive mar-
gin), through binary and continuous-dependent-variable models. The consid-
erations I have just described should be borne in mind when interpreting the
results from the binary-choice, extensive margin analysis.
Wealth stocks and enterprise activity
While the above Proposition pertains to the relationship between financial
shocks (interpreted as shocks to the stock of wealth) and enterprise choice, the
model also has implications for the relationship between the stock of wealth
and enterprise choices. The key subtlety, however, arises from the role of w as
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a measure of opportunity cost. First, assume that w is homogenous across the
population. Then individuals’ decisions between wage and self-employment
depend on the returns to self-employment, which as we have seen depend on
whether or not the financing constraint binds. It is always the case that high
ability individuals have higher-returns from self-employment all things equal,
R(W, θH) > R(W, θL), since all key parameters of the model (θH, W, and λ) go
in the same direction. Then the question is how the returns compare to w.
We have three cases: (1) w > R(W, θH) > R(W, θL), so no one would enter self-
employment, (2) R(W, θH) ≥ w > R(W, θL), so only high-ability types would enter
self-employment, or (3) R(W, θH) > R(W, θL) > w, so everyone would enter self-
employment.
Incorporating the possibility that w varies by individual adds a layer of com-
plication and potential censoring. Namely, let us now revert to the original as-
sumption that w and θi are positively correlated, so wages for high-ability types
are higher than for low-ability types, and denote these wages by wH > wL. In
this case it can be that wH > R(W, θH) > R(W, θL) > wL. Namely, the individ-
uals who can obtain the highest returns from self-employment will not enter,
because their opportunity cost is even higher. Notice that this possibility does
not change the unambiguous latent positive relationship between wealth and
enterprise activity – it is just that w may act to obscure this relationship. This is
the extreme case of negative selection, and it has a number of implications.
First, revealed preference alone is not a sufficient justification to judge the
efficiency of the occupational choice configuration in any economy. Namely,
the observed self-employed may not at all be those who are most skilled in that
occupation. Second, the fact that there are many small, subsistence enterprises
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that do not grow may not be an indication of exogenous constraints – it may just
be that a negative selection mechanism is effectively forcing low-ability types
into self-employment. This has the additional direct implication that attempts
to remove posited external constraints may not be very effective. Indeed, recent
literature, mostly based on randomized-controlled trials (RCTs),12 has shown a
number of interventions, from credit to business registration, to be relatively in-
effective in changing the activities of apparently low-ability self-employed and
potential low-ability self-employed.
Hence, unfortunately, the relationship between wealth and enterprise activ-
ity is ambiguous, due to the possibility that w is correlated with W. It is not clear
that the propensity to start a business will be increasing in W, even if credit con-
straints do bind, if w is rising even faster and removing the incentive to switch
into enterprise activity. Hence if we hypothesize that low-income economies
are characterized by having large numbers of relatively low-ability individu-
als with weak employment prospects, we might expect to observe a large pool
of subsistence self-employed who show little responsiveness to wealth, while
a relatively small cohort of higher-ability individuals is more responsive to fi-
nancing shocks. The empirical analysis below will look into these empirical
relationships in more detail.
3.4 Data and Descriptive Evidence
In this section I provide a discussion of the dataset employed in the empirical
analysis, the Indonesia Family Life Survey, pertaining to the issues at hand in
12Papers include [Banerjee et al., 2009], and [Karlan & Zinman, 2010], [Carter & Olinto, 2003],
among others.
69
this chapter. A more comprehensive discussion of the dataset is provided in
Chapter 2.
3.4.1 Indonesia Family Life Survey: General Background,
Characteristics and Context
My primary dataset is the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS), a large-scale
household survey from Indonesia with data collection rounds in 1993-94, 1997,
2000 and 2007-08.13 For the intervening years between survey rounds, signifi-
cant retrospective data are collected in the subsequent round. The dataset was
designed to be representative of 83% of the Indonesian population in 1993.
It covered 13 of 26 existing provinces in 1993, generally higher-population
provinces in the western parts of the country, covering all of Java, most of Suma-
tra, and additional provinces in Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Bali. There was over-
sampling of urban locations and locations outside of Java, which is the country’s
main economic hub.
In the survey rounds data were collected at the individual, household, and
community levels, and these three sources can be matched together. At the
household level there is a wealth of information on issues such as consumption,
assets, and labor market outcomes, both at the household-level and for select
individuals within the household. The community and facilities survey collects
information on issues such as aspects of the physical and social environment,
infrastructure, employment opportunities, food prices, and access to health and
13Various organizations and researchers have been involved in designing, collecting
and funding the IFLS. For more details, see [Strauss et al., 2009], [Strauss et al., 2004],
[Frankenberg & Thomas, 2000], and [Frankenberg & Karoly, 1995].
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educational facilities.
The original round of the survey in 1993-94 (IFLS1) surveyed 7224 house-
holds. Subsequent rounds have involved re-sampling the original households
and then sampling all split-offs from the original households. Attrition has
been relatively low, especially for a survey of this scope, at around 5% between
rounds. Overall 87.6% of the original households appear in all four rounds. The
sample expands in each subsequent round, as splits from the original house-
holds are tracked and surveyed. In addition, the proportion of household mem-
bers directly interviewed also increases across rounds. By the 2007-08 round
(IFLS4) the survey covers 13,535 households, with 44,103 individual interviews.
The IFLS covers a period of tremendous economic dynamism and upheaval
in Indonesia. The decades preceding the 1990s were a time of significant demo-
graphic, social and economic change, under the regime of President Suharto.
Per capita income had grown significantly since the 1960s, and hence massive
improvements occurred on a number of dimensions of living standards. The
poverty headcount ratio declined from 40% in 1976 to 18% in 1996, and im-
provements of similar scope were seen on indicators such as infant mortality,
primary school enrollments, secondary school enrollments and fertility rates.
In the late 1990s Indonesia was caught in the grips of a major economic crisis,
which affected much of Asia. The crisis first began to hit the financial sector in
July 1997, but many of its effects on the real economy took until later in the year
or into 1998 to take effect. Indonesia was worst-hit of all the Asian countries,
experiencing a 13.5% decline of GDP and massive currency devaluation in 1998.
Under tremendous political and economic pressure, President Suharto stepped
down after 30 years in power in May of 1998. IFLS2 was fielded in 1997, just
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prior to the onset of the crisis. A 25% sub-sample (IFLS2+) was collected a year
later, and has been used to assess the early effects of the crisis; however, these
data are not publicly available.
What followed the crisis was a period of political and economic transition.
The authoritarian government of the Suharto era gave way to a new period of
democratic elections under a multi-party system. A number of economic and
political reforms were carried out, perhaps most significant among them a large
decentralization of powers to the regions, which took effect in 2002-03. As these
reforms came online and there was broader regional recovery, the economy be-
gan to grow quickly again, with GDP growth rates between 4.5% and 5.5% in
the years until 2007. Indeed, Indonesia was one of only three major economies
(China and India being the others) that experienced positive economic growth
(over 4%), during the global financial crisis of 2008-09. The most recent avail-
able round of the IFLS, IFLS4, was collected just prior to the onset of the crisis,
in 2007-08.
3.5 Assets, Wealth and Entrepreneurial Choice
In this section I carry out asset and wealth-based tests of financial, studying the
relationship between stock variables in the household’s financial portfolio and
intensive and extensive margin enterprise choices.
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3.5.1 Empirical Model
Theoretical Setup
The empirical model is based on regressing an enterprise decision variable, such
as the (binary) decision of a household to startup a business (extensive margin),
or the (continuous) amount to invest in startup capital (intensive margin), on a
measure of wealth and a vector of household characteristics. I allow the wealth
variable to enter the regression equations through a semiparametric estimation
approach that allows the relevant enterprise decision to be a fully-flexible, non-
linear function of the wealth variable.
My approach is motivated by recent papers that point to a highly non-linear
relationship between (lagged) household wealth and enterprise outcomes. One
set of papers uses non-parametric techniques to model the relationship between
wealth and enterprise outcomes (e.g., [Paulson & Townsend, 2004]). While
highly flexible, such approaches suffer from the well-known dimensionality
problems in non-parametric kernel approaches that importantly do not allow
for additional linear controls to enter the regressions. Hence such evidence is
highly descriptive and may suffer from significant omitted variable bias.
An additional set of papers uses flexible parametric models (usually a 4th
or 5th-order polynomial functional form) to model the relationship between
wealth and enterprise choices (e.g., [Hurst & Lusardi, 2004]). By working in a
more tractable parametric framework these empirical models allow for addi-
tional linear controls to enter the model. However, given the significant non-
linearities uncovered in this literature, we might still be concerned about over-
smoothing of non-linear effects given the imposition of a parametric specifica-
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tion.
The approach described in this section manages to combine the virtues of
each approach – the great flexibility of the non-parametric approach in cap-
turing the effects of the main explanatory variable(s), along with the ability to
tractably control for additional observable heterogeneity in a parametric frame-
work. The approach is built on a semi-parametric approach in which non-linear
effects can be incorporated tractably through linear combinations of flexible
parametric functions.
I will describe the modeling framework in the context of a binary choice
model, in particular focusing on how the semiparametric component is incor-
porated in the model. The outlined approach applies similarly to setups with a
continuous dependent variable, with the only difference being the familiar dif-
ference between a binary choice model and a linear model. Hence I omit the
development of the case of a continuous dependent variable, simply pointing
out the obvious adjustment to the model setup.
In the empirical model y is the latent (unobserved) variable representing the
discrete enterprise choice, taking the value 1 if the individual chooses the enter-
prise activity at hand, 0 otherwise. I drop the subscript i representing individ-
ual observations to simplify notation. y∗ represents the true threshold condition,
with the threshold normalized to 0. y∗ is assumed to be a function f ∗ (W, x)− ε of
wealth, W, and other observable covariates, x. The choice-based version of the
empirical binary choice model is then as follows,
y =

1 y∗ ≥ 0
0 o.w.
=

1 f ∗ (W, x) ≥ ε
0 o.w.
, (3.3)
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where ε represents the distribution of unobservable influences on choice, and
noise.
My objective is to estimate f ∗, given an assumed distribution on ε. I make
the following (linearizing) functional-form assumption on f ∗:
f ∗ (W, x) = g∗ (W) + β∗′x,
where g represents a (possibly highly nonlinear) function of wealth and β′x rep-
resents the contribution of other covariates in the usual (linear) parametric way.
We can also interpret this model in terms of the probability of choosing y = 1,
P
[
y = 1|W, x] = P [g∗ (W) + β∗′x ≥ ε|W, x] (3.4)
= F∗ε
[
g∗ (W) + β∗′x
]
.
For identification purposes, assume F∗ε is standard normal, which gives lo-
cation and scale, g∗ is real-valued continuous but unknown, and the full set of
covariates has full support. provides general identification results on this class
of models.
Estimation
The estimation procedure, allowing for the flexible estimation of g∗ (Wi), is car-
ried out using a semiparametric approach through the use of penalized splines.
The essence of the penalized spline approach is that in addition to the usual
regression optimization problem fitting a function of covariates to a response
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variable, it also constructs a penalty matrix, with a parameterization determin-
ing the weight of the penalty. Penalization accounts for the fact that such flexible
estimation is susceptible to the overfitting trap, and hence ”wigglyness” of g is
penalized. The estimation is carried out in the R statistical package, using the
’mgcv’ (generalized additive model) package developed by Simon N. Wood of
the University of Bath.
As one might expect, the results of such models cannot be fully presented
using the conventional regression table, since the estimands of interest are not
merely regression parameters. The conventional linear estimation coefficients
(β∗ above) can be presented in standard regression tables, with conventional
standard errors and attendant tests of statistical significance. The presentation
of the estimated function (g∗ above) is similar to a non-parametric approach –
graphical. We can display a graph of the estimated function over its domain,
and then report on certain properties of the function. The standard presentation
is an ”influence graph” – a function which plots the influence of variation in
the key right-hand side variable (here, Wi) on the outcome represented on the
y-axis.
Continuous Dependent Variable Case
The continuous variable case is very similar to the above, essentially just remov-
ing the complication of the model structure needed for a binary choice model.
The empirical model hence takes the form,
Yi = β′xi + g (Wi) + εi, (3.5)
76
in the case of a continuous left-hand-side variable like startup capital, where
Yi is a continuous outcome (e.g., startup capital, or current capital in the enter-
prise), g is an arbitrary function of wealth, Wi, β′xi represents additional linear
covariates, and ε is a normally-distributed error parameter.
3.5.2 Empirical Implementation
In practice I need to account for the concern that at least part of W can be simul-
taneously determined with the outcome variable. As in previous papers (e.g.,
[Paulson & Townsend, 2004]) I exploit the panel nature of the data to take the
lagged value of W as a proxy for current capital, which is clearly independent
of current decisions. The lagged value of wealth is the value of wealth in the
previous round of the survey. So, for example, in studying enterprise decisions
in IFLS4 (2007-08) I would be using wealth from IFLS3 (2000) on the right-hand
side. All values in the study are converted to 2005 dollars, so they are on a
common index.
In practice I measure W through a broad set of measures of household wealth
available in the IFLS, including the value of large assets such as land, buildings,
and automobiles, major household durables like appliances, and additional
forms of wealth such as jewelry and bank accounts. I also include business
wealth.14
14Specifically, I include all of the following variables in the measure of wealth, which I distin-
guish here by plausibly liquid and plausibly illiquid wealth variables:
Liquid wealth. Household poultry, household vehicles, household appliances, sav-
ings/certificate or deposit/stocks, receivables, jewelry, household furniture and utensils, other
household assets, business four-wheel motor vehicles, business other vehicles, business other
non-farm equipment.
Illiquid wealth. House and land occupied by household, other house/building, non-farm
land, business land, business building.
The measures are constructed by summing each of these values, and then deflating them as
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I also provide two measures of wealth: (1) wealth in levels (i.e., total wealth
of the household), and (2) wealth per head, with total wealth of the household
divided by adult equivalent units. The latter measure provides a useful correc-
tion that controls for heterogeneity induced simply by household size. It turns
out that this distinction is not so important empirically.
3.5.3 Results
All results appear in the Appendix. There are four sets of results: (1) the effects
of wealth (in levels) on enterprise startup, (2) the effects of wealth (in logs) on
enterprise startup, (3) the effects of wealth on startup capital, (4) the effects of
wealth on current capital (as of 2008). For each of these four sets of results I
present six graphs – three of which are from the results with wealth in levels,
and three from the results with wealth per head, giving the graphical represen-
tation of the result of the semiparametric fit. Since the results from wealth per
head are generally qualitatively consistent with those from wealth in levels, I
focus here on the results from wealth in levels. Error bands at two standard
deviations are also included. The corresponding tables for these sets of results
appear in Tables B.2 to B.9, which include the estimates for the parametric coef-
ficients, and information on the quality of fit.
First, I look at the relationship between wealth and enterprise activity in
terms of the propensity to start an enterprise, in Figures B.2 to B.5 and cor-
responding Tables B.2 to B.5. More specifically, I study the propensity of a
household to start a new enterprise between 2001 and 2008, conditional on their
wealth in 2000. This follows [Paulson & Townsend, 2004], who study the re-
appropriate with the price deflator used throughout the survey.
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lationship between wealth and enterprise activity through bivariate, nonpara-
metric analysis and multiple regression analysis.15 I find that the hypothesized
relationship, that the propensity to startup an enterprise should be monotoni-
cally increasing in wealth, does not seem to hold.
Over approximately the first 60 percentiles of the wealth distribution there
is almost no relationship between wealth and enterprise activity. This suggests
the poorest households, which we would expect to be most constrained by ac-
cess to finance, are not more likely to startup enterprises based on incremental
increases in wealth. One possible explanation is that starting any enterprise re-
quires significant, ”lumpy” investments, and so the non-response simply iden-
tifies the subset of households of such low wealth that they cannot afford the
minimal necessary fixed investment. However, given that the relationship be-
tween wealth and startup capital is similarly flat for poorer households, this
explanation requires strong assumptions about the ”lumpiness” of necessary
capital. Also, the majority of enterprises in the data operate with little formal
capital stock at all, suggesting that many enterprise forms are attainable with
little to no physical capital.
Interestingly, the relationship between wealth and enterprise startup
propensity is much stronger over the middle of the wealth distribution, while
again tapering off in the higher wealth percentiles, before the data become
sparse. The evidence above about the 60th wealth percentile is quite consistent
with the evidence from [Hurst & Lusardi, 2004], who find that financing does
not seem to be a significant hindrance to most enterprise startups in the US.
15[Paulson & Townsend, 2004] find some evidence that is supportive of the standard model
of credit-constrained occupational choice, though their dataset is dominated by firms with 0, 1
or 2 employees.
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Tables B.6 to B.9 move to continuous left-hand-side variables, with Tables B.6
to B.9 presenting the corresponding regression coefficients. In Figures B.6 and
B.7 we have the startup capital of the enterprise as the key dependent variable,
while in Figures B.8 and B.9 we have current capital in the enterprise. In all
cases we see little activity over the first 50 percentiles of the wealth distribution,
then see greater response at higher percentiles.
These findings are supported by recent evidence in the literature.
[Carter & Olinto, 2003] show that the enterprise investment response emanating
from a policy change meant to strengthen property rights (and hence the ability
of households to collateralize assets) is concentrated amongst wealthy house-
holds. [de Mel et al., 2008], [Banerjee et al., 2009], and [Karlan & Zinman, 2010]
present evidence on random financing shocks to microentrepreneurs and ran-
domized rollout of microfinance services, showing in part that the response is
concentrated among higher wealth households or those who are already en-
gaged in enterprise activity. This points to the idea that there must be something
more at work in driving enterprise behavior than just financing constraints.
The results on the estimates from the parametric terms in the models are
consistent with existing literature. Notably, the dummy for urban location is
has the largest economic significance on the propensity to startup, indicating
greater urban enterprise activity and perhaps churning, which is consistent with
more competitive markets. There is a concave relationship between age and
the propensity to startup, which is highly consistent with existing literature.
Notably, education bears a positive relationship to startup. The availability of
household labor (which also implies the need to find work for additional la-
bor) is unsurprisingly positively related to startup. Looking at the continuous
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dependent variables, we see that education of the household head and avail-
able male labor are the only two variables that significantly (positively) predict
startup capital. Education of the head and available labor are perhaps unsur-
prisingly related to current level of capital.
While the evidence that emerges from this analysis is interesting, it suffers
from the drawback that, in a dynamic sense, wealth and enterprise decisions are
still co-determined. [Buera, 2009] best highlights the omitted variable bias that
can result from studying the relationship between wealth and enterprise activ-
ity. Namely, in a dynamic model with savings, if financing constraints bind then
households with relatively large stocks of entrepreneurial skill have a relatively
larger incentives to ”save up” for enterprise investments (particularly if those
investments are generally ”lumpy”). But this implies that households with high
ability should (1) be more likely to engage in enterprise activity, and (2) be rel-
atively more wealthy, even before entering self-employment. If measures of
ability are omitted from the regression, we can draw the false impression that it
is wealth (and hence financing) alone that is driving entrepreneurial dynamics,
when in fact wealth is endogenous in this longer-term problem.
In order to partially deal with this issue, in the next section I move away
from stock-based measures of financing.
3.6 Income Shocks and Entrepreneurial Choice
In this section I present tests of financial constraints based on various income
flows. This includes flows that are plausibly anticipated or conditional on some
characteristics of the individual, including government transfers like uncondi-
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tional cash transfers and non-government wealth transfers. I also look at the
role of income shocks of a more random nature, such as bonuses, lottery win-
nings and insurance payouts.
The basic idea behind these tests is related to a large literature that attempts
to test for financing constraints using exogenous income shocks. The idea is
that if a household is financing-constrained in business activity, then a positive
income transfer should lead to an increased propensity to startup or invest in
a business. In a world in which all of the financing needed for the business is
freely available, we would not expect positive financial shocks to have an ef-
fect on the business, because using the financing on the business would not be
productive. The financing could be more efficiently used on household con-
sumption, for example.
I initially look at correlations between positive income shocks and enterprise
response across a variety of specifications. While overall significance of effect
and direction are merely indicative in this case, it is still helpful to look for signif-
icant effects and direction of effects. At this stage I find that some financial flows
seem to have effects on enterprise activity (unconditional cash transfers, and the
more random financial flows noted above like lottery winnings and bonuses)
and others don’t. I then drop my pursuit of the seemingly non-effectual flows,
and attempt to address the role of selection in drawing more rigorous inferences
from each of the two seemingly effectual flows.
The simple inference that ”if positive shocks lead to more investment, the
household is financing constrained, and if not, then not” is complicated by at
least two factors in observational data. The first is the role of anticipation. If a
positive financial shock is anticipated, then it might be possible for the house-
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hold to smooth income by contracting on the expected financial flow (e.g., bor-
rowing from a money lender or family member). This would bring the financing
effect forward, which would mute the observed effect of the financing trans-
fer itself. Hence the implication for inferences from shocks is that it should be
plausible that a transfer is unanticipated, or else financial markets should be
sufficiently imperfect that ex ante contracting is not fully available. However,
if a kind of transfer is plausibly anticipated, it is sufficient to show that there
is heterogeneity in effects, particularly if we find little effect at the low end of
the wealth distribution. This is because the poor would be most likely to face
distorted financial markets and hence greater difficulties in contracting on an-
ticipated financing.
The second complicating factor is the role of opportunity cost, particularly
heterogeneity in opportunity cost. Namely, it may be that in response to a fi-
nancial transfer a household does not invest in business activity, not because
the business could not plausibly make use of capital at market rates, but be-
cause some other need in the household carries even greater marginal return. It
could even be the case that wealthier households invest relatively more in en-
terprises even if they are relatively less financing constrained, because poorer
households have more pressing needs to initially attend to than the enterprise.
This issue is challenging, even in the context of randomly-assigned financ-
ing treatments. Any subsequent inference on treatment response that varies ac-
cording to an observable variable like wealth may be driven by heterogeneous
opportunity costs that are correlated with wealth. This means that the selection
of the study population can have important effects on results, even if enterprise
returns and costs of borrowing are roughly similar across settings. I attempt
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to control for this unobserved heterogeneity through identification approaches
that are well-suited to the financial flows that seem to be effectual. While this
cannot rule out heterogeneous response that is correlated with wealth, inferred
heterogeneity in treatment response can still indicate that certain households
have relatively higher opportunity costs and enterprise may not be the highest-
value investment. This has important implications for maximizing efficiency in
program targeting.
An additional potential complication may arise due to size of needed in-
vestment. Namely, it may be that a poor household would like to invest posi-
tive income shocks in the business, but the desired investment is lumpy and its
price exceeds the value of the transfer, making the desired purchase unattain-
able. While this possibility is present and difficult to rule out with certainty, it
does not seem totally plausible. In the data we see that lower-income house-
holds commonly run simple, subsistence enterprises with little fixed capital. It
seems unlikely that such enterprises, if financing constrained, would not be able
to identify incremental investments that increase productivity.
Hence the results in this section should be interpreted with these caveats.
Selection control strategies have the potential to account for the potential role of
unobserved heterogeneity in driving observed outcomes, increasing our confi-
dence in the results.
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3.6.1 Empirical model
I begin by providing correlational evidence on the potential role of positive in-
come shocks, employing binary-choice empirical models of the form
Yi = Φ (Xiβ + siγ) , (3.6)
and continuous models of the form
Yi = Xiβ + siγ + εi, (3.7)
where Yi represents the binary enterprise formation decision or the continuous
starting capital decision, Φ is the functional for a binary choice model (I employ
probit), X is a vector of controls, and β is a vector of estimands. si represents
a vector of (lagged) shocks to household income, while γ captures the effect of
the shock(s) on the household decision. In the analysis that appears herein si is
primarily coded as a dummy variable.
3.6.2 Empirical Implementation
Income Shocks
Here I summarize the kinds of income shocks, the key right-hand variables, con-
sidered in the analysis. First, note that I date the transfers around the cutoff year
of 2000. In general, transfers are classified as pre-2000, or ’07-’08, representing
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the years in which the transfers occurred. The categories of transfers are:16
• Gov. trans. = sundry transfers of money from the government, apart from
conditional cash transfers and unconditional cash transfers.
• Non-gov. trans. = an aggregation of transfers received from non-
government sources; most commonly family and friends.
• Uncond. cash trans. = unconditional cash transfers.
• Exog. trans. = the most plausibly randomized forms of wealth transfer –
lottery, bonus, and insurance payouts.
Further Issues
Sometimes I distinguish ”ent. 1” and ”ent. 2” – this captures whether the startup
decision pertains to the first enterprise owned by the household, or the second.
3.6.3 Correlational tests for credit constraints based on positive
income shocks
Results are reported in regression Tables B.10 to B.18. In Tables B.10 to B.14 I
employ binary models (probit), so I report both the coefficient and the marginal
effect. Tables B.15 to B.18 contain the results on the starting capital decision.
In the probit formation setup, I find that the relationship between (lagged)
16Conditional cash transfers are excluded from this part of the analysis as they are more dif-
ficult to code – they only began to appear post-2000 (i.e., 2003, 2005) and hence are entangled
with enterprise decisions made in the post-2000 period.
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sources of potentially expected income transfers and enterprise activity is gen-
erally negligible for government transfers and non-government transfers
The strongest noted effects on startup are obviously for unconditional cash
transfers. In Table B.10 the effect seems very large – roughly a 50% marginal
effect increase in propensity to startup an enterprise subsequent to an uncon-
ditional cash transfer. This is also confirmed in Tables B.11 and B.12, which
expands the set of transfer measures. Interestingly, the wealth interaction for
unconditional cash transfers seem to be negligible. However, it is also notable
in Tables B.11 and B.12 that future receipts of unconditional transfers (in 2007-
08) are also correlated with enterprise activity, and negatively.17 This finding
suggests two things. First, there is something special about the set of individu-
als who tend to receive unconditional cash transfers, even after other controls,
that leads them to serially obtain cash transfers and be active in business. Sec-
ond, given the negative coefficient on the 2007-08 transfers, if those trapped in
poverty are more likely to be cash transfer recipients in the future, then those
individuals seem to be significantly less likely to engage in enterprise activity.
Now I look at starting capital decisions in Tables B.15 to B.18. We first can see
that as in Table B.15 I break out the results by percentile and find that once inter-
acted with household wealth, there seems to be a positive effect of government
transfers on enterprise startup activity near the lower end of the wealth distribu-
tion, with this effect increasing in wealth. A less detectable effect also exists for
the (quadratic term in) non-government transfers in the same table. However,
the dominant effects are again for unconditional cash transfers. While there is no
effect in Table B.15 in the first-order term, there does seem to be a ”convex” effect
17The strategy of incorporating future lags into such regressions is analogous to Hurst and
Lusardi (2004).
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in wealth. This is interesting because it suggests a negative marginal propensity
to engage in self-employment for the poorest of the poor, but that this effect is
removed as we move up the wealth distribution. Effects in the other percentiles
are not statistically significant though this may be partly because individuals in
those wealth percentiles are less likely to receive the transfers. In Table B.17 we
see little effect of unconditional cash transfers, at least in the mean regressions
displayed in Table B.15.
3.6.4 Exogenous financial shocks
I exploit more plausibly exogenous sources of income shocks, such as lottery
winnings, insurance payouts, and bonus payouts. This use of exogenous shocks
is analogous to tests in the recent literature, which have looked at the effects of
exogenous transfers of financing through natural experiments or randomiza-
tion (e.g., [de Mel et al., 2008], [Banerjee & Duflo, 2010]). I do find evidence that
such income transfers seem to (positively) predict enterprise activity. However,
in addition I present evidence that the propensity to respond to such exogenous
wealth shocks is ”increasing” in wealth. That is, fitting with other literature
on exogenous transfers, it appears that the response in terms of setting up or
investing in enterprises is actually concentrated amongst higher-wealth house-
holds. A sample of this evidence is presented in Table B.10. I report the coef-
ficient estimates and marginal effects from interaction terms between (lagged)
wealth and the receipt of positive shocks, in probit enterprise startup regres-
sions. I look at the startup of both a household’s first and second enterprise.
For the first enterprise, I find that the positive relationship between wealth and
the enterprise activity only disappears beyond the 99th percentile of the wealth
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distribution, which directly opposes the prediction of the standard model of
financing-constrained enterprise activity. Interestingly, for the second enterprise
the expected negative relationship between wealth and startup returns, which
reinforces the idea that more experienced entrepreneurs are relatively more con-
strained by access to finance.
3.6.5 Selection and heterogeneity of effects
The preceding analysis provides suggestive evidence about the role of financing
in enterprise outcomes, by looking at correlations between the receipt of posi-
tive income shocks the timing of which is exogenous to the household, and
enterprise outcomes. The concern with drawing causal inferences from this
analysis is of course that treatment assignment is likely to be correlated with
observable and unobservable characteristics of the household. Based on the cor-
relational evidence, I will focus on two forms of transfers, which show strong
effects in correlation: unconditional cash transfers and what were called exoge-
nous transfers (lottery winnings, bonuses, insurance payouts). For each of these
two forms of transfers, I develop an identification strategy that is appropriate to
the selection processes that are likely at work.
Exogenous financial shocks
In the of transfers like lottery winnings, bonuses and insurance payouts, the
IFLS does not provide information on the full potential recipient population.
That is, we do not know which households enter lotteries, take out insurance,
or are in occupations where bonuses are available, just which households get
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such payouts. Given that the receipt of such transfers likely varies from year-to-
year, it is very likely that there are individuals in the sample who have potential
access to such transfers, but do not happen to receive payouts in a certain year
or set of years. Hence in attempting to construct a counterfactual to the group
of households that receive the transfers, I employ a propensity score matching
strategy which balances the characteristics of the treatment and control groups
on observable factors that seem likely to be related to selection into access into
these kinds of transfers.
Fortunately, the IFLS provides a rich set of observables on which to statis-
tically match subjects in the propensity score approach. The key identifying
assumption in the PSM approach in a causal framework is that conditional on
available balancing variables, it is as if the treatment is randomly assigned.
Since this assumption is not possible to test the credibility of a PSM exercise
will rely on the plausibility of the balancing variables chosen.
The variables I focus on are as follows. First, it seems very likely that selec-
tion into accessing ”exogenous transfers” is related to risk and time preferences.
Fortunately, the IFLS4 contains a number of questions on risk preferences and
time preferences (8 for each) based on hypothetical scenarios, and I balance on
each of the response variables within the household head.18 Second, I also bal-
ance on additional characteristics of the household head: age and years of edu-
cation. Finally, I balance on characteristics of the household: a dummy for urban
status and lagged wealth. In the stage in which I calculate the propensity score,
I require balancing to hold at the 0.01 level, and the listed control variables gen-
18An example of a risk question is the choice between an option of earning 800 thousand Rph.
per month for sure, versus a gamble between 1.6 million Rph. per month and 400 thousand
Rph. per month with equal probability on both outcomes. An example of a time question is for
the subject to suppose they have won the lottery and can choose between 1 million Rph. today
or 3 million Rph. in 1 year.
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erated balanced treatment and control groups for ”exogenous transfers” under
this criterion.
I use the stratification method to calculate the average treatment effect. The
program generates 7 blocks, with 8725 observations in total, with 95 treatment
and 8630 control. As noted, mean propensity score is not different for the treat-
ment and control groups in each block, at the 0.01 level.
The estimated ATT is 0.069. The standard errors need to be bootstrapped,
and this procedure yields a standard error on the estimated parameter of 0.044,
with a t-statistic of 1.578, indicating a statistically-significant, positive treatment
effect of ”exogenous transfers” on enterprise participation response.
However, the estimated effects are much smaller than the correlations indi-
cated in the preliminary analysis, where the marginal effect of receiving exoge-
nous transfers on enterprise participation was on the order of approximately
0.4. It appears that the selection correction has removed a significant amount
of the relationship between the receipt of exogenous transfers and enterprise re-
sponse. In tandem with the suggestive evidence that responsiveness to financial
transfers is increasing in wealth, it appears that much of the response is driven
by relatively wealthier households. These households would be more likely to
have the disposable income to participate in lotteries, purchase insurance, and
might be more likely to be in occupations in which bonuses are available. Ap-
parently it is this group that is driving much of the treatment response, in line
with emerging results in the literature on microfinance and microentrepreneur-
ship.
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Unconditional cash transfers (UCT)
In the case of unconditional cash transfers it is possible to control for treatment
assignment based on observables, at least in principle. The targeting of UCTs in
Indonesia was based on an objective index,19 with most if not all of the criteria
appearing in the IFLS survey. Of course the credibility of individual assignment
that can be explained by observables rests on the assumption that the program
was relatively well-targeted. It also rests on the assumption that lagged val-
ues of the targeting indicator variables (recorded in IFLS3 around 2001) provide
good measures for the indicators in 2005 and later, when the Indonesian gov-
ernment implemented a major cash transfer program. Conditional on these as-
sumptions holding, selection into the UCT treatment can be directly controlled
by observables. Indeed, regression analysis on selection indicates that the selec-
tion equation into receipt of the UCT has relatively high R-squared.
Results from the UCT approach are presented in Tables B.19 and ??, which
do not and then do control for selection into the UCT, respectively. There we see
that once program selection is controlled for there is no statistically-significant
effect of receipt of UCT on enterprise activity.
19There are 14. criteria for receiving cash transfers: size of house (square meters), flooring ma-
terial of house, material used for walls of house, sanitary facilities in house, source of drinking
water, source of main lighting, kind of fuel used for daily cooking, source of main lighting, how
many times a week the family buys meat/chicken/milk, how many times per day the family
eats, how much new clothes the family buys for a majority of household members per year, fi-
nancial ability to go to the clinic if sick, main job of the head of family, and possession of specific
assets worth over 500.000 rupiah (about $50 USD) – savings, gold, color TV, livestock.
The household is also asked about the name of the head of family, education level of the head
of family, number of family members, children aged 7-18, and females 10-49 in the household,
and whether they are married.
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3.7 Additional Factors in Entrepreneurial Selection and Choice
The existing analysis thus far is consistent with the hypothesis that lower-
income households aren’t primarily constrained by financing in their en-
trepreneurial activities. There seems to be little relationship between (lagged)
wealth and enterprise choices in the lower percentiles of the wealth distribution,
while exogenous income shocks seem to have more of an influence on higher-
income households. This then raises the obvious question: if heterogenous fi-
nancing constraints, impinging more severely on lower-income individuals, do
not explain observed enterprise patterns, then what else could it be?
In this section I provide some initial evidence in this direction, exploring a
number of potential factors. This starts to provide evidence that accounts for
the limitations of the empirical analysis that we can carry out on observational
data, by attempting to account for some potential key unobservables that are
available.
The first three factors are primarily lifestyle and context-based. First, I
look at the role of family, with the idea in mind that perhaps something
about entrepreneurship is passed between generations. Indeed, in much of the
developed-country literature on entrepreneurial selection, having a parent (par-
ticularly a father) who is an entrepreneur seems to be the strongest predictor of
entry into enterprise activity of the common measurables. Second, I look at the
role of gender. Perhaps it is the case that some of the micro-enterprises we ob-
serve are started by women just looking for a side-business to be run out of the
home, while watching children. Such businesses are severely limited in their
ability to grow and may not be meant to grow at all, due to the woman’s other
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time commitments and responsibilities. This hypothesis is consistent with find-
ings in the literature on microfinance activity, that when an impact of micro-
finance is observed, it is usually more concentrated amongst male borrowers
(see, e.g., [de Mel et al., 2008]). Third, I look at the relationship between non-
farm enterprise activity and farm-based enterprise activity. This is motivated
by the possibility that non-farm enterprise activity amongst agricultural house-
holds may just be a revenue-diversification activity, and not a primary focus for
income-generation.
The second set of factors look more internally at the individual, providing
attempts to measure unobserved preferences and human capital. The fourth
factor I consider is the role of ”behavioral” factors – risk and time preferences.
Note that the strength of the inferences that can be drawn from these variables
is limited by the fact that they are only collected in IFLS4 (2008). Fifth, I look at
the role of raw cognitive ability – this could be a significant source of variation
in entrepreneurial outcomes if raw cognitive ability is an important factor in en-
trepreneurial activity. Finally, I consider an alternative source of entrepreneurial
skill accumulation – direct experience. The idea is that learning-by-doing is crit-
ical to building entrepreneurial skill. Hence individuals with more experience,
especially in running more complex (which I proxy by size) enterprises should
be relatively more successful.
3.7.1 Familial Effects
I hypothesize that the familial channel is the primary institution for the transfer
of human capital specific to entrepreneurship (taking direct learning-by-doing
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to be about accumulation rather than transfer of human capital specific to en-
trepreneurship), particularly in the developing-country setting. If frictions in
the labor market create a hindrance to ”outsiders” working in family enter-
prises, children could be end up much more likely to work in the family en-
terprise. But if this is the case, then the child may be more likely to accu-
mulate valuable human capital specific to entrepreneurship. We see some ev-
idence for this in recent analysis using US data. [Dunn & Holtz-Eakin, 2000]
and [Fairlie & Robb, 2007b], [Fairlie & Robb, 2007a] look deeper into the strong
propensity of children of self-employed individuals to become self-employed
themselves. While having self-employed parents is perhaps the strongest pre-
dictor of a child’s self-employment propensity in the empirical analysis of en-
trepreneurship, such a correlation could be driven by at least two channels.
First, entrepreneurs tend to be wealthier and hence parents might help their
children overcome financial constraints (or directly transfer the enterprise it-
self). Second, there may be some kind of valuable non-monetary transfer be-
tween parents and children. The authors’ findings strongly favor the second
hypothesis. Direct transfer of the enterprise between parents and children is ac-
tually quite rare (less than 5% of children’s enterprises start this way). Overall
wealth of parents, or financial transfers from parents and children, do not seem
to predict enterprise activity or the success of the children in enterprise activity.
In addition, the success of parents in enterprise activity strongly predicts chil-
dren’s success, even after controlling for wealth. Also, whether or not the child
actually worked in the family enterprise while growing up predicts both greater
propensity for self-employment and later success. This empirical work provides
strong evidence that something valuable is transferred between entrepreneurial
parents and their children, though of course it is still not clear from this work
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what is being transferred, whether human capital, or perhaps genetic code.20
I present preliminary evidence related to familial effects in Appendix B. I
show that there is a significant increase in the propensity of children to be-
come self-employed based on having self-employed parents. I begin by pre-
senting a cross-tab that bins the observations of parents and children according
to whether or not parents have certain kinds of enterprise experience and the
subsequent outcomes of their children in Table B.21. The results are clearer in
the Table B.22, which collects probit regression results reporting the propensity
of children to be self-employed as a function of their parents’ self-employment
status. We see that the marginal effects are substantial relative to the baseline
self-employment propensity in the sample, which is about 10%. If one’s fa-
ther was most recently operating a single-proprietor enterprise, then one is 33%
more likely than the average to engage in self-employment. The comparable
effect is 60% for father’s status running an enterprise with household members
working in the enterprise. Though the effect for having parent self-employed in
an enterprise hiring in waged workers is not significant (probably due to sample
size concerns) we still say a large, marginal effect on the order of a 50% increase.
The mother effect is analogous. Perhaps surprisingly, the marginal effect on the
interaction of having both parents self-employed is negative. It is possible that
having both parents self-employed is correlated with other statistical patterns
(e.g., higher poverty) that would bias the coefficient. But even then the large
individual effects seem to overwhelm this larger, apparently negative overall
effect.
As an initial attempt at teasing out whether the ”parental transfer” is primar-
20There is emerging work on the role of genetics in entrepreneurship. For one of the first
published papers see [Nicolau et al., 2008]. This paper, based on twin data, finds that about half
of entrepreneurial propensity can be explained by genetic factors.
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ily financial or something else, I look at the subsequent earnings of children in
self-employment as a function of their parents’ self-employment status in Table
B.23. I find that children of fathers who run enterprises with wage workers earn
on average about $127 US equivalent per month more than those with parents
in other categories. Unfortunately, other coefficients are not statistically signifi-
cant.
These results provide preliminary evidence that parental skill matters both
for their children’s later propensity to be self-employed, and there performance
therein.
3.7.2 Gender
To consider the role of gender I first focus on households headed by men and
women, and only the primary enterprise run by the household. This removes
potential biases from comparing primary and secondary enterprises, and main-
tains the focus on the primary breadwinner. Across all measures I find that
female-run business are smaller and less prolific – they are less likely to operate
outside the home (68% for female-run to 83% for male-run), less likely to apply
for business permits (47% to 52%), startup with less household/temporary and
wage-workers (0.62 to 0.67 and 0.2 to 0.8, respectively) and startup with 30% the
level of physical capital stock, similarly have less current workers in both cate-
gories (0.59 to 0.68 and 0.27 to 1.08) and currently have less than half the capital
stock, and have 71% the amount of earnings. Along these same lines, we find
that if the primary enterprise is run by the male household head it is larger and
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more prolific on all expected measures21 than if it is run by another household
member, which is almost always the wife.
3.7.3 Risk and time preferences
To look at the role of risk and time preferences in enterprise outcomes I employ
the same risk and time measures that were employed earlier in this study. The
idea that risk and time preferences would matter for enterprise activity seems
intuitive. Running a business can be an incredibly risky and uncertain activity,
and so attitudes to risk may govern individuals’ willingness to participate or
what actions they take. I also expect time preferences to be relevant, since indi-
viduals’ patience might determine their willingness to stick with an idea or wait
for a business to grow.
These variables are based on the standard approaches for eliciting risk and
time preferences: subjective choices when faced with hypothetical gambles and
time receipt of money. The results come with a key caution: the risk and time
preference variables are only available in IFLS4. If we think that risk and time
preferences are stable over time then this is not a problem, but we might expect
that risk and time preferences vary over time, in ways correlated with actions
(including enterprise activity choices). In any case, it is interested to look at the
results in a descriptive sense.
Initial results on selection into self-employment indicate that selection into
entrepreneurship is positively correlated with a willingness to take risk. Of
the two risk-choice questions that lead to responses that are statistically signifi-
21Only smaller in terms of household/temporary workers employed, which could be due to
children working in the family enterprise.
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cantly correlated with entry into self-employment (after controlling for a range
of covariates), both involve the subject choosing the ”more risky” option by tak-
ing the gamble. In terms of time preferences, only the response to one question
is statistically significant. This coefficient estimate suggests that selection into
self-employment is associated with patience, as the response correlated with se-
lection into self-employment involves making the choice to wait for a payout
rather than taking a smaller payout today.
While this preliminary evidence on risk and time preferences comes with the
clear caveat that the risk and time preference questions may vary over time as a
function of agent outcomes, it is still suggestive. As expected, we find that selec-
tion into self-employment seems to be positively correlated with a willingness
to take risk, and patience.
3.7.4 Cognitive ability
It seems intuitive that raw cognitive ability for matter for enterprise activity.
Individuals with greater raw cognitive ability might be able to process informa-
tion more quickly and solve challenging real-world puzzles. On the other hand,
it may be that if ”push” self-employment is important, that lower cognitive abil-
ity might be correlated with an inability to obtain steady wage employment.
The IFLS contains a number of measures of raw cognitive ability, which fall
in two categories of about 10-15 questions per subject. The first category of
questions is based on matching shapes. The subject is presented with an image
with a piece missing, and invited to propose a fill-in piece from a menu of 3-4
options. The second set of questions are basic math questions, involving basic
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operations like additional, subtraction, multiplication and division. The mea-
sures of cognitive ability show significant variation across the sample, which a
very small proportion of subjects truncated at 0 or 1.
Initial results on raw cognitive ability and self-employment indicate that se-
lection into entrepreneurship is quite negatively correlated with raw cognitive
ability (of the household head). The marginal effect of -0.2 (on a variable on a 0-
1 scale) is statistically significant at the 10% level, with a z-value of 0.087 (with a
number of other demographic and locational controls included). This initial re-
sult suggests that the negative selection story may be the more prevalent one for
enterprise activity. It may be that individuals with high cognitive ability have
greater opportunities to pursue higher-return wage earning opportunities, and
hence shun self-employment on average.
3.8 Conclusion
Recent literature on the relationship between financing and small-scale enter-
prise activity at the household level in developing countries raises some im-
portant questions. In contradiction to the standard model of credit-constrained
occupational choices, we find that financial transfers do little to spur significant
microenterprise activity. We particularly see that such transfers fail to spur the
growth of microenterprises that might increase employment demand. In this
paper I delve into the heterogeneity in financial effects in greater detail, carry-
ing out a number of tests of financial constraints to small-scale entrepreneurship
at the household level.
First, making use of detailed information on households’ durable and busi-
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ness assets I study the relationship between (lagged) wealth and measures of
enterprise activity, such as startup and investment. The results from this exer-
cise indicate that there is little relationship between (lagged) household wealth
and enterprise activity at the lower 60 percentiles of the wealth distribution.
This sharply contrasts the predictions of standard models, which predict that
less wealth households should be most severely subject to financial constraints.
Second, I carry out liquidity-based tests of financing constraints using infor-
mation on exogenous (but potentially anticipated) financial flows. I find that
most flows are unrelated to enterprise choice, though receipts of unconditional
cash transfers are important predictors of later enterprise activity. Third, I ex-
ploit plausibly exogenous financial shocks, such as lottery winnings and insur-
ance payouts, to further test for the presence of financial constraints. I find a
small but significant, positive net effect of such transfers on later enterprise ac-
tivity in most specifications. I run a further specification for these transfers that
employs a Propensity Score Matching approach to account for potential unob-
servable heterogeneity in the propensity to get access to such transfers, which
implies a much more moderate effect of financing constraints.
Finally, I interact transfers with wealth levels to uncover heterogeneity in
the role of financing constraints across the wealth distribution. In a number
of specifications I find that responsiveness to financial transfers is increasing in
the wealth distribution, in contradiction to standard models that predict that
poorer households are most constrained by financing. I also find greater re-
sponsiveness amongst existing entrepreneurs, which is consistent with a model
of entrepreneurial learning.
Taken together, these tests provide a nuanced picture on the role of financ-
101
ing as a constraint to household enterprise activity in the developing-country
setting. Importantly, the results suggest that financing is not the main binding
constraint to enterprise activity at the lower end of the wealth distribution. This
in itself is an important policy implication in a world in which there is tremen-
dous effort spent on getting financial resources to microentrepreneurs with the
express goal of promoting growth-oriented enterprise activity. Of course, these
results do not by any means show that microfinance or other such programs
cannot be productive in supporting a range of other household activities. Yet
they point to important caution in thinking of financing as the answer to en-
trepreneurial development among the poor.
Furthermore, the results indicate that wealthier households and existing en-
terprise owners are actually more constrained by financing. This suggests the
hypotheses that such individuals may be endowed with greater entrepreneurial
skills, which are largely overlooked in the current policy mix. I briefly look
at the potential role of familial transmission of entrepreneurial skill in the
final section of the paper. The results are also fitting with the model of
[Ghatak et al., 2007], which suggests that developing-country lending might be
distorted by an overabundance of subsistence self-employed who might be
better-served in switching into waged employment. These issues, also dis-
cussed in [Schoar, 2010] will require further study.
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CHAPTER 4
ENTREPRENEURIAL HUMAN CAPITAL AND ENTREPRENEURIAL
DYNAMICS: EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL EXPERIMENT
4.1 Introduction
The question of what drives entrepreneurial dynamics, particularly entry and
enterprise growth, is of long-standing interest to policymakers and academics
in both the advanced and developing world. Such issues have taken on a new
urgency in the developing world due to the pressures and opportunities of glob-
alization and an increased recognition of vibrant private-sector enterprise activ-
ity as a source of economic growth and poverty reduction. In the academic
literature there has been a recent, burgeoning interest in the factors behind en-
trepreneurial dynamics and firm performance. This has partly been motivated
by the large interest, and subsequent disappointment, in microfinance as a stim-
ulant of widespread growth-oriented entrepreneurship ([Banerjee et al., 2009];
[Karlan & Zinman, 2010]), and also a growing interest in cross-country differ-
ences in firm productivity ([Bloom et al., 2010]).
While much existing literature has focused particularly on firm-level fi-
nancing access constraints as the key factor behind enterprise dynamics and
outcomes, there has been growing awareness that this might not tell the full
story. Attention has begun to shift to the human capital and managerial
skill and knowledge of the individual entrepreneur and the firm (see, e.g.,
[Bloom et al., 2010], [Bruhn et al., 2010]), and the distinction between the much
larger cohort of subsistence entrepreneurs and the significantly smaller co-
hort of higher-potential, transformational entrepreneurs ([Schoar, 2010]). While
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existing theories largely take the entrepreneurship-specific human capital of
the entrepreneur as a fixed parameter and focus on other factors behind
enterprise dynamics such as learning and credit-savings interactions (e.g.,
[Jovanovic, 1982], [Buera, 2009]), in this chapter I derive and test predictions
of a simple theory of entrepreneurship-specific human capital accumulation.
To test the theory and provide additional evidence on the returns to en-
trepreneurial experience, I exploit a uniquely-suitable natural experiment,
the 1997-98 East Asian financial crisis. Key to identifying the stock of en-
trepreneurial human capital is the ability to disentangle it from other (gen-
erally unobservable) factors generating selection into entrepreneurial occupa-
tions, such as the role of a market opportunity, a ”good idea,” or unobserved
ability or information. The crisis provides a plausibly unanticipated shock that
generates increased entry into self-employment, which is orthogonal to a num-
ber of potential confounding factors. I focus on Indonesia, where the crisis had
its most drastic effects among all countries. During the crisis period the re-
turns to informal self-employment relative to private sector wage employment
shift sharply in favor of self-employment for a significant cohort of individuals,
providing an exogenous source of selection into self-employment. In addition,
this effect is much more pervasive at the upper end of the earnings distribution
([Thomas et al., 2000]), allowing us to focus on a higher-ability cohort of poten-
tial entrepreneurs.
We can think of this as a convenient natural laboratory in which to study
the factors behind entrepreneurial dynamics. A cohort with higher potential
to be transformational entrepreneurs, who might not normally consider run-
ning a business, are suddenly forced to do so. They generally start enterprises
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in the informal non-farm sector, which was relatively unaffected by the finan-
cial crisis relative to the formal sector. Many have little prior self-employment
experience. This focus on high-ability types is important in light of recent litera-
ture pointing to significant heterogeneity in the entrepreneurial potential of in-
dividuals (e.g., [Barrett et al., 2005], [de Mel et al., 2010], [Porta & Shleifer, 2008],
[Schoar, 2010]). Such work suggests that the subset of individuals with the po-
tential to run relatively larger, growth-oriented enterprises is a relatively small
subset of the entrepreneurial talent distribution. Additionally, much of the ex-
isting developing-country literature has focused on the self-employment expe-
riences of low-ability individuals, or draws inferences on higher-ability types
from samples that are subject to non-random selection and recall biases. Finally,
while recessionary and crisis events in more developed economies also have
been shown to increase self-employment, such cases are less useful for the pur-
poses of this chapter because the selection effect tends to be concentrated on
lower-ability individuals, and is distorted by social safety nets such as unem-
ployment insurance, severance packages, firing restrictions, and the like.
My primary dataset is the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS), a panel sur-
vey which follows a nationally-representative sample of around 10,000 house-
holds and spans the crisis years. A particularly striking and puzzling finding in
the data is that self-employment activity is remarkably persistent amongst those
who enter self-employment during the crisis. This is true even in the years after
the effects of the crisis have dissipated and the cohort of crisis entrants might
have been expected to return to waged employment. About 78% of individuals
who enter self-employment during the crisis are still running a business as their
primary occupation 9 years after the crisis, whereas the usual 9-year persistence
rate is around 46%.
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I conduct more detailed empirical analysis in order to show that this persis-
tence is robust. To do so I estimate counterfactual models of self-employment
participation, to compare predicted self-employment participation to realized
outcomes. I show that even after controlling for other covariates, in particular
individuals’ expected wage (as a measure of opportunity cost), individuals are
estimated to be three to ten times more likely to engage in self-employment than
under the counterfactual. I interpret this as evidence that after the initial, unex-
pected entry into self-employment, the individuals’ stock of entrepreneurship-
specific human capital has increased to the point of altering long-run occupa-
tional choice incentives. This explanation is also consistent with the jump in
persistence (from 46% to 78%) amongst crisis-period entrants. If we make the
natural assumption that the learning curve is concave and hence relatively steep
early in one’s entrepreneurial career, then we would expect the largest jump in
persistence amongst a cohort of individuals with little prior experience who are
exogenously pushed into self-employment.
Since alternative theories also predict persistence, however, I also look at
unique predictions of the theory of entrepreneurial human capital accumulation
regarding earnings. Competing theories that take the stock of entrepreneurial
skill as fixed generate sub-optimal initial physical capital allocations due to
uncertainty over own-ability ([Jovanovic, 1982]) or credit-market constraints
([Buera, 2009]). Under such theories firm growth (and persistence) is input-
driven, as the stock of labor and capital in the firm grow to match the ability
endowment of the entrepreneur. However, such theories require certain pat-
terns in the co-movement of inputs and returns to hold (under a reasonable
specification of the production function). I show that the trajectory of returns is
best explained by the human capital-acquisition theory, as it exceeds potential
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benchmarks including the dynamic expansion of inputs.
Finally, having provided evidence in support of the theory of entrepreneurial
human capital accumulation, I proceed to directly estimate the causal effect
of entrepreneurial experience on earnings. I use self-employment experience
as a proxy for entrepreneurship-specific human capital acquisition through
learning-by-doing, since underlying entrepreneurial ability is not directly ob-
served. While a substantial literature in labor economics that similarly proxies
human capital accumulation through years of exposure generally points to a
positive effect of human capital on entry and earnings,1 rigorous empirical evi-
dence focused on human capital specific to entrepreneurship is much less com-
mon. In this case the separation between formal-sector labor market churning
and outcomes in the informal sector is used as the key exclusion restriction in
an instrumental variables setup. The evidence is supportive of the quantitative
importance of the role of human capital acquisition, as experience is shown to
strongly increase earnings, with the best estimate suggesting on average a 3%
boost in net profit for each additional year of experience.
The chapter makes a number of contributions to the literature. It provides
new evidence and an explanation for the surprising persistence in entrepreneur-
ship that we see amongst higher-ability individuals after the Indonesian finan-
cial crisis. It suggests that a theory of transformational entrepreneurship should
reflect the role of learning-by-doing in driving entrepreneurial dynamics. It also
provides evidence on the value of entrepreneurial learning-by-doing for the
unique cohort of crisis-period entrants, providing some of the first estimates
on the value of such human capital in the literature.
1See [Card, 1999] for a review of studies taking years of education as a proxy for general-
ized human capital accumulation, and [Angrist, 1990] and [Behrman & Rosenzweig, 1999] for
studies of human capital accumulation through work experience.
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The chapter proceeds as follows. I begin with a qualitative description of
the setting, with a particular focus on the informal sector in Indonesia and the
effects of the crisis, along with a discussion of entrepreneurial human capital,
in Section 4.2. I then outline a simple, dynamic model of entrepreneurial se-
lection, savings and consumption in Section 4.3, and derive testable predictions
that can be used to distinguish it from competing theories. I provide descrip-
tive evidence on the dataset and outline the identification strategies in Section
4.4. The empirical analysis has two foci: evidence in favor the theory of en-
trepreneurial human capital accumulation, and causal evidence on the effects of
entrepreneurial experience on earnings. The results are presented in Section 4.6,
while various threats to analysis and robustness checks are presented in Section
4.7. Section 4.8 concludes, while additional content appears in C.
4.2 The Setting, and Entrepreneurial Human Capital
4.2.1 Indonesia Background
Indonesia is the world’s fourth-largest country by population, and the largest
Muslim democracy, though civil society is relatively secularized. In 1970 it was
one of the world’s poorest countries by any measure. However, it enjoyed aver-
age economic growth of 4.5% per year between the mid-sixties until the 1997-98
Asian Financial Crisis, and was on the verge of joining the middle income coun-
tries. In 1998 GDP dropped by 14% at the height of the crisis. After the end of
President Suharto’s reign during the crisis, the country began a political tran-
sition, which has involved full, democratic elections, regulatory reform, and
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decentralization of power. By 2000 GDP growth recovered to 5% and was fairly
steady around 5-6% until 2008.
Geographically, the country is spread out over thousands of islands in the
world’s largest archipelago. The country is highly diverse ethnically, religiously,
linguistically and economically, yet unified by a common major language and
national institutional structure. The island of Java, which contains the capital
city of Jakarta, is the central economic hub. Per capita gross domestic product
in purchasing power parity terms was $4000 USD in 2009, putting Indonesia at
155 in the world in this category (for comparison, the equivalent value for the
United States is $46,400), while the value of the Gini coefficient was 39.4 in 2005,
which is about average in international comparison ([CIA, 2011]).
Indonesian Labor Market Status and Trends
In most less-developed economies more than half of the workforce is engaged
in operating or working in microenterprises,2 which generate roughly half of
GDP. A negligible proportion of such enterprises manage to grow beyond sub-
sistence scale. In more developed economies the contribution of microenter-
prises to employment and GDP is closer to 15%, while an active and large small
and medium enterprise sector that is absent in most developing countries con-
tributes close to half of GDP. In Indonesia more than half of the workforce has
typically been involved in working in or running micro, small or medium en-
terprises. The vast majority of such enterprises are informal sector firms with
less than 10 employees.
2Indonesia’s official enterprise size cohorts are defined as follows: microenterprise (1-4
workers), small enterprise (5-19 workers), medium enterprise (20-99 workers) large enterprise
(100+ workers).
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The formal sector was expanding in Indonesia in the years leading up to the
crisis. From the mid-1980s until the late 1990s agricultural employment declined
from 55 to 41% of the workforce, while manufacturing employment increased
from 8 to 19% over the same period. Workforce participation rates of women
were also increasing in the years leading up the crisis, from about 30 to 37% in
the urban sector, though there was a steadier level of participation in rural areas
of around 55%. This increase in urban employment was enjoyed in both the
wage and self-employment sectors. We also notice that women are much more
likely to work as workers in household enterprises in rural areas, at a 20-30%
rate. Overall we see that labor force participation is relatively stable leading up
the crisis, with a small uptrend toward formal sector activity.
The 1997-98 Crisis
The study of the labor market and self-employment effects of the crisis is facil-
itated by the availability of two excellent micro-datasets, which is unusual for
a developing country. SAKERNAS is a labor-force survey that is collected by
the Indonesian government statistical service, BPS, and is a large-scale, cross-
sectional labor force survey. The Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), is a
panel dataset that was collected over multiple years, including the years span-
ning the crisis. For the study of the effects of a large-scale economic crisis, the
dataset is particularly exciting because it included rounds just before the crisis
hit, in 1997, and then a one-year-later follow-up. The IFLS is the primary dataset
that will be used in the subsequent analysis in this chapter.
[Smith et al., 2002] and [Thomas et al., 2000] provide evidence on the labor
market effects of the crisis. It is broadly recognized that Indonesia was the coun-
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try worst-hit by the crisis, and that it was an unexpected event. The primary
direct victim of the crisis was the banking and financial-services sector, much
of which was left out or reorganized. The banking sector fell into disarray, and
this led to a shortening of credit. While some of the early post-crisis research
suggested that the crisis caused massive unemployment, in fact this claim does
not hold up in the micro-data. What we see instead is significant churning in
occupational allocations, with one important movement being from private sec-
tor waged employment to self-employment. The government sector seems to
be relatively well-sheltered from the effects of the crisis.
Consumer prices began to spiral upward in 1998, at the rate of 80% in that
year according to CPI. Hence a number of price subsidies were removed, such as
on rice, oil and some fuels. All of this uncertainty and economic pain led to the
fall of President Suharto in May 1998, with multi-party elections and the return
to relative stability in 1999. The shock to relative prices that the crisis brought
about did have some beneficiaries – exporters, export producers and the like.
Those producing services and non-tradeables likely did less well, though on the
other hand the informal sector was also better-sheltered from the crisis, by being
more independent from formal sector financial institutions ex ante.
The labor market and consumer effects were a derivative of the impacts on
firms and the price rises. On average real wages collapsed by 40% between Au-
gust 1997 and August 1998, and these effects reached most sectors of the econ-
omy. However, informal sector effects were less pervasive, particularly amongst
rural, self-employed males. Of greater interest to the current study is the result-
ing relative price changes, as reported in [Thomas et al., 2000]. In particular, there
is strong evidence that the main relative price shock during the crisis was in ex-
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panding the relative margin between waged employment and self-employment.
Self-employment broadly became relatively more attractive in comparison to
private, waged employment, on the order of a 25-60% shift in relative returns
depending on sector, gender and urban or rural location. In addition, this effect
seems to be more strongly concentrated at the upper-end of the wage distribu-
tion ([Smith et al., 2002]; [Thomas et al., 2000]), and we see the most significant
occupational churning from private wage to self-employment at the upper end
of the wage distribution.3 This suggests that it might be relatively high-ability
individuals who were induced to enter self-employment during the crisis.
Hence it appears that the crisis can be interpreted as a large, unexpected
shock to the choice margin between private wage employment and self-
employment, which hits the most able formal-sector workers the hardest. This
was due both to a significant hit to private wage returns, along with the obser-
vation that informal-sector, self-employment activity was generally more shel-
tered from the crisis. This exogenous and unanticipated shift in the choice mar-
gin appears to have induced sectoral restructuring toward self-employment ac-
tivity.
4.2.2 Entrepreneurial Human Capital
Entrepreneurial human capital (EHC) constitutes specialized, high-level
entrepreneurship-specific skills and knowledge, such as in selling, negotiating,
product development, risk judgment ([Shane, 2003]) and entrepreneurial social
capital. Above and beyond heterogeneous ex ante endowments of innate EHC,
perhaps due to genetic inheritance or early upbringing (i.e., dynastic transi-
3[Poppele et al., 1999] argue that the main effect of the crisis was on the urban elites.
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tions), I hypothesize that EHC is significantly accumulated through direct ex-
posure to entrepreneurial activity. Such entrepreneurial capabilities are distinct
from other, generalized forms of human capital such as education, life experi-
ence, and experience in waged employment. A primary channel for acquiring
EHC is learning-by-doing (i.e., running an enterprise, the focus of this chapter).4
EHC cannot be transacted in the marketplace separately from the individual en-
dowed with it and public institutions for the transmission of EHC (such as the
formal education system for wage work) are generally absent. Hence dynamic
occupational selection incentives can play a crucial role in individuals’ ability to
accumulate EHC.
4.3 A Simple, Dynamic Model of Entrepreneurial Selection,
Savings, and Consumption
I outline a simple, forward-looking model of individual occupational choice that
captures the theoretical mechanism that I will test for in the data. The key fea-
ture of the theory is that it allows for entrepreneurial human capital accumu-
lation through direct learning-by-doing. This is meant to capture the accumu-
lation of entrepreneurship-specific human capital and business capital, such as in
product development, marketing, risk judgment and business-relevant social
network connections, through first-hand exposure to entrepreneurial activity.
Much of the existing literature takes entrepreneurial human capital as fixed,5
4Other channels for EHC transmission that one might consider include transmission of EHC
in the family (e.g., learning from one’s parents, if they are entrepreneurs), or learning through
work experience in another firm.
5The seminal, early reference on job- and occupation-specific human capital is [Becker, 1964].
Surprisingly little work has been done to formally extend such ideas to entrepreneurship,
though less formal work exists in the economics literature in the work of [Schultz, 1980]; see
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and then studies dynamics emanating from the physical capital accumulation
(savings) choices of the entrepreneur,6 or learning about the value of the un-
known entrepreneurial ability endowment in a Bayesian learning framework.7
In the empirical analysis I will argue that the learning-by-doing framework best
matches the patterns in the data. Hence I begin by providing a simple formal-
ization of the learning-by-doing framework, then derive testable predictions of
the modeling frameworks that allow me to disentangle them in the data.
The agent is initially endowed with a stock of liquid wealth, W0. While the
agent can be thought of as capturing a household unit, the exposition will de-
scribe the model for a single individual. In each of two periods, t = 0, 1, the
individual makes a choice between one of two occupations – waged employ-
ment, denoted by w, or self-employment, denoted by s. Human capital specific
to each occupation is modeled by stock variables for each occupation.
Wage earnings, y
(
θtw
)
, are a function of the agent’s stock of wage-specific hu-
man capital, θtw, which can accumulate due to work experience. Let Φw
(
θ0w, ·
)
denote the transmission of wage-specific human capital between the two peri-
ods, where the second argument of Φw records the agent’s occupational choice in
the first period. Then θ0w denotes the initial endowment of wage-specific human
capital, and θ1w = Φw
(
θ0w, ·
)
denotes the stock of human capital in the second pe-
riod. I assume that work experience has value, that is, that Φw
(
θ0w,w
)
= θ1w > θ
0
w.
also [Klein & Cook, 2006]. Two exceptions, though less general in scope, are [Otani, 1996] and
[Iyigun & Owen, 1998].
6The literature focusing on occupational choice and the dynamic savings problem has pri-
marily been motivated by an attempt to rationalize otherwise suprisingly strong inequalities
in the aggregate wealth distribution. In such models individuals with (unobserved) high en-
trepreneurial skill have an incentive to save much more than others, which can generate signifi-
cant wealth inequalities in a dynamic setup. See, e.g., [Cagetti & Nardi, 2006] and [Buera, 2009].
7The early, seminal paper in this line is [Jovanovic, 1982]. [Taveras, 2010] carries out a cal-
ibration exercise on a similar model to show that a number of stylized facts that have been
taken as evidence of credit constraints in prior literature can in fact be rationalized in a model
of Bayesian learning about entrepreneurial skill if learning is sufficiently slow.
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For simplicity, θ0w = Φw
(
θ0w, s
)
(i.e., if the agent does not acquire wage work expe-
rience then the stock of wage-specific human capital does not change). Note that
this rules out the possibility that human capital relevant to wage employment
can be acquired in self-employment. While it would be interesting to consider
an extension that weakens this assumption, it would raise additional empirical
challenges to identify cross-occupational-relevant human capital accumulation.
Finally, I assume that Φw is increasing in its first argument.
The setup for self-employment is analogous. Self-employment earnings are
influenced by the agent’s stock of entrepreneurial human capital, θts. Φs
(
θ0s , ·
)
denotes the transmission function, where θ1s = Φs
(
θ0s , ·
)
. Analogously, I assume
that Φs
(
θ0s , s
)
= θ1s > θ
0
s , that θ0s = Φs
(
θ0s ,w
)
, and Φs is bounded.8 The profit
function is as follows, for t = 0, 1,
pi
(
θts,W
t, pt, ptk, p
t
l
)
= maxl≥0 pt f
(
θts, k, l
) − ptk (W − k) − ptll
s.t. 0 ≤ ptkk ≤ λW t
(4.1)
where pt is the price of a single output in period t, k is capital, l is labor, ptk
and ptl are their respective prices in period t, and f is an increasing, concave
production function. I assume that the the firm is a price-taker. The constraint
set k ∈ [0, λW t] is standard in the literature and captures credit constraints – the
stock of physical capital employed in the enterprise may be constrained by own-
funding constraints if there are frictions in credit markets and other financing
sources are not available. That is, it may be that the optimal stock of capital, k∗,
is strictly greater than λW t, so that the firm is constrained from employing the
optimal capital stock.
8Perhaps most important here is the second part of the assumption, which implies that en-
trepreneurial skills aren’t acquired in wage employment.
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The timing of the model is as follows. The agent first draws human cap-
ital endowments θ0w and θ0s from the joint distribution η, with support on R2.
This allows for arbitrary correlation between the two, which can be interpreted
as capturing greater general ability in the individual, and can exacerbate se-
lection effects as I will demonstrate below. These occupation-specific human
capital stocks are known at the beginning of each of the two decision periods.
Given these known human capital stocks, the agent makes a discrete occupa-
tional choice, between wage-employment and self-employment, w or s, in a
forward-looking way in the first period. If the agent chooses self-employment,
she makes a decision about the labor and capital inputs to the enterprise, k and
l. The intertemporal connection between the two periods is given by the human
capital transmission functions Φw and Φs as described above, along with the in-
tertemporal savings problem. Denote the savings choice by x, where it must be
that the value of x is less than the sum of wealth the agent opens the first period
with, W0, and earnings (y or pi). The residual of the savings choice is consump-
tion, which is evaluated in the strictly increasing, concave utility function U. At
the end of the second period the agent is taken to consume all remaining wealth.
Formally, then the agent faces the following decision problem in the initial
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period, which is summarized by the value function V0,
V0
(
θ0w, θ
0
s ,W
0
)
(4.2)
= max
{
max
0≤x≤y+W0
U
[
y
(
θ0w
)
+ W0 − x
]
+ βmax
{
U
[
y
(
θ1w
)
+ W1
]
, (4.3)
U
[
pi
(
θ0s ,W
1, p1, p1k , p
1
l
)
+ W1
]}
,
max
0≤x≤pi+W0
U
[
pi
(
θ0s ,W
0, p0, p0k , p
0
l
)
+ W0 − x
]
+ βmax
{
U
[
y
(
θ0w
)
+ W1
]
,
U
[
pi
(
θ1s ,W
1, p1, p1k , p
1
l
)
+ W1
]}}
= max
{
max
0≤x≤y+W0
U
[
y
(
θ0w
)
+ W0 − x
]
+ βmax
{
U
[
y
(
Φw
(
θ0w,w
))
+ W0 + x
]
, (4.4)
U
[
pi
(
θ0s ,W
0 + x, p1, p1k , p
1
l
)
+ W0 + x
]}
,
max
0≤x≤pi+W0
U
[
pi
(
θ0s ,W
0, p0, p0k , p
0
l
)
+ W0 − x
]
+ βmax
{
U
[
y
(
θ0w
)
+ W0 + x
]
,
U
[
pi
(
Φs
(
θ0s , s
)
,W0 + x, p1, p1k , p
1
l
)
+ W0 + x
]}}
where the second equality illustrates the functional relationships that generate
the final-period values of the stock variables of occupational skill and wealth,
and β is a discount factor in the (0, 1) interval. Namely, in the initial period the
agent faces a discrete choice over the immediate occupational return given by y
or pi, and the discounted future return obtained from the same activity choice in
the second period.
4.3.1 Basic Properties of the Model
The value function in equation (4.2) formalizes the dynamic incentives in the
occupational choice problem. First, the individual faces an initial ”selection”
incentive, influenced both by the initial returns generated by the values of θ0s
and θ0w (and possibly the effect of binding credit constraints on the physical cap-
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ital decision), and prospective second-period returns due to savings and human
capital accumulation. θ0s and θ0w might be accumulated prior to formally entering
the workforce through familial effects, education, or other life experiences. All
things equal we expect that individuals with a relatively higher stock of abil-
ity in a given occupation to be more likely to self-select into that occupation.
Formally, the condition for selection into self-employment is as follows,
max
0≤x≤pi+W0
U
[
pi
(
θ0s ,W
0, p0, p0k , p
0
l
)
+ W0 − x
]
+ βV s1 (4.5)
≥ max
0≤x≤y+W0
U
[
y
(
θ0w
)
+ W0 − x
]
+ βVw1 ,
where to save on notation V s1 and V
w
1 denote the future utility derived from
choosing the optimal occupation in the second period, given human capital ac-
cumulated by the choices of s and w, respectively, in the initial period. The com-
plementary condition captures the incentive for selection into waged employ-
ment. Equation (4.5) can be used to characterize the subsets of the parameter
space under which selection into each occupation is optimal.
Self-selecting into a given occupation can lead to the acquisition of relevant
human capital that further shifts the choice margin between the two occupa-
tions. That is, human capital accumulation can lead to lock-in, in a given oc-
cupation. If, for example, the individual chooses self-employment in the first
period, this increases the value of θ1s , which increases the value of second-period
profit pi
(
θ1s ,W
1, p1, p1k , p
1
l
)
and hence increases the propensity to select into self-
employment in the second period. In fact, dynamic incentives might even gen-
erate dynamic selection effects, under which individuals are incentivized to en-
ter self-employment today even for a lower static return, under the anticipation
of greater returns in the future ([Foster & Rosenzweig, 1995] capture similar in-
118
tuition).
The human capital lock-in effect highlights the importance of the initial oc-
cupational choice, which is driven by the initial stocks of human capital, θ0s and
θ0w. If there is a reasonably high degree of correlation between the initial stocks of
human capital, then it may be that the ”highest-potential” entrepreneurs do not
enter self-employment at all, because the opportunity cost to self-employment
is high based on wage earnings possibilities. This insight, first discussed semi-
formally in the economics literature in [Roy, 1951], points out that occupational
selection will be driven by the distribution of skills in the population and how
they are compensated in equilibrium. It could be that most high-ability indi-
viduals tend to enter waged employment, and human capital lock-in further
reinforces that choice. On the other hand, low-skill individuals might receive
relatively lower returns in wage employment, particularly if low-skill labor sup-
ply is abundant. This is consistent with the massive cohort of low-skill, self-
employed individuals in developing countries, most of whose enterprises have
low returns and grow little. In Chapter 5 I present a model of dynamic en-
trepreneurial human capital accumulation in which low-skill individuals can
get trapped in a subsistence microentrepreneurship ”poverty trap,” not due to
lack of financing but rather inadequate human capital.9
9This charactization is consistent with recent empirical evidence (e.g.,
[Carter & Olinto, 2003]; [de Mel et al., 2008]; [Banerjee et al., 2009]; [Karlan & Zinman, 2010]).
Demand for capital ends up being relatively stronger amongst wealthier or higher-ability
individuals and hence individuals end up more responsive to positive financial shocks.
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4.3.2 The Effects of Exogenous Shocks to Occupational Choice
Incentives
The potential for human capital lock-in to prevent the highest-potential en-
trepreneurs from entering self-employment is suggestive of the empirical strat-
egy that will be employed in this chapter. I will seek a source of exogenous
variation in selection incentives, orthogonal to individual ability, that leads rel-
atively high-ability individuals to select into self-employment when they other-
wise would not have done so. Such a shock can be due to any of the exogenous
parameters of the model – to a price, to wealth, or to the earnings functions.
The value function in equation (4.2) clarifies the effect of such changes, which
are almost always unambiguous in the model. In this chapter I will focus on an
exogenous, negative shock to the wage employment earnings function, y
(
θ0w
)
,
though it is not problematic if the effects of the shock are transmitted through
additional parameters of the model. Due to an exogenous event, which we can
think of as occurring prior to period 0, the margin of choice will shift for a num-
ber of individuals, and they will have a much greater incentive to select into
self-employment, as it becomes more likely that equation (??) will see a tilt in
incentives toward self-employment.
4.3.3 Testable Predictions and Alternative Theories
A direct prediction of the theory is that entrepreneurial experience should lead
to entrepreneurial persistence, even after accounting for opportunity costs. This
is the human capital lock-in effect that was discussed above. As θ0s increases to
θ1s , the individual should be more likely to again engage in self-employment
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in period 1. This is true even if a negative wage shock caused an increase in
self-employment, and then the wage returns to its previous level. The empirical
version of this prediction will be developed in Section 4.5. However, while the
finding that individuals who obtain self-employment experience are more likely
to remain self-employed is consistent with and strongly suggestive of a theory
of entrepreneurial human capital accumulation, such a finding is still not a con-
clusive basis to argue that entrepreneurship-specific human capital accumula-
tion is the primary factor driving enterprise dynamics. There are at least two
alternative theories that generate a similar prediction, which in contrast take
the stock of entrepreneurial skill as fixed and generate dynamic effects through
other channels.
In [Jovanovic, 1982], individuals are endowed with a fixed stock of en-
trepreneurial skill, which they are uncertain about and have prior beliefs over.
In the context of the model developed herein, we can think of this as an en-
trepreneurial skill parameter θs that doesn’t vary over time, but determines the
distribution of stochastic realizations of the production function.10 The indi-
vidual holds subjective beliefs µθs over the distribution of θs, which is initially
drawn from a normal distribution with known mean and variance. Since the
individual does not know the exact value of her own θs, the initial belief is
taken as the mean of the distribution µθs . Over time, as the firm operates, the
agent draws observations on a stochastic production process, which allow for
inferences on θs, with updating of beliefs through a standard Bayesian learning
process. Hence there is a co-movement of beliefs and firm size – in expectation
good entrepreneurs grow their firms as their beliefs about own-ability move
upwards, while bad entrepreneurs shrink and eventually exit.
10In fact, in [Jovanovic, 1982] θs is a parameter that determines the distribution of shocks to
the cost function.
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In [Buera, 2009] and related models, skill is known but credit market con-
straints might prevent the optimal physical capital level from being attained, at
least in the short run. Individuals know their entrepreneurial skill level, and
indeed that knowledge may exactly induce them to save more ex ante in order
to eventually be able to self-fund the startup or growth of an enterprise. In the
context of the model herein, we can think of this as a case where the function
Φs (·, ·) is a constant function. For the model to be empirically relevant it is im-
portant that the credit constraint actually binds for a significant proportion of
the population. Similarly to [Jovanovic, 1982], the theory predicts that physical
capital increases over time for good entrepreneurs, as it converges to the level
most compatible with the endowment of skill.
Hence both models allow for the possibility that a significant number of in-
dividuals who enter self-employment will be persistent and see an increase in
inputs and earnings over time. They suggest that a significant number of enter-
prises will enter the market at a different scale from their long-run optimal scale,
and that successful firms will converge to the long-run optimal size as dictated
by the fixed stock of entrepreneurial skill. Of course, one can quickly see that
the theory of entrepreneurial human capital accumulation will also predict in-
creases in capital and labor inputs over time, to optimally complement the stock
of entrepreneurial skill. However, what is critical is that the alternative theories
suggest that increases in returns should be input-driven, in terms of labor and
capital inputs. The theories do not allow for residual increases in profitability
due to increases in the entrepreneurial and managerial abilities and business
capital of the individual running the firm.
An additional test would then be to study the relationship between earn-
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ings increases of the firm and increases in the size of the capital and labor stock
of the firm. The testable prediction disentangling a model with dynamically-
accumulating entrepreneurial human capital from the other theories would be
the finding that the variation in earnings could not be explained by dynamic
changes in inputs alone. Technically this requires some assumptions about the
revenue function of firms, in order to discipline the relationship between inputs
and revenues.
A final notable implication regards the rate of purported entrepreneurial hu-
man capital accumulation amongst entrants. It seems reasonable to posit that
the learning function takes a concave shape, with diminishing returns to learn-
ing as more human capital is accumulated. This would mean that, all things
equal, brand new entrants (those who had not previously run an enterprise)
should learn at the highest rate, and hence be subject to the largest change in
earnings and occupational choice incentives. We will also look for support for
this final testable implication.
4.4 Design of the Study and Preliminary Evidence
4.4.1 Data
My primary dataset is the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS).11 The data was
collected as a household panel survey in Indonesia, with data collection rounds
in 1993, 1997-98, 2000-01 and 2007-08. The 1997-98 round directly proceeded the
11Various organizations and researchers have been involved in designing, collecting
and funding the IFLS. For more details, see [Strauss et al., 2009], [Strauss et al., 2004],
[Frankenberg & Thomas, 2000], and [Frankenberg & Karoly, 1995].
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crisis. For the intervening years when the survey is not fielded, significant retro-
spective data are collected in the subsequent round. The dataset was designed
to be representative of 83% of the Indonesian population in 1993, covering 13
of the higher-population provinces generally in the western parts of the coun-
try, with over-sampling of urban locations and locations outside Java island, the
main economic hub. Data were collected at the individual, household, and com-
munity level, and these three sources can be matched together. More details on
relevant parts of the dataset, including for enterprise activity, will be discussed
in more detail below.
The original 1993 round of the survey (IFLS1) surveyed 7224 households.
Subsequent rounds have involved re-sampling the original households, and
then sampling all split-offs from the original households. Attrition has been rel-
atively minor, at less than 10% between rounds, and overall 87.6% of the orig-
inal households appear in all four rounds. Table A.1 presents the number of
individuals,12 households, household enterprises and communities appearing
in each round of the survey. We see that the sample expands in each subsequent
round, as splits from the original households are tracked and surveyed. In addi-
tion, the proportion of household members directly interviewed also increases
across rounds.
There is significant geographic and size variation amongst the enterprises.13
Though the largest firm representations are from Java, the economic and popu-
lation center of the country, the bias is not overwhelming and a significant pro-
portion of firms are observed from all of the main survey provinces. This is true
12Both adults and children (defined as those under age 15 at the time of the survey) are sur-
veyed, though the childrens’ module is less extensive.
13The distribution of enterprises is less even if we stratify by industry–the largest proportions
of enterprises by far are in the sectors of restaurant/food, and sales:non-food, at around 30%
each. The next two largest sectors are food processing, and services:transport.
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even if we focus on firms with a relatively larger capital stock, above $1000 US
(converted from Indonesian rupiah at the going exchange rate in a given survey
year). It is notable that the slightly larger proportion of firms seems to be in rural
areas. This fits with [Liedholm & Mead, 1999] and may be due to the fact that
smaller firms are more likely to service demand in more remote areas. Also, we
see that the sample contains a significant number of firms exceeding the sizes
observed in the vast majority of studies on micro and small enterprises from
developing countries, while firm-level surveys looking at such firms generally
have little information on the primary entrepreneur. Given that conversion to
US purchasing power parity implies a multiple of about 12, there are hundreds
of enterprises with more than $25,000 US PPP equivalent in capital, and dozens
with 10, 15 or more workers.
Table C.2 presents a summary of a number of community-level measures
of market churning that will be useful in the background of the later analysis,
as these variables are used as exogenous sources of variation in the individual
propensity to enter and remain in self-employment.
4.4.2 Preliminary Evidence
In Chapter 5 I provide evidence on earning-experience profiles in the data, dis-
tinguishing across enterprise type cohorts. In particular, the cohorts of individ-
uals running enterprises with no employees, only household/unpaid employ-
ees, and those actually hiring outside, paid employees can be distinguished.
The empirical analysis employs panel data techniques that allow the fixed effect
term to be interpreted as controlling for time-invariant ability. Those results sug-
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gest a year-on-year value of entrepreneurial experience of 8-15% on average, de-
pending on cohort. In Figure B.1 I non-parametrically plot experience-earnings
(net profit) profiles across these three qualitative categories, using a Lowess tri-
cube smoother. There we see that while all three groups enjoy an increase in
earnings on average, the rate of increase is substantially higher for those run-
ning the enterprise we would expect to be most complex: firms with hired, wage
workers. This bifurcation in returns is suggestive of the select group of individ-
uals running more complex enterprises ”pulling away” from the much larger
group of individuals running enterprises in the other two categories. We would
expect that significantly greater returns would enable significantly greater cap-
ital accumulation.
In Table C.1 I present summary statistics on the smaller population of indi-
viduals who enter self-employment during the financial crisis, a smaller sam-
ple. There are 684 such individuals who are eligible for the study due to en-
try during 1997, and 1355 eligible due to entry in 1998. In comparison to full-
population summary statistics presented elsewhere in this thesis, we see that
they are highly likely to be married, often quite well-educated, and more likely
to be male. They also appear relatively younger, which could be a reflection of
the role in seniority in worker separations during the crisis.
4.5 Identification Strategies and Empirical Specifications
The identification of EHC raises empirical challenges due to the selection pro-
cesses highlighted in the model. The ideal experiment would randomly as-
sign EHC to individuals, orthogonally to all other characteristics, and then ob-
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serve the resulting enterprise performance trajectories. Clearly such an exper-
iment would be infeasible for a number of reasons, including endogenous en-
terprise survival, and difficulties in assigning EHC. However, individuals with
greater ex ante (unobserved) entrepreneurial ability are more likely to select into
self-employment, and hence accumulate greater entrepreneurial human capi-
tal. Hence higher-ability self-employed individuals are likely to have better
entrepreneurial performance (i.e., higher enterprise returns), while simultane-
ously having greater accumulated experience, due to endogenous survival ef-
fects.
Since the ideal experiment is not feasible in practice, I exploit a source of ex-
ogenous and unanticipated assignment into self-employment (experience) due
to the 1997-98 Financial Crisis. Here the primary ”treatment” group of interest is
the subset of individuals that enter self-employment during 1998, the main year
in which the effects of the crisis were felt in Indonesia. In particular, the interest
is in individuals who were ’pushed’ into self-employment, who would not have
otherwise entered, which provides a source of a counterfactual to consider the
effects of the quasi-random assignment of EHC.
Previous analyses of the effects of the crisis have shown that the crisis
did not cause a significant drop in overall employment; however, it caused a
significant shift in real wages, in some cases up to 40%, with effects partic-
ularly concentrated on relatively higher-earning, formal-sector wage workers
([Thomas et al., 2000]). This exogenous shock is particularly useful for the pur-
poses of this study, because it means that a significant number of relatively
higher-ability individuals were ’pushed’ into self-employment. Hence this nat-
ural experiment is quite appealing to test the theory of EHC, because other
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sources of exogenous shocks such as rainfall might be expected to be concen-
trated on lower-income individuals who might have fewer alternatives to self-
employment.
Based on this intuition, I construct two main tests of the interpretation of
EHC as a natural experiment that assigns individuals to acquire entrepreneurial
experience. First, I look at self-employment persistence. The theoretical model
predicts that individuals who acquire human capital in a particular occupation
should, all things equal, be more likely to remain in that occupation. In test-
ing this implication I deal with the assumption of ”all things equal” potentially
not holding by using a number of regression controls, including in particular an
out-of-sample estimate of the counterfactual wage that self-employed individ-
uals would earn in wage employment. Since dynamic occupational persistence
can be explained by a number of theories outside of EHC accumulation, I sec-
ondly look at earnings dynamics, to generate further evidence consistent with
the proposed theory.
Building on this evidence, I provide evidence on the causal effect of en-
trepreneurial learning-by-doing on earnings. The empirical challenge that arises
is that, of course, the crisis is not a perfect natural experiment. It does not nec-
essarily randomize selection into self-employment (and subsequent acquisition
of experience) orthogonally to unobserved ability, in particular. Those cohorts
that enter self-employment, even during the crisis period, presumably include
at least two groups: (i) those who enter self-employment as a survival response
to the shock (due to having lost their job, etc.), or the ’pushed’ group of inter-
est, and (ii) those who enter self-employment voluntarily (perhaps because the
disequilibrium process highlights a new profit-making opportunity), or because
128
they were already planning to enter self-employment independently from the
crisis. I attempt to control for endogenous selection into self-employment in
1998 through a selection-on-observables-type strategy, which is plausibly ex-
ogenous to individual-level EHC.
Details behind these approaches are discussed in the remainder of this sec-
tion, and estimation results are then presented in Section 4.6.1.
Self-employment Persistence
An important implication of the theoretical model is that the accumulation of
EHC changes the occupational choice incentives of the individual. If in period
1 the individual chooses self-employment, s, perhaps due to a shock to the op-
portunity cost to self-employment (the wage y
(
θ0w
)
), then the human capital ac-
cumulation function, Φs
(
θ0s , s
)
, implies that the stock of EHC increases from θ0s
to θ1s > θ0s . Even if the opportunity cost of self-employment returns to near
its previous level, the agent is more likely to find it optimal to remain in self-
employment in subsequent periods. This trade-off is formalized in the model,
in particular where we see that the second-period decision involves the static
maximization problem,
max
{
U
[
y
(
θ1w
)
+ W1
]
,U
[
pi
(
θ1s ,W
1, p1, p1k , p
1
l
)
+ W1
]}
. (4.6)
Of course the outcome is not deterministic – since the choice is discrete it may be
that the choice margin moves but still not enough to induce the agent to remain
in self-employment once the wage recovers. However, across the population
distribution we might expect to observe an effect.
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Just looking at raw numbers, we see that 684 individuals newly shift into
self-employment in 1998, about a 10% increase in the number of self-employed
individuals. By the year 2000, 587 of these individuals are still self-employed
(about 85%), even though the economy has already shown significant recov-
ery from the crisis event. Even by the year 2008, about 78% remain in self-
employment. This comes in stark contrast to the comparable figure from other
the 10 years of the survey from which a 9-year persistence rate can be calculated,
which averages 46%. However, these raw indications are subject to some key
challenges in terms of identification. I discuss how I deal with these challenges
in what follows.
Firstly, the descriptive evidence on self-employment persistence does not
control for the expected wage, the opportunity cost to self-employment. It
could be the case that wages don’t recover for the types of individuals who
enter self-employment during the crisis, and hence in fact the opportunity cost
to self-employment remains low. In addition, as has been already discussed,
the self-employment entry decision can be driven by unobservables. In order
to account for these concerns, I carry out the following estimation procedure to
attempt to provide more convincing evidence for the robustness of occupational
persistence.
The intuition behind the procedure is to construct the (unobserved) coun-
terfactual probability of being self-employed in absence of having entered self-
employment during the crisis, and then compare that to two constructs of the
realized propensity to be self-employed: (1) the empirical realization of self-
employment propensity (the simple frequentist estimate), and (2) an estimated
probit model on ex post occupational choice outcomes in the sample of individ-
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uals who enter self-employment during the crisis. Hence it involves a within
comparison of predicted entrepreneurial propensity based on pre-crisis choices,
with ex post realized outcomes. I will then argue that results of sufficient mag-
nitude overcome other explanations for the self-employment persistence such
as, e.g., labor market frictions preventing re-integration into the formal wage
sector.
The procedure works as follows. First, I empirically capture the occupational
choice decision rule of individuals by estimating a probit self-employment se-
lection equation of the form,
Pr (yit = 1|xit) = G (xitβ + γωit) , (4.7)
where y represents the discrete occupational choice (yit = 1 denotes self-
employment, and yit = 0 denotes wage employment), G is the standard normal
density, xit is a vector of regression controls such as age and age-squared, educa-
tion (in years) and marital status, ωit represents the wage, and β and γ represent
regression coefficients.
I estimate the above model using two definitions of the population. First,
just on the sub-sample of individuals who enter self-employment during the
crisis, and secondly on the whole population. The former more directly cap-
tures the choice function of the specific individuals involved, though it might
underestimate entrepreneurial propensity since these individuals are less likely
to be self-employed pre-crisis. The latter better captures the determinants of en-
trepreneurial selection in the population, though it might induce estimates that
are less applicable to the particular crisis-entrant sample.
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Second, having used this model to estimate the occupational choice func-
tion, I then construct projected occupational selection propensities, Gˆit out of
equation (4.7), by predicting out of sample using the estimators βˆ and γˆ. Since
the wage, ωit in equation (4.7), is not observed once individuals have entered
self-employment, I employ the following wage equation in order to calculate
the individual-specific projected wage, ωˆit, as a measure of the opportunity cost
of self-employment,
ωit = xitδ + ci + yeart + εit, (4.8)
where xit is a vector of regression controls such as age and age-squared, educa-
tion (in years) and marital status, ci is an individual-specific fixed effect term,
and yeart is a year effect.14 I use a bootstrap approach to deal with the issue of
using projected regressors as explanatory variables in a subsequent regression.
The out-of-sample prediction of self-employment propensity, Gˆit, gives a
counterfactual measure of self-employment propensity. I generate out-of-
sample predictions of Gˆit from two different data samples, which I denote
PsubPre→Post and P
f ull
Pre→Post, respectively. I denote the mean of the distribution of val-
ues of individual-specific self-employment propensities based on ex ante data
only from the subsample of crisis-period entrants by PsubPre→Post. I denote the same
object, estimated on full ex ante population data, by P f ullPre→Post.
Third, I construct ex post measures of self-employment propensity, from ac-
tual realizations in the data. I denote by PsubPost freq the empirical realization of
self-employment propensity (the simple frequentist estimate), and by PsubPost prob
occupational choice propensity estimates generated from a probit model on ex
14I do not include time-variant, location-specific variables as controls, since geographic iden-
tifiers are not always available for each observation, meaning sample size would be noticeably
reduced.
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post occupational choice outcomes in the sample of individuals who enter self-
employment during the crisis.
I then test whether there is a statistically significant difference in the propen-
sity to be self-employed, comparing the constructed counterfactuals, PsubPre→Post
and P f ullPre→Post to the ex post realizations, P
sub
Post freq and P
sub
Post prob. I apply t-tests to the
differences in the means of the two distributions.
The Dynamics of Self-Employment Returns
The analysis of persistence provides a convincing source of evidence on the
propensity to remain self-employed. Yet, it does not rule out some alternative
hypotheses outside of the endogenous accumulation of EHC. The main compet-
ing theories of entrepreneurial dynamics take entrepreneurial ability as fixed,
and then generate dynamics from learning about own-ability [Jovanovic, 1982],
saving, or the like. To disentangle the proposed theory of EHC accumulation
from a Jovanovic-type story, I study enterprise earnings dynamics.
In Jovanovic’s model, individuals persist in self-employment because they
turn out to be the ’good’ entrepreneurs, through getting earnings draws and
learning about own ability. In such a model we should not see entrepreneurial
returns increase greatly relative to the overall economy, because optimal en-
trepreneurial inputs are available immediately at enterprise startup. Hence I
study the dynamics of enterprise earnings and how they increase relative to the
growth of the overall economy and counterfactual wages.
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Selection-corrected earnings dynamics The final piece of evidence on earn-
ings dynamics comes from taking years spent running an enterprise as a mea-
sure of learning-by-doing and entrepreneurial human capital acquisition. This
is analogous to the literature on education as a source of human capital. Simi-
larly to that literature, the main empirical problem in deriving causal estimates
of the effects of human capital acquisition is one of selection: individuals are
not randomly assigned to acquire entrepreneurial experience. I take the crisis to
provide quasi-experimental variation in the incentives to enter self-employment
and hence acquire entrepreneurial experience.
I calculate years of experience running enterprises in three different size cat-
egories – no employees, only household/unpaid employees in the enterprise,
or those which hire permanent wage workers for an explicit wage. I then use an
adaptation of the Heckman selection procedure to study the selection-corrected
relationship between the experience measures and self-employment earnings
(net profit).
The traditional Heckman model involved running a first-stage selection
equation, then using it to generate an individual-level estimate of the propen-
sity to select into one of the selection options, which is then fed into the second-
stage equation as the inverse Mills ratio. I follow this approach, inserting an
estimate of the propensity to enter self-employment which has already been
presented above in Section 4.5, in equation (4.7). I take the appropriate version
of Gˆit to give me the individual-level occupational selection propensity, then use
it as a control in an earnings experience regression. As already discussed above,
the first-stage selection model incorporates variables reasonably excluded in the
second-stage earnings equation – primarily location-level measures of occupa-
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tional churning. Hence the requirement of at least one non-intersection between
the first- and second-stage equations in a traditional Heckman setup is satisfied.
This approach accounts for individual-level variation in the propensity to enter
self-employment in a given period, based on observables.
The second-stage earnings equation is given as follows:
yi = β0 + expiβ + xiγ + Gˆiδ + εi, (4.9)
where yit represents reported self-employment earnings by individual i, β0 is
a constant, expi is a vector of individual-specific entrepreneurial experience
counts, xi is a vector of other controls (age, age2, gender, education (in years),
marital status), and Gˆi is the projected occupational selection value.
Given that this procedure introduces a generated regressor in the second-
stage earnings equation through Gˆi, in the second stage estimates I use a boot-
strap procedure with 50 replications, to account for a potential non-standard
error distribution rather than imposing normality on the model.
4.6 Estimation Results: Self-employment Persistence and Re-
turns
In this section I present the empirical results on self-employment persistence,
and self-employment earnings dynamics, respectively.
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4.6.1 Self-employment Persistence
The results from this part of the analysis are summarized in Tables C.3 to C.5.
I present the results of the fixed effects wage equation analysis in Table C.3.
The main goal of this equation is explanatory power, and that seems to be
achieved with an R2 of 0.49. The age effect is notable in implying a convex func-
tion, though the first-order coefficient is negative but not statistically-significant.
In general Mincer equations will generate a concave age effect. Otherwise
we find that the remaining regressors are almost always highly statistically-
significant with reasonable coefficients.
Looking at entrepreneurial persistence, I report on analysis looking sep-
arately at the group of individuals who enter self-employment during 1998
(which might be affected by the onset of the crisis), and those who enter self-
employment during 1999 (whose employment incentives would be expected to
be heavily affected by the brunt of the crisis), in Tables C.4 and C.5, respectively.
I find that the propensity of the individuals who enter during the crisis, which
can be reasonably argued to be dominated by those involuntarily forced into
self-employment, to remain in self-employment is remarkably high, even after
controlling for the opportunity cost of self-employment, the expected wage. All
changes in propensity are strongly statistically significant, by a standard t-test.
Individuals who are self-employed during the crisis are very likely to be
self-employed even after the crisis – about a tripling of the propensity to be self-
employed for the 1998 entrants, and anywhere from a four to ten times increase
for those who enter in 1999. As we look at years further and further from the
crisis, up until 2008, the propensity to remain in self-employment remains re-
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markably strong. Namely, even after accounting for the expected wage, and
hence the recovery of the economy, we still see a very strong increase in propen-
sity to remain self-employed. I take this to suggest that the individuals who
involuntarily enter self-employment during the crisis manage to accumulate a
significant enough stock of EHC from that experience that they become much
more likely to subsequently engage in self-employment. I argue that this in-
creased propensity is far greater than would be predicted by any reasonable
model that assumes away the endogenous accumulation of EHC. In particular,
the effect seems to be so qualitatively large as to exceed any reasonable frictions
that might inhibit back into the wage sector, such as job search frictions.
4.6.2 The Dynamics of Self-Employment Returns
If we look at the raw numbers, we see that in the year in which the main cri-
sis cohort enters self-employment, 1999, their self-employment earnings are
about 9% lower than the counterfactual expected wage. Note that this is per-
fectly reasonable in a model in which (i) individuals are unexpected forced to
enter self-employment (due to the crisis), and/or (ii) they anticipate dynamic
increases in earnings over time. By 10 years later the situation has flipped quite
strongly – expected earnings are now 16% higher than the counterfactual ex-
pected wage. While the latter figure is biased somewhat by the natural attrition
of some lower-performing entrepreneurs, the bias is limited by the low attrition
that has already been discussed in this cohort.
This effect seems large in terms of levels, also. By the year 2000, 1998 entrants
see a 40% increase in profitability, while 1999 entrants see a 20% increase. This is
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substantial, and far exceeds the growth rate of the economy (as a control for time
trend). For example, we see only about an 8% increase in expected wage, which
provides a reasonable and context-relevant baseline comparison to control for
economic growth overall. This trajectory in returns points to a human capital
accumulation dynamic. In addition, it provides further evidence against labor
market frictions in explaining the lack of switching – switching costs would
have to be on the order of 20% of yearly income to justify not switching back
into wage employment.
4.6.3 Selection-corrected earnings dynamics
The final piece of evidence on earnings dynamics comes from taking years spent
running an enterprise as a measure of learning-by-doing and entrepreneurial
human capital acquisition. As discussed, I employ a version of the Heckman
selection model. As also noted, part of the first-stage analysis is taken from
previous work on occupational persistence, and hence I do not present those
first-stage results here, rather just focusing on the second-stage earnings equa-
tion.
Tables C.6 and C.7 provide final-stage selection-corrected evidence on re-
turns, using entrants from the years 1998 and 1999, respectively. What we first
notice is that selection bias, at least according to controls based on observables,
does not appear to be an important problem, as the estimated coefficient on the
inverse Mills ratio is not statistically distinguishable from zero in either regres-
sion.
Looking at the coefficients on the experience variables, we see that the shape
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of returns in experience is intuitive, following a concave shape for all three
types, with the exception of the single proprietor enterprises amongst 1999
entrants, with easily the highest returns for those running enterprises in the
greater complexity category. Among the 1998 entrants, the estimated learning
effect is positive for all three types, though seemingly less persistent for those
running the simplest enterprises, where the positive learning effect diminishes
after just over 4 years. By contrast, the learning effect persists for around 6
years for the other types. Keeping in mind that median enterprise experience
is around 5-6 years in the population, it seems safe to conclude that there is a
positive learning effect. Many of the coefficients for the 1998 entrants are not sta-
tistically significant. While it is tempting to rationalize this based on low sample
size, we get much more precisely-estimated effects from the smaller 1999 entrant
cohort.
Looking at the results from the 1999 cohort, there is interestingly a convex
estimated experience effect for individuals running the simplest enterprises,
which actually implies negative returns to experience for the first five plus years
running an enterprise. While the initial estimated learning effect is positive in
the other two enterprise types, it is dissipates quickly.
These results emerge after controlling for endogenous selection into self-
employment, again with variables plausibly exogenous to individual EHC en-
dowments. In other words, this evidence is about as close as we could reason-
ably expect to get to exogenously assigning experience to individuals.
139
4.7 Alternative Explanations and Further Evidence
While the analysis above is derived from the two strongest sources of evidence
to support the interpretation of the natural experiment – occupational persis-
tence and earnings dynamics – the evidence does not account for all alternative
explanations. This section presents tests meant to account for and cast doubt on
alternative explanations for the results.
4.7.1 Capital Stock Lock-in
One possible alternative explanation for enterprise persistence, other than the
posited story of entrepreneurial human capital acquisition, is capital stock lock-
in. Namely, that individuals who entered during the crisis took on greater sunk
costs in their capital stock investments, which they might have been reluctant
to abandon as the economy recovered. While this seems somewhat implausible
as the crisis period was a time of great uncertainty that saw greater levels of
investment from inexperienced entrepreneurs (both of which should lead to less
significant investment), I carry out a test.
I test this by looking at capital stocks held by individuals who enter self-
employment during the crisis period, and those who had entered at other times.
What we would expect is that if capital stock lock-in were to explain enterprise
persistence, the quantities of startup capital should be larger for firms that en-
tered during the crisis years. Since data on startup capital is only provided in
IFLS4, I am forced to focus on IFLS4 as the source of data. If we look at aver-
age startup capital in the full sample of firms, it is 6722876 Rph., while for firms
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which started up in either 1998 or 1999 (following the main crisis years), the av-
erage starting capital is 5027424 Rph. While both figures are somewhat biased
due to survival (of firms still active during the 2007-08 survey round), since they
both are subject to the same type of bias this is less of a concern.
4.7.2 Optimal Industry Selection
Another possible explanation for the positive earnings dynamic among sur-
vivors after the crisis years is that the individuals who start such enterprises
during the crisis might have optimally selected into higher-growth industries
(due to skill or luck, or both). Hence their earnings increases would be better
explained by the effects or riding a wave during the period of opportunities that
a crisis brings about. The initial suggestion seems implausible in light of the fact
that the crisis was a fairly long-lasting disruptive event, and there continued to
be economic and political changes well beyond the initial onset which would
have made it difficult for early entrants into self-employment to parse out the
best opportunities.
4.7.3 Changes in Inputs
Another potential explanation for the positive earnings dynamic is that it is
driven by inputs. Namely, whether it is because individuals don’t know their
optimal input mix initially (and need to learn) or because of market constraints
preventing initial access to the optimal input mix for new entrants, firms will
increase input usage over time, and hence naturally increase returns.
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However, this assertion does not fit with what we know about changes in
capital stock and labor stock amongst firms. Tables A.3 to A.5 summarizes the
evidence on firms in the IFLS. In particular, we focus on observed changes in
enterprise size from startup to present, the last 2 rows of the tables. The tables
record transitions from startup size to current size for all of the enterprises in
the sample that are operating in 2008.
We see that the propensity of household enterprises to significantly change
in size is quite small, whether size is measured in terms of physical capital or
labor. Only 14% of firms show any growth at all in labor, and for most the
growth is minimal. Even as of the 95th percentile of the distribution, firms show
no change in labor stock. The average change in labor employment is actually
a small decrease. Looking at the data on capital stock, we again see minimal
changes in firm size; even as of the 75th percentile of the capital stock growth
distribution, we only have about a $135 USD change in physical capital since
startup.
Taken together, this evidence indicates that firm growth is not driven by
increases in inputs alone.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter I develop and test a microeconomic theory of entrepreneurial hu-
man capital (EHC) accumulation. The key channel for acquiring EHC is through
direct learning-by-doing. The theory is tested through exploiting a natural ex-
periment based on the 1997-98 Indonesian financial crisis, which provides a
source of exogenous assignment into entrepreneurial activity. This is useful be-
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cause it pins down some confounding factors in selection into self-employment.
The setting is also particularly suitable because we observe a large cohort of
formal-sector workers exogenously forced into self-employment, in the more-
stable informal sector. Consistent with the theory of entrepreneurial human
capital accumulation, entrepreneurial activity is remarkably and robustly per-
sistent. Even after controls for opportunity costs the propensity to be self-
employed amongst this cohort increase by 2 to 9 times. The selection-corrected
dynamic increase in returns to self-employment exceeds what could be reason-
ably expected in the absence of human capital accumulation. Taken together,
these results suggest the importance of modeling entrepreneurial dynamics in a
way that incorporates the role of endogenous human capital accumulation.
These results have a number of implications for policies regarding en-
trepreneurship promotion in developing countries. First, they highlight the
importance of the accumulation of entrepreneurial human capital in enterprise
outcomes. The policy implication from a model in which ability is fixed is that it
is the financier’s job to identify the ex ante higher-ability types as soon as possi-
ble and provide them with the full complement of financing that is proportional
to their stock of entrepreneurial skill. A theory of dynamic entrepreneurial
learning, however, suggests a more incrementalist approach with greater atten-
tion to timing, mixing financing provision with other skill-building services.
Second, the results pertain to institutions for the transfer of entrepreneurial
human capital. In most countries the primary institution for the formation of
skills for the waged-sector is formal education, which can last twelve or more
years. While some writers, notably Schultz, have suggested that education
might be an important venue for the formation of entrepreneurial skill, such
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a hypothesis is not well supported by the evidence in this chapter. Instead, the
results suggest that entrepreneurial skills are more specific and require more fo-
cused and sustained exposure to enterprise activity itself.15 Hence this suggests
the potential for specialized institutions for the transfer of entrepreneurial hu-
man capital. In most developing countries, the existing institution seems to be
the family unit, at least those households in which the parents have a significant
stock of entrepreneurial human capital that can be transferred to their children.
There have attempts at various forms of entrepreneurial training, including
recent tests in the economics literature based on RCT designs, but based on the
results in this chapter it is not so surprising that the results from short-term
training have been mixed at best. While many of the existing programs are
focused on transferring low-level entrepreneurial skills (keeping records, ba-
sics of managing finances, etc.), it seems that high-level entrepreneurial skills
(sales, marketing, risk judgment, product development, etc.) may be signifi-
cantly more important, particularly for growth-oriented firms. It may be that
a more intensive, sustained mix of direct experience and perhaps mentorship
from more experienced and successful entrepreneurs is needed to enable the
emergence of higher-potential entrepreneurs and the transfer of high-level en-
trepreneurial skills.
This chapter also raises a number of questions for future research. The most
obvious one regards the identification of entrepreneurial human capital and its
various components? What are the most important high-level entrepreneurial
skills? Are they complementary to each other, or are certain skills critical at
15This is not to suggest that education is not useful in general, particularly for pushing up
the overall level of human capital in the population. However, the evidence herein, based on
within-population variation in education and EHC, suggests that EHC is a more important rel-
ative factor in enterprise outcomes.
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certain stages? How can such skills be effectively transmitted? A key identifi-
cation challenge faced by this chapter is that many of the results could be ex-
plained not by entrepreneurial human capital accumulation that is internal to
the entrepreneur, but rather an external reputation-building process amongst
customers and other business partners. Of course, reputation is heavily entan-
gled with the underlying ability and performance of the entrepreneur in ques-
tion. Hence future research might employ research strategies better suited to
teasing out these internal and external effects.
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CHAPTER 5
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE AND
ENTREPRENEURIAL HUMAN CAPITAL
5.1 Introduction
An important aspect of economic development is the specialization of economic
roles. This includes the emergence of higher-ability entrepreneurs who accu-
mulate resources according to their productive abilities. Such opportunity-
oriented entrepreneurs can generate employment for people with inferior
entrepreneurial skills who might otherwise be engaged in subsistence self-
employment, and contribute to economic growth. I distinguish opportunity-
oriented entrepreneurs, who enter self-employment to pursue an opportunity,
from subsistence entrepreneurs who enter self-employment due to a lack of al-
ternatives.
This description is consistent with cross-country data. Across less-
developed economies more than half of the workforce is engaged in operating
or working in microenterprises, which generate roughly half of GDP. A negli-
gible proportion of such enterprises manage to grow beyond subsistence scale.
In more developed economies the contribution of microenterprises to employ-
ment and GDP is closer to 15% and an active small and medium enterprise sec-
tor contributes close to half of GDP.1 The apparent stasis of subsistence-oriented
microenterprises along with broader poverty in developing countries has led to
a significant interest in policies to assist existing enterprises and promote the
1I use the following enterprise size categories: microenterprise (1-4 workers), small enter-
prise (5-19 workers), medium enterprise (20-99 workers) large enterprise (100+ workers). These
are the official cohort definitions in the source country of my primary dataset, Indonesia.
146
emergence of new ones.
Such policies have primarily focused on broad impediments to enterprise
activity, including difficulties in obtaining financing. Yet recent evaluations of
such policies in the economics literature have often generated puzzling or dis-
appointing results relative to prior expectations.2 In particular, positive treat-
ment effects on business activity seem to be concentrated among higher-wealth
households or existing business owners, indicating important underlying het-
erogeneity that might go beyond differences in innate ability. The evidence
presented thus far in this thesis, particularly in chapters 3-4, provides further
support for this way of thinking. This raises the natural questions: might ac-
cumulated entrepreneurial skill play a role in explaining the heterogeneity in
outcomes, and more broadly, what are the factors behind the emergence of
opportunity-oriented entrepreneurs?
In order to address these questions I propose and test a theory of en-
trepreneurial human capital (EHC) accumulation. EHC constitutes specialized,
entrepreneurship-specific skills and knowledge, such as in selling, negotiating,
product development, risk judgment ([Shane, 2003]) and entrepreneurial social
capital. Above and beyond heterogeneous ex ante endowments of innate EHC,
perhaps due to genetic inheritance or early upbringing, I hypothesize that EHC
is significantly accumulated through direct exposure to entrepreneurial activ-
2E.g., [de Mel et al., 2008], [Banerjee et al., 2009], and [Karlan & Zinman, 2010], who report,
for example, ”The canonical case for microcredit...is not supported on average. Instead the
impacts are diffuse, heterogeneous, and surprising...Our treatment effects are stronger for
groups that are not typically targeted by microlenders: male and higher-income entrepreneurs.”
[Carter & Olinto, 2003], and [Field & Torero, 2006] find analogous evidence after policy changes
meant to strengthen property rights and hence make it easier for the poor to collateralize their
assets. In addition, [Bruhn et al., 2010] summarize recent evaluations of training programs for
the self-employed in developing countries. To date the effects of such programs, usually short-
term in nature, are highly mixed, and in any case provide little guidance on the emergence of
higher-potential entrepreneurs.
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ity. I hypothesize that the dynamic accumulation of EHC is a crucial factor in
entrepreneurial outcomes, and such entrepreneurial abilities are distinct from
other, generalized forms of human capital such as education, life experience,
and experience in waged employment. The key channels for acquiring EHC
are learning-by-doing (i.e., running an enterprise) and direct familial exposure
to enterprise activity. EHC cannot be transacted in the marketplace separately
from the individual endowed with it, and public institutions for the transmis-
sion of EHC (such as the formal education system for wage work) are gener-
ally absent. Hence dynamic occupational selection incentives and family back-
ground play crucial roles in individuals’ ability to accumulate EHC.
I build EHC accumulation onto the canonical dynamic, discrete-choice
model of occupational choice with credit constraints, in which an individual
assigns a single unit of labor to either working for a wage or running an en-
terprise, in each time period. EHC is accumulated through learning-by-doing
from enterprise experience. Crucial to the learning model is distinguishing the
quality of EHC acquired according to the complexity of the enterprise to which
an individual is exposed. The idea is that individuals who run more complex
enterprises relative to their current stock of EHC enjoy a period of increasing
returns in learning due to experiencing greater complexity in the span of en-
trepreneurial functions. This creates an endogenous learning effect.
The model provides an explanation for the bifurcation in entrepreneurial
outcomes between subsistence and opportunity-oriented self-employed. Indi-
viduals with low ex ante EHC optimally operate relatively small, simple enter-
prises, and hence accumulate little EHC. Higher-ability entrepreneurs, on the
other hand, optimally run more complex enterprises and enjoy far greater EHC
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accumulation, eventually potentially outstripping their access to financial capi-
tal. This formalizes an endogenous poverty trap in one’s stock of EHC, in which
low-skilled self-employed can get stuck in subsistence self-employment.
Through this modeling approach I am able to more plausibly capture hetero-
geneity in entrepreneurial behavior observed in the developing-country setting.
This includes evidence on the dynamic relationship between wealth and enter-
prise activity that is captured in models such as [Buera, 2009], but primarily
through the savings problem. The theory shows how EHC could constitute a
crucial omitted variable in existing studies, generating incorrect inferences in
favor of financial constraints for the subsistence entrepreneurs, while underem-
phasizing the role of financial constraints for the select group of higher-ability
entrepreneurs.3
To my knowledge the theoretical model in this chapter is the first to capture
the life-cycle accumulation of entrepreneurial ability in the presence of selec-
tion effects and market frictions that are particularly relevant in the developing
country setting. The canonical model of entrepreneurship in economics takes
the stock of entrepreneurial skill as fixed.4 Hence the theory in this chapter pro-
vides alternative microeconomic foundations for entrepreneurial dynamics.5
3This potential bias, which may provide a partial explanation for apparent high returns
to capital amongst some developing-country enterprises, is discussed in papers such as
[Udry & Anagol, 2006] and [Naude, 2008].
4An early, equilibrium model of the division of workers between wage and self-
employment, assigning to each individual an ex ante ability parameter from a fixed dis-
tribution, is [Lucas, 1978]. [Kihlstrom & Laffont, 1979] and [Kanbur, 1979] build equilibrium
theories of entrepreneurship based on heterogeneity not in ability but risk preferences.
[Evans & Jovanovic, 1989] develop and estimate a static model of occupational choice between
wage and self-employment under credit constraints that extracts an estimate of the fixed en-
trepreneurial ability parameter. [de Mel et al., 2008] use the same model to rationalize results on
returns to capital amongst micro-firms in Sri Lanka.
5In the realm of dynamic models, one thread of the literature captures the correlation be-
tween wealth and entrepreneurial outcomes in an occupational-choice setting through the
mechanism that higher-ability entrepreneurs will have higher savings ([Cagetti & Nardi, 2006];
[Buera, 2009]). These models are primarily motivated by explaining the pronounced inequal-
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The approach is also in line with recent literature in fields such as psy-
chology and management on the nature of dynamic entrepreneurial learning
([Cope, 2005]; [Politis, 2008]). Such literature has been motivated by the failures
of primarily static, personality-based approaches to explain entrepreneurial
behavior. Instead, this newer literature has particularly focused on learning
through experience.
Within the economics literature the approach in this chapter is closest to the
human capital-based theories of entrepreneurship of [Schultz, 1980]. However,
a crucial distinction is the emphasis in this chapter on direct entrepreneurial ex-
perience as the key channel for acquiring EHC, as opposed to formal education,
as emphasized by Schultz. Though the conceptual development of this chapter
occurred independently, it also echoes recent proposals motivated by similar
empirical literature (e.g., [Bruhn et al., 2010], [Bloom et al., 2010]), and provides
empirical and numerical evidence on some of the tests suggested in that work.
The quantitative analysis of the model involves empirical analysis of earn-
ings trajectories using panel data methods. I am able to construct rich mea-
sures of experience in running enterprises in three distinct complexity cohorts
(no employees, only family/unpaid employees, employing waged employees),
and relate those to earnings outcomes, while controlling for unobserved, time-
invariant heterogeneity. I show that what I find in the data is consistent with
the implications of the model.
This analysis sets the stage for a full numeric analysis of the model.
ity in the wealth distribution in developed economies. An additional class of models stem from
the seminal work of [Jovanovic, 1982], in which entrepreneurs are modeled as Bayesian learners
with an unknown, fixed stock of entrepreneurial ability that they learn about only by working as
entrepreneurs. [Taveras, 2010] shows that an appropriately-calibrated version of this theory can
provide an alternative explanation for a number of stylized facts about entrepreneurial activity
that have been used as evidence for financing constraints in the context of the US economy.
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The empirical analysis contributes a number of new insights about
the dynamics of entrepreneurial skill formation and particularly the
emergence of higher-ability, opportunity-oriented entrepreneurs in devel-
oping countries. Much of the literature to date has been descrip-
tive or focused on uncovering broad correlates of self-employment selec-
tion and outcomes (e.g., [Liedholm & Mead, 1999], [Nafziger & Terrell, 1996],
[Fields & Pfefferman, 2003], and [Barrett et al., 2005]). I employ a uniquely-
suitable panel dataset from Indonesia to conduct the empirical analysis.
The key results are as follows. First, endogenously-accumulated EHC mat-
ters to entrepreneurial outcomes above and beyond innate ability and general-
ized forms of human capital such as life experience and education. In addition,
the estimates indicate that direct exposure to enterprise activity is an order of
magnitude more important than overall life experience and education in ex-
plaining enterprise performance, implying a 5-12% increase in net profits for
each year of experience. In addition, I show: (1) that distinguishing varying
quality in acquired entrepreneurial experience is important, with greater value
derived from experience with more complex enterprises, and (2) that there are
increasing returns in higher-value entrepreneurial experience, which indicates
a bifurcation in entrepreneurial dynamics between subsistence and opportunity
entrepreneurs that is consistent with the theory. In addition, I provide evidence
on two empirical questions raised in light of the model, finding that (1) firm-
specific EHC seems to be much more important than generalized EHC in enter-
prise performance, and (2) that the effects of entrepreneurial learning-by-doing
diffuse over years; positive marginal effects of learning-by-doing are evident for
7-12 or more years in the main specification.
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The results from this analysis are largely new relative to the existing liter-
ature, particularly given the dearth of existing datasets providing detailed in-
formation on entrepreneurial activity beyond recording the broad occupational
category of self-employment. Datasets connecting individual entrepreneurs to
their firm have only recently begun to emerge in the US, for example, and hence
still have a relatively short time-series dimension. I employ a dataset, the In-
donesia Family Life Survey, that is unique in that the cross-sectional population
is large enough to statistically distinguish subsistence entrepreneurs from plau-
sibly opportunity-oriented entrepreneurs with 10, 15 or more employees. Com-
parable existing studies are largely based on individuals running firms with 1-2
employees.
In addition, using household data allows me to overcome the selection bi-
ases and lack of information on the individual entrepreneur inherent in firm-
level data. The data also provide rich information on entrepreneurial histo-
ries within the panel and recall data spanning as far back as first employ-
ment. While most existing studies use rough approximations for experience
such as age minus one’s age when finishing school, I am able to construct
far more detailed entrepreneurial experience profiles than in existing stud-
ies, stratified by plausible proxies for enterprise complexity. I use these mea-
sures of accumulated experience as proxies for the formation of entrepreneurial
skill. Hence while the empirical analysis in this chapter is limited to provid-
ing statistically-meaningful results on entrepreneurs running firms with less
than 20-25 employees, the results can be taken as suggestive for the nature of
entrepreneurial activity more broadly, where similar analysis might not even
be possible. In addition, while a number of studies point out the important
distinction between subsistence and opportunity-oriented entrepreneurs (e.g.,
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[Liedholm & Mead, 1999]; [Barrett et al., 2005]; [Schoar, 2010]), this study devel-
ops and tests detailed micro-level mechanisms meant to account for how such
heterogeneity arises.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First I outline the dynamic model and
present some results in Section 5.2. I outline the panel regression approach and
present the results of that analysis, along with a couple pieces of additional
evidence, in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 concludes. Regression tables, proofs and
other evidence are presented in Appendix D.
5.2 Dynamic Model of Entrepreneurial Capital Accumulation
This section provides a model of entrepreneurial human capital accumulation.
The model builds on the standard framework for credit-constrained occupa-
tional choice in the literature by adding the possibility of accumulating en-
trepreneurial human capital through learning-by-doing from occupational ex-
perience, and familial effects. I insert a learning function for the accumulation
of EHC in the model that formalizes my hypotheses about the nature of en-
trepreneurial learning.
This addition to the standard occupational choice model provides a contri-
bution to the literature on entrepreneurship, though it echoes a large literature
in labor economics on the role of experience and job- and occupation-specific
human capital that dates back to [Becker, 1964]. Such work has seen remarkably
little application to the process of entrepreneurship. In addition, the structure
of the learning function is meant to capture human capital accumulation pro-
cesses that seem more applicable to entrepreneurship. There have been a couple
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of papers that attempt to formalize similar ideas, though they are distinct from
the approach here.[Otani, 1996] models the accumulation of a specialized stock
of entrepreneurial knowledge, though it occurs through a specialized manage-
rial apprenticeship stage. [Iyigun & Owen, 1998] provide a brief analysis of the
accumulation of entrepreneurial human capital in an overlapping-generations
setting that incorporates the role of occupational choice, though it does not lend
itself as well to studying the rich set of dynamic processes that I consider.
The learning process formalized in the model captures the idea that there
are increasing returns to learning as entrepreneurs scale up their enterprise rel-
ative to their ex ante stock of ability. The idea is that because the entrepreneur
typically ends up managing a number of complex enterprise processes simul-
taneously, this can lead to a kind of multiplier effect in these joint tasks. Hence
an individual running a more sophisticated enterprise relative to their current
knowledge and ability will accumulate significantly more learning than an in-
dividual running a significantly less sophisticated enterprise. I formalize this
learning process, along with other standard entrepreneurial tasks such as pro-
duction and investment, in a dynamic programming framework. I show that
the model has a tractable, recursive representation, and then provide additional
analysis of the model. I show how the model formalizes static and dynamic oc-
cupational selection incentives. In particular, the model captures the possibility
that the entrepreneur might ”strategically” invest in enterprise activity, perhaps
taking lower static returns today in order to benefit from greater future returns
due to EHC accumulation. The nature of the learning function also allows for
the possibility of a ”firm ladder” as seen in the data, in which successful en-
trepreneurs make successive, large investments over time in growing their en-
terprise activities, rather than making steady, incremental investments. Finally,
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I show how the model can generate outcomes consistent with the relationships
we see in the data between wealth and enterprise activity on the one hand, and
income shocks and enterprise activity on the other. We see how a strong link be-
tween wealth and enterprise activity only emerges for the relatively wealthier
subset of the population. In contradiction with the standard model of credit-
constrained occupational choice, relatively wealthier individuals may be more
responsive to positive income shocks in terms of enterprise activity.
The theoretical work in this chapter contributes to a long line of work in eco-
nomics on the role of entrepreneurs in the economy. Some of the best-known
work, by scholars such as Frank Knight and Joseph Schumpeter, develops theo-
ries taking the presence of entrepreneurs as given and then studies their role in
the economy. While Schumpeter distinguished entrepreneurs from capitalists,
Knight’s approach sees entrepreneurs’ primary role in making judgments under
uncertainty, which at its essence involves the allocation of resources. This ap-
proach is closer to what I have in mind here, as it emphasizes important abilities
of entrepreneurs that could be considered as elements of EHC, such as judgment
and foresight, which cannot be directly transacted in the market.6
The closest existing work, though somewhat less known, is that of the Nobel-
prize winner T.W. Schultz. Schultz’s perspective on entrepreneurship explicitly
focused on human-capital, allowing anyone to be defined as an entrepreneur
who adjusts or reallocates economic resources in response to changes in eco-
nomic circumstances [Schultz, 1980]. Schultz hypothesizes about the channels
through which entrepreneurial ability is formed, focusing on formal education
6An additional, prominent strand of work in the Austrian tradition is that of Israel Kirzner.
Kirzner’s theory primarily defines entrepreneurs based on their alertness to profit opportuni-
ties. This approach does not lend itself to a model of an optimizing agent, though the approach
fits with mine to the extent that such ‘alertness’ can be seen as a developed entrepreneurial skill.
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though also acknowledging the role of experience.7 However, the theory devel-
oped herein is conceptually distinct from Schultz’s approach, both in allowing
entrepreneurial actions to take place outside of a state of disequilibrium, and in
emphasizing direct experience and exposure, rather than formal education, as
the key factor in the accumulation of EHC.
5.2.1 Environment and Primitives
In each discrete time period individuals, denoted by i, allocate a single unit
of labor to either waged employment or self-employment (aka., entrepreneur-
ship). The agents in the model can also be thought of as households, which
have unitary preferences and allocate a single unit of labor. I focus on individu-
als because most of the empirical analysis focuses on individuals, though there
is some analysis with the household as the unit observation, with the head of the
household taken as the relevant individual representative. Individuals may dif-
fer on three key dimensions. First, each individual possesses a stock of wealth,
denoted by Wi ≥ 0.
Second, individuals are endowed with stock variables representing the ac-
cumulation of human capital in each of the two occupational activities. Denote
the individual’s stock of wage experience by xi ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, which increments
in years of experience in waged employment. The return to waged employment
is given by w (xi) = xiξ ≥ 0, where ξ is a mean one i.i.d. shock with positive sup-
port and finite variance σ2ξ . The parameter ξ will be important in modeling the
role of shocks to the wage sector in occupational choice incentives. I take E to
7A succinct discussion of Schultz’s perspective on entrepreneurship, including in relation to
other prominent schools of thought, is provided in [Klein & Cook, 2006].
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denote the expectation operator over the distribution of wages as a function of
ξ.
Finally, the individual is endowed with a stock of EHC denoted by ei ∈ R+. I
will discuss the accumulation and evolution of EHC in detail shortly, after dis-
cussing the payoff functions. I model the labor allocation choice as a discrete
choice between two occupations for simplicity, as a model of the choice over the
primary occupation. The model can naturally be extended to a setting in which
the individual holds multiple occupations simultaneously, for example allocat-
ing some time to running a business and some time to waged employment.
The revenue function for enterprise activity is given by,
f (ei, k, l) , (5.1)
where l is the labor input in the business, k is the capital input, and f is a produc-
tion function with the standard properties: f is strictly increasing in each of its
arguments, f is concave, all of the cross-partials are strictly positive amongst the
inputs, and the standard Inada conditions hold. The lack of an output price in
the revenue function can be interpreted as normalizing the output price, p = 1.
I assume that f is weakly DRS jointly in (k, l), but I allow the possibility of in-
creasing returns in all three factors together once the entrepreneurial factor, ei,
is accounted for.8 However, since ei is not a choice variable of the agent, the
8Formally, I assume that for any λ > 1,
f (ei, λk, λl) ≤ λ f (ei, k, l) ,
but it can be that,
f (λei, λk, λl) ≥ λ f (ei, k, l) .
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within-period production function is always effectively DRS in (k, l).
The individual’s net income if self-employment is chosen is given by the
following return function
R (k, l;w, r; ei,Wi) = f (ei, k, l) + r (Wi − k) − wl, (5.2)
where w is a market wage and r represents the cost of renting capital within the
period.
I assume that the cost of capital must be paid up front and hence the indi-
vidual may be bound by the following credit constraint,
0 ≤ rk ≤ λ (ei,Wi) , (5.3)
where λ represents the individual’s ability to obtain additional financing to pur-
chase business capital as a function of EHC and wealth. In general λ (e,Wi) ≥ Wi
for any value of e, since the individual can always employ her own wealth
to increase the capital stock of the enterprise (assuming that Wi indexes liquid
wealth). I assume that λ is increasing and concave in both arguments, and twice
continuously differentiable. Between own internal resources and credit access,
the individual may or may not be able to attain her return-maximizing level of
capital stock, k∗ (w, r, ei). Namely, it may be that rk∗ > λ (ei,Wi). Such a constraint
is common in the literature,9 and is often interpreted as arising from credit mar-
ket dysfunction, perhaps due to weak contracting institutions or asymmetric in-
9In papers such as [Evans & Jovanovic, 1989] this constraint takes the form λW, where λ
is a parameter, and W represents household wealth. This also echoes the specification in
[Feder, 1985], where credit supply is given by S (V), where V is land owned by the household
(the natural collateralizable asset in his rural agricultural setting) and S is a supply function.
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formation on the part of lenders about borrowers. Having EHC enter this func-
tion is novel,10 and pins down a separate role of EHC from its role in the pro-
duction function. It may be that EHC generates greater access to capital based
on reputation, social connections that generate access to credit, etc. Hence EHC
and credit access can be positively correlated.
Notice that while I allow the individual to ”sell” her stock of waged-
employment-specific human capital, xi, through the wage function w (xi), I do
not allow for the same transaction for EHC. While EHC enters the return func-
tion for self-employment, R (k, l;w, r; ei,Wi), when the individual is running a
business, there is not a separate occupational choice in which the individual di-
rectly ”sells” their EHC for a wage, for example to work as a businessperson or
manager on someone else’s behalf. A similar assumption is commonly made in
the relevant occupational choice literature, though usually only implicitly.
In fact, it constitutes an important ”missing market” assumption that is cru-
cial to showing that credit constraints can drive heterogeneous returns to phys-
ical capital (including values well above the market interest rate). This should
not be surprising, as we know from standard neoclassical theory that one miss-
ing market is insufficient to generate market price idiosyncrasies. A similar
point is made by [Feder, 1985]. Nonetheless, I maintain the assumption of non-
tradability of EHC. I motivate this assumption by referring to labor market (i.e.,
contracting) frictions that make it difficult to family enterprises to hire and mon-
itor outsiders as managers. I provide evidence that such market frictions matter
10As [Evans & Jovanovic, 1989] note, ”In a more realistic model, λ would depend not only on
W but also on observed characteristics...since the latter affect returns and hence the probability
of repayment.” After citing an empirical paper providing evidence that credit access indeed
seems to depend on characteristics of the entrepreneur like business experience of the applicant,
size of the firm and past credit record of the firm, they note that ”...in future work it would be
useful to explore whether the liquidity constraint and the interest rate depend on demographic
characteristics.”
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in Table D.1, where I present an adaption of the test of [Benjamin, 1992] for labor
market frictions in the agricultural setting, which is also motivated by asymmet-
ric information concerns. A more detailed discussion of this test if provided in
the Appendix.
Now I discuss the accumulation of EHC, ei, in more detail. EHC can be ac-
quired through two channels. First, the individual has an ex ante endowment
of EHC upon entering the workforce, which is denoted by e¯i. e¯i can be strictly
greater than zero because it may be that the individual has some innate EHC
at birth, or acquires EHC through her upbringing, particularly due to direct ex-
posure to entrepreneurial activity in the family unit. This could be modeled
by a familial EHC acquisition function h (e˜i) = e¯i, where e˜i is the individual’s
stock of innate EHC and h is a positive, monotonic mapping from innate ability
into the stock of EHC with which the individual enters the workforce. If the
individual selects self-employment, she can additionally acquire EHC through
learning by doing. For simplicity, I do not allow for the possibility of deprecia-
tion of the stock of EHC, though this would also constitute a natural extension
to the model.
Under learning by doing, ei evolves according to experience acquired
through occupational choices. I model this by assuming that the person running
an enterprise adds to her EHC stock according to the positive learning function
g (ei, c) = e′i , where c ≥ 0 is a measure of enterprise complexity. The idea is
quite intuitive – there is relatively more to be learned by an individual who is
running a business that is relatively more sophisticated and unfamiliar, due to
the greater span of enterprise functions that the individual faces. I capture the
nature of entrepreneurial learning through the following properties. First, the
160
degree to which an individual learns (the ”quality” of learning) depends on the
complexity of the enterprise to which they are exposed. A natural index for en-
terprise complexity in this setting is the size of the enterprise in a given period;
hence I take the complexity to be a function of labor and capital employed in the
period: c (k, l). I assume that c is strictly increasing and CRS in its arguments,
and twice-continuously differentiable.
Second, the degree of learning depends on the individual’s existing stock of
EHC. In particular, there exist diminishing learning returns to complexity such
that operating an enterprise of complexity c leads to relatively more learning for
individual with EHC stock ei than the individual with e′i , where ei < e
′
i .
Third, there are increasing returns in learning, for the right ratio of enter-
prise complexity to the individual’s current EHC. In mathematical terms, this
means that the learning function is not specified in levels, but rather it takes as
an argument a function that is roughly a ratio with c in the numerator and ei in
the denominator. To understand this latter property, we can think about an in-
dividual running a very simple enterprise not learning very much, because the
enterprise’s functions – sales, marketing, financing, negotiating, etc. – are all
very simple and quickly mastered if they require any skill at all. This would be
a case where c is small, so c/e is relatively small. However, for a relatively more
complex enterprise one takes on a significantly more complex and comprehen-
sive set of entrepreneurial functions. Hence there are initially increasing returns
to learning over a certain range of the complexity/ability nexus. Namely, c/e
will initially be small, but because the value of next period’s e is increasing in
c/e today, the value of the ratio will diminish as e ”catches up” over time. This
is the limit at which decreasing returns take over, perhaps because the indi-
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vidual suffers from time constraints, learning capacity constraints, and the like.
[Jovanovic & Nyarko, 1996] model the dynamic process of acquiring knowledge
about the operation of a technology, and obtain an analogous convex learning
effect.
To formalize these ideas I assume that g takes the following functional form,
g (ei, c (k, l)) = `
(
c (k, l)
1 + ei
)
ei = e′i ≥ 1, (5.4)
where ` is a particular case of the learning function and e′i is next-period’s stock
of EHC given current stock ei. Here, I assume that ` is an increasing, monotonic,
twice continuously-differentiable function with the properties that ` (0) = 1, and
`′ (0) = 0. I assume that there exists a point e > 0, such that ` is convex up to e,
then concave afterwards, i.e.,
`′′ > 0 if 0 ≤ ei ≤ e, (5.5)
`′′ < 0 if ei ≥ e.
The mathematical assumptions provide ` with the following properties,
which conform with the previous description of entrepreneurial learning:
(1) ` is increasing in c and decreasing in ei, so that learning is increasing in en-
terprise complexity and decreasing in the existing stock of knowledge. The fact
that the argument of ` is a ratio naturally captures the idea that learning is rela-
tive to existing EHC;
(2) if c = 0, then ` = 1, which is essentially a normalization implying that run-
ning the simplest firm leads to no learning regardless of one’s stock of ei;
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(3) ` is ”not explosive” in small values of ei; because of the normalization of
the denominator by (1 + ei) the argument of ` cannot grow exponentially as the
denominator goes to zero. This is meant to capture the idea that individuals
should not accumulate arbitrary quantities of learning due to starting from a
low initial point;
(4) the assumptions on the second-order shape of `, given in equation (5.5)
imply that there are increasing returns in learning over a certain range of
c (k, l) / (1 + ei), but these effects eventually diminish. This captures the idea of
multiplication in the challenge of being an entrepreneur as one’s responsibilities
increase across all tasks, but that there is eventually a limit to such learning.
As an alternative description, the function ` can then be displayed IN Figure
D.1 in c/(1 + ei)-
(
e′i/ei
)
space.
Finally, I model individual preferences over money by the utility function U,
where money is taken as the index of consumption. U has the standard mathe-
matical properties – strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously dif-
ferentiable, and Inada conditions hold. For technical reasons I additionally as-
sume that U is bounded.
5.2.2 Bellman Equation
Let V represent represent the individual’s value function, which evaluates the
value of the stream of benefits emanating from a given set of state variables,
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(ei, xi,Wi, ξ),
V (ei, xi,Wi, ξ) (5.6)
= max
{
max
s∈[0,w(xi)+Wi]
U [Wi + w (xi) − s] + δEV (ei, xi + 1, s, ξ′) ,
max
s∈[0,R+Wi], l≥0,
k∈[0,λ(ei,Wi)/r]
U [Wi + R (k, l;w, r; ei,Wi) − s] + δEV (` (c (k, l) / (1 + ei)) , xi, s, ξ′)
 ,
where s represents the intertemporal savings choice problem, and δ ∈ (0, 1) is
the discount factor. Savings must be chosen from the feasible set at the end of a
period – the stock of wealth, Wi, plus the intra-period income realization, which
is w (xi) in the case of waged employment and R in the case of self-employment.
This lays out the agent’s dynamic choice problem. Given ability endowments
ei and xi, wealth Wi and a realization of ξ from the distribution of wage shocks,
the individual makes the discrete occupational choice between waged and self-
employment, accumulating ability in one of the skill areas.
5.2.3 Analysis
Here I provide analysis of the dynamic model of EHC accumulation summa-
rized in equation (5.6). I begin by stating some basic technical results about the
model that I will analyze further in the Appendix, and then I state a number of
predictions of the model that I will explore in the empirical work.
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The basic technical properties of the model
Here I confirm that the mathematical assumptions on the model are sufficient
to imply the existence of the recursive form, and additional properties of the
model. The formal definition of the relevant mathematical objects and the for-
mal proofs of these statements are provided in the Appendix.
The value function V exists and is unique. Furthermore, V is bounded and
continuous, and a stationary optimal policy ζ∗ exists.
Endogenous selection effects
The value function in equation (5.6) formalizes the dynamic incentives inherent
in the occupational choice problem. First, the individual faces an initial ”se-
lection” incentive. Depending on the initial (possibly non-zero) endowments
of ei and xi the individual makes the initial occupational choice, comparing the
two discrete terms in the value function. All things equal we would expect
that individuals with a relatively higher stock of ability in a given occupation to
self-select into that occupation. ei and xi might be accumulated prior to formally
entering the workforce through familial effects, education, or other life experi-
ences. Self-selecting into a given occupation can then lead to the acquisition of
relevant skills that further shift the choice margin between the two occupations.
It is important to keep this initial selection problem in mind while interpret-
ing data on occupational trajectories. Notice also how the i.i.d. wage shock
term, ξ, can influence the static decision between the two occupations. While
the long-run terms, δEV (·), are unchanged by the present wage shock, the com-
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parison
U
[
Wi + xiξ − s] ≶ U [Wi + R (k, l;w, r; ei,Wi) − s] (5.7)
is directly influenced by the realization of ξ. While one could extend the model
with additional stochasticity, it is already apparent that ξ can serve to break the
potential determinism in the model emanating from the initial values of Wi, xi,
and ei.
The model also captures dynamic selection effects that are more subtle. First,
there is a strategic investment incentive due to the possibility of accumulat-
ing xi and ei. While a simple static comparison between w (xi) and the highest
attainable value of R (k, l;w, r; ei,Wi) (which could even be negative) might im-
ply that waged employment is optimal, the dynamic considerations emanating
from the possibility of accumulating ei (and Wi) through self-employment might
lead the individual to self-select into self-employment. Because of the nature of
the learning process, this kind of strategic human capital investment behavior is
possible for any initial value of ei. Hence the individual may be willing to accept
a static lower payoff for a number of periods in order to enjoy a greater long-run
return. On the other hand, if the financial constraint is particularly binding the
individual might have an incentive to pursue waged employment for a number
of periods in order to build up savings, and then switch into self-employment
when a sufficient investment in the enterprise can be made.
Firm ladder and occupational persistence
The possibility of a ”firm ladder” is perhaps the most interesting dynamic be-
havior generated by the model. The motivation for such behavior was provided
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in Chapter 3, where we saw that firms tend not to change in size significantly
(at least in terms of number of employees). This suggests that if entrepreneurs
are seen to operate larger and larger enterprises, this generally occurs through
making a large investment in a new enterprise, rather than growing a given en-
terprise. This fits with the idea that in order to obtain the benefits of the convex
learning function, individuals must pursue operating an enterprise at a suffi-
cient complexity level. Hence the possibility of observing a policy in which
the individual makes intermittent ”large” enterprise investments, saving in the
meantime. In addition, once individuals select into a given occupation, having
made investments they are incentivized to persist in that firm type.11 I formalize
this intuition in the form of a proposition.
For ei, e, 1/σ2ξ , and δ sufficiently large, `
′′ sufficiently large on
(
0, e
)
, and
λ (ei,Wi) sufficiently small on R2+, there exists an optimal policy ζ∗ under which
s∗ > 0 in all states, with s∗ increasing in ei, and there exists a ratio of Wi/ei such
that e′/e  1, whereas when such a ratio is not satisfied e′/e ≈ 1.
This raises the possibility of observing individual enterprise trajectories in
which the individual saves for a number of periods, then undertakes a signif-
icant enterprise investment (enjoying the significant increase in EHC from the
convex learning function, perhaps for more than one period), then persists in a
relatively similar enterprise size while continuing to save.
Such a potential optimal policy also implies that we would be more likely
to observe the returns function to be convex in EHC for opportunity-oriented
entrepreneurs.
11[Keane & Wolpin, 1997] present an analysis of labor force trajectories based on this insight.
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The relationship between wealth and enterprise activity
The model can match the stylized observations discussed in Chapter 3 that (i)
low-wealth households seem to show little relationship between wealth and
enterprise activity, and (ii) as of some percentile of the wealth distribution, the
correlation between wealth and enterprise activity becomes more pronounced.
Low-wealth households generally have low stocks of EHC (else they would not
have low-wealth). Hence if and when they start enterprises, those enterprises
are optimally relatively small, due to the static incentives inherent in R – having
a small stock of EHC, it is optimal for the capital and labor stocks employed
in the enterprise to also be relatively small. For initial ei sufficiently small this
static profitability incentive overwhelms the long-run incentive to invest in the
enterprise in order to increase EHC accumulation. But according to the struc-
ture of the learning process, employing relatively small k and l leads to little
learning, and hence persistence of the small stock of EHC, regardless of finan-
cial situation.
On the other hand, for individuals with sufficient endowments of EHC,
they are induced to (optimally) start relatively complex enterprises. This puts
them higher on the learning curve, which allows them to more rapidly accumu-
late EHC. Hence, when possible they will own-save in order to fund the opti-
mal capital stock to match their stock of EHC. However, because λ is concave
and eventually bounded the the individual can become relatively financially-
constrained.
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The response to income/wealth shocks is increasing in wealth
This is the natural extension of the previous subsection, in which relatively
poor, low-ability individuals can end up in an endogenous EHC poverty trap,
whereas higher-ability individuals optimally begin to own-save out of it. Based
on the convex learning function, the higher-ability, wealthier individual might
actually end up more constrained by financing than a lower-ability, less-wealthy
individual. This drives the pent up demand for capital amongst more wealthy
or higher-ability individuals that has been verified in a number of empirical
studies (e.g., [Carter & Olinto, 2003], [de Mel et al., 2008], [Banerjee et al., 2009],
[Karlan & Zinman, 2010]). Higher-wealth individuals end up becoming more
responsive to financial access shocks than do lower-wealth individuals, con-
trary to the conventional neoclassical model of occupational choice but consis-
tent with much recent empirical evidence.
5.3 Identifying the Formation of and Returns to EHC
The focus of this section is on using panel data methods to identify the role of
dynamically-accumulated EHC on entrepreneurial returns, accounting for the
role of innate EHC and other time-invariant factors through individual fixed ef-
fects. The key variables used to identify accumulated EHC are rich measures of
enterprise experience that distinguish between the complexity of the enterprise
that the individual operates (no employees, only household/unpaid employ-
ees, or hiring waged employees). I primarily focus on testing the following hy-
potheses: (1) that endogenously-accumulated EHC matters to entrepreneurial
outcomes above and beyond innate entrepreneurial ability, (2) that distinguish-
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ing the value of varying quality in acquired entrepreneurial experience is impor-
tant, (3) that endogenously-accumulated EHC matters above and beyond gen-
eralized forms of human capital such as life experience and education, and (4)
that there is a bifurcation in entrepreneurial outcomes according to the quality
of one’s enterprise experience. In addition, I provide evidence on the question
of whether EHC is primarily firm-specific, or accumulated as a general stock of
entrepreneurial skill across specific firms that an individual operates, and the
nature of the entrepreneurial learning curve.
These hypotheses drive the empirical specifications. I begin by outlin-
ing a general framework separating the roles of innate and endogenously-
accumulated EHC. Then I outline how the identification operates in a panel
setting. I show that because my main regressor of interest is a dynamically-
accumulated factor, panel fixed effects are only a partial solution for identifica-
tion problems emanating from selection. Then I provide a brief description of
the data. I then provide regression analysis on the role of EHC. The main results
are derived in a log-linear panel regression setup. I then conduct subsequent
analysis that parses out the results using quantile regressions.
I then estimate an alternative, Cobb-Douglas model of EHC accumula-
tion, which I interpret as providing an estimate of the ”EHC production func-
tion.” I use the results of this analysis to derive the implied distribution of
endogenously-accumulated EHC in the population.
Finally, in order to deal with the identification challenges in identifying EHC,
due to endogeneity of dynamically-accumulated EHC resulting from ex ante se-
lection, I run the same panel regressions on selected cohorts. This is meant to
further purge the role of unobserved factors in selection into entrepreneurship
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and hence provide supportive evidence from smaller subsamples.
5.3.1 Framework for Distinguishing Innate and Accumulated
EHC
The theory formalizes the idea that entrepreneurship-specific human capital is
both (i) innate or accumulated through experiences during upbringing, and
(ii) built through experience – direct exposure to enterprise activity through
learning-by-doing (i.e., someone running an enterprise oneself) and learning
from others (i.e., close exposure to how an enterprise is run, perhaps from fam-
ily members (e.g., in a family business). So we can think of EHC, eit, as being
an unobserved stock variable composed of both fixed and evolving components
for individual i,
eit = (ei, e(expit, zit)) , (5.8)
where ei is the fixed stock of EHC of person i acquired prior to entering the
workforce, and e(expit, zit) represents an EHC shifter function, capturing the way
that one can augment their stock of EHC during their work life.12 expit repre-
sents a vector capturing cumulative entrepreneurial experience as of period t,
and zit records other factors (e.g., education) that could influence the acquisi-
12This setup is related to the recent work by Heckman and Cunha on the technology of skill
production (see, e.g., [Cunha et al., 2006]). In that work they model and empirically estimate
the production of occupational-relevant skills during upbringing, focusing on the role of critical
stages in skill acquisition and complementarities between cognitive and non-cognitive skills.
The analysis here takes many of the particular skills that Heckman and Cunha focus on as given,
since those early skill formation processes are not easily measured here and of less interest
anyway since they form more generalized human capital. In a standard Heckman-Cunha model
we have a given stock of skills, and it is augmented through investments. The approach is
similar here. In the data investments are identified as units of time spent in direct or at least close
exposure to entrepreneurship. Time units are parsed by a quality index, which is essentially an
index of enterprise size/complexity, which seems a good index of quality in these data.
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tion of EHC.13 I will take expit to be a vector that counts years of experience in
directly running an enterprise, stratified in two directions. First, wherever the
IFLS records occupational histories it distinguishes between experience running
an enterprise with no employees, with only family or unpaid workers in the en-
terprise, or with outside, paid workers. While certainly not a perfect measure, I
argue that distinguishing enterprise experience in this way is superior to other,
more ad hoc ways of classifying the quality of self-employment experience. The
hypothesis is that this distinction should make a difference–that years of expe-
rience in a more complex enterprise (i.e., which provides stable employment for
hired workers) should have higher value than other forms of experience. Sec-
ond, I stratify expit by years of experience in one’s current enterprise in a given
year, or whether experience was recorded in a prior enterprise. This allows me to
distinguish between the value of firm-specific human capital and one’s longer-
term accumulated enterprise experience.
The distinction between innate, fixed EHC, ei, and that which is endoge-
nously acquired, e(expit, zit), is greatly facilitated by the availability of panel data.
Indeed, the theory predicts that individuals with higher ex ante ability should be
more likely to enter self-employment, all things equal. But this should then lead
to further accumulation of EHC, according to the theory. This implies that ex
ante ability should be correlated with endogenously-acquired EHC, or in other
words, that there is unobserved selection bias in who accumulate EHC. If ex
ante ability could not be controlled for, this would lead to upward bias in the
estimate of the role of endogenously-acquired EHC. I show that under certain
assumptions, the panel structure of the data allows me to control for ex ante,
13Of course, in theory zit includes important unobservable factors such as learning effort. To
the extent that such variables are unobservable I assume that they are distributed mean-zero and
independent in the population so that they are captured by the noise parameter in a regression
model.
172
fixed ability through an individual-specific fixed effect.
5.3.2 Identifying EHC in a Panel Regression Framework
The main approach here is to build on the large learning-by-experience lit-
erature in labor economics, and suppose that accumulated entrepreneurial
ability is primarily generated by experience. To be concrete, let Yit be the
period-t observed value of some entrepreneurship-relevant outcome of inter-
est, such as entry or enterprise returns. Then theoretically Yit is a function
f (e¯i, e(expit, zit), xi, xit), with xi and xit representing other fixed and time-varying
factors from enterprise inputs like labor and capital to other characteristics of
an individual, household, industry or region.
In taking this model to the data, e¯i and eit are not directly observable, only
some components of (xi, xit) are observable, and the form of f is not known. In
order to make this empirically implementable I make a couple of assumptions:
1. Since the functional form of e(expit, zit) is not known, I assume that e (.) can
be approximated through a parametric functional form.
2. While the form of f is unknown, I assume we can approximate it as fol-
lows. First suppose that f is additively separable in e¯i and the unobservable
components of xi and xit, which I denote by x˜i and x˜it (and with slight abuse of
notation denote the observable parts by the original label), and affine in e¯i, x˜i
and x˜it; that is
Yit = f (e¯i, ei, xi, xit, x˜i, x˜it) = e¯i + x˜i + fˆ (e (expit, zit) , xi, xit) + x˜it, (5.9)
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so that I can control for (e¯i + x˜i) through an individual fixed effect. To control
for x˜it (unobserved individual-specific time effects) I assume that x˜it = x¯it + νit,
where x¯it is homogenous across individuals and νit is i.i.d. noise, so I can control
x˜it through a time period fixed effect.
Notice that this approach does not allow me to compare the role of ex ante
EHC to endogenous EHC (i.e., e¯i versus eit) since the fixed effect (e¯i + x˜i) in-
cludes x˜i, which in principle can be of any sign and magnitude. The most I can
conclude from this setup is that eit is statistically/economically significant after
controlling for e¯i. In addition, notice that if key inputs in the profit function,
such as labor and capital, are not accounted for, then x˜i controls for the average
value of these inputs, while the deviations from the average value of the inputs
enters the error term. According to the theory, this should imply some positive
correlation between the error term and the measure of EHC.
In this approach I take (expit, zit) to perfectly measure endogenous human
capital, and assume that I know the functional form of e (.). Hence I run the
empirical version of equation (5.9) in one stage in a panel regression, with the
following empirical specification,
Yit = e¯i + x˜i + fˆ (expit, zit, xi, xit) + x˜it + µit, (5.10)
where µit denotes all other residual noise, measurement and sampling error, etc.
Hence the regression equation becomes the following
Yit = γi + g (expit, zit, xi, xit, β) + εit, (5.11)
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where γi = (e¯i + x˜i) can be estimated as a regression fixed effect term, g will be
a linear-in-estimators function, with β representing a vector of regression coef-
ficients to be estimated, and εit = x˜it + µit is the error term. In order to generate
consistent estimates, I need to assume that x˜it, representing unobserved, time-
varying factors, is independent in i and t and mean-zero. Unfortunately, this
implies heteroskedastic errors if unobserved factors are time-varying. In prac-
tice I am not able to include t as a regressor itself, due to collinearity with a
number of other explanatory variables that follow similar time increments.
In practice I will consider a couple of alternative functional forms on the
above. First, I consider the possibility that the right-hand-side is an exponential
function; that is, that
Yit = exp (γi + g (expit, zit, xi, xit, β) + εit) . (5.12)
Taking the natural log of both sides of this equation, I generated a log-linear
estimation equation,
lnYit = γi + g (expit, zit, xi, xit, β) + εit. (5.13)
Second, I consider a Cobb-Douglas functional form, allowing for the possibility
of complementarities between the experience and other terms. I assume that the
following functional form,
Yit = eγieαXiteεit (1 + zit)
β0
j=1
K (1 + expit)β j , (5.14)
where K is the number of experience measures employed, Xit represents addi-
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tional linear controls, and α is the coefficient on the additional linear controls.
Taking natural logs of both sides and adding some additional linear controls I
obtain the following log-log regression equation,
lnYit = γi + β0 ln (1 + zit) +
K∑
j=1
β j ln (1 + expit) + α′Xit + εit. (5.15)
5.3.3 Description of the Data
The analysis in this section is conducted with the individual as the unit of obser-
vation. In the IFLS we have detailed information on year-by-year occupational
profiles, with years between panel rounds covered by recall in the subsequent
survey round. The analysis is restricted to individual-year observations on in-
dividuals who report running an enterprise as their primary occupation in the
given year, with the top 5% and bottom 5% of the earnings distribution trimmed
off.14 Summary statistics on individuals in the panel who operated enterprises,
and enterprise experience profiles, are provided in in Tables A.7 and A.6.
Table A.7 provides a summary of basic individual characteristics, parsed out
by observations of individuals running one of the three enterprise types. The
average age of self-employed individuals in the overall sample is 43, with a me-
dian of 53. This tends to fit with the profile of self-employed in more advanced
economies, where self-employment tends to be chosen after a few years of wage
work experience. However, we see that individuals running enterprises with
no employees, or with waged employees, tend to be slightly younger on aver-
age than those running family enterprises. 62% of the self-employed are male
14The results have been checked for robustness against this sample selection criterion. The
results do not show significant change under other sample selection rules.
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and 60% are married, though in the parsed statistics we see that entrepreneurs
running enterprises with waged employees are slightly more likely to be male,
and to be married. The average number of years of education is just over two
overall, though it is quite noticeably higher for those who run enterprises with
waged employees. A simple summary of monthly net profits (enterprise earn-
ings) in Indonesian rupiah is provided, pooled across individuals and years.
Mean earnings are 260,000 Rph per month, or the equivalent of about $26 per
month in US dollars with the rule of thumb of a 10,000 Rph = 1 USD exchange
rate. Earnings for individuals running enterprises with waged employees are
significantly higher.
A summary of statistics on enterprise experience profiles is provided in Ta-
ble A.6. This table pools data across individual-year observations (hence any
given person may be represented up to 20 times in this table). The first row of
each of the three subsections summarizes experience in years for a given sur-
vey year in an individual’s current enterprise. The average current number of
years of experience running an enterprise with no employees is about 6, with a
median value of 5. Years of experience in a current enterprise employing fam-
ily/unpaid workers is just over 6, with a median value of 5. Years of experience
running an enterprise employing waged workers is lower in the mean at 4.9,
and with a lower median at 4.5. Notice that the sample of individuals running
enterprises with waged workers is much smaller than the other two categories.
The last three rows of each subsection of the table summarize total enterprise
experience profiles – years of experience running one’s current enterprise, plus
any prior experience running other enterprises. The respective means and me-
dians across the three enterprise categories (no employees, only family/unpaid,
waged) are as follows: (10.77, 7), (11.15,7), and (7.2,5). In general this indicates
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that individuals tend to accumulate somewhat less experience running more
complex enterprises (those that hire permanent, waged workers).
5.3.4 Results
Tables of results are provided in Appendix D.
Log-linear Panel Regressions: Main results
The main panel regression appears in Table D.2, controlling for unobserved het-
erogeneity through fixed effects, with the relationship between accumulated
EHC and outcomes (net profit) given in log-linear form. Accumulated EHC
matters above and beyond one’s innate stock of ability – experience-based prox-
ies for accumulated EHC have statistically and economically significant effects
on the key measure of performance, net profit. The preferred specification is
in column (6), which contains the largest set of controls. An extra year of ex-
perience, depending on enterprise type, leads to a 5-12% increase in profits in
the first-order term. The shape of returns in EHC is concave for those running
enterprises with no employees, or only family/unpaid employees, though the
coefficients on the quadratic term are about an order of magnitude smaller than
those on the linear term. These estimates also indicate that the learning effect
persists for a number of years, at least 6.5 and up to 12 years. This suggests that
the entrepreneurial learning-by-doing persists for a significant amount of time,
and hence that the skill accumulation process is quite long-lasting.
For those in the highest enterprise category, in the preferred specification we
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see that the relationship of current experience to returns is positive and convex,
in columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 of Table D.2. Matching this result to the model, the
hypothesis that individuals running ”more complex” enterprises would be in a
higher-returns region of the learning curve, perhaps even enjoying increasing
returns to EHC, fits with the evidence in the data.
Additional evidence is provided through a Cobb-Douglas log-log specifi-
cation in Table D.3, which I interpret as capturing the ”production function”
for EHC, if we interpret net enterprise returns to represent an index of en-
trepreneurial skill (after accounting for other observables). Consistent with the
prior analysis, the direct enterprise experience variables are statistically and eco-
nomically significant. Again, the total career experience terms seem to have a
negative relationship with returns, particularly in the preferred specification in
column (6).
Accounting for Unobservables: Selected cohorts based on age and experience
In this section I carry out a final piece of analysis that is meant to deal more
rigorously with the role of the endogeneity of entry. As noted, measures of
experience do not constitute perfect measures of EHC, because individuals en-
dogenously select into self-employment, and hence EHC accumulation, at least
partly as a function of (unobserved) ex ante ability. In order to purge some of
these effects, in this subsection I re-run the analysis on a couple of key sub-
samples: a group of individuals who form a balanced panel by all having been
self-employed for 8-12 years (Table D.5), and a cohort of individuals who enter
self-employment in their 20s (Table D.6). The idea is that such sample selec-
tion better accounts for unobserved heterogeneity that might bias the results,
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by looking at the role of experience in a more homogenous sample.
What I find is that these results provide some support for the previous re-
sults. The experience variables are sometimes less likely to be statistically sig-
nificant, due to the smaller sample sizes involved. The shape of returns in total
experience generally seems to be concave for individuals running less complex
enterprises (categories 1 and 2), though by contrast returns from experience in
the current enterprise are more likely to have a convex shape (positive second
derivative). This could be reflective of the fact that the selected sub-samples are
drawn from individuals that have better learned their optimal enterprise-type
match. The shape of the learning process is more likely to have a convex shape
for individuals running enterprises with outside wage workers, as before. It is
notable that the variables on total experience are more likely to have a positive
sign in these regressions, whereas in the previous analysis they often entered
with negative signs. This may again be because the samples selected in this
part of the analysis are more likely to select on higher-potential entrepreneurial
types (longer survivors or those who enter self-employment at a younger age).
We also see that the variable for age enters with larger magnitude than in the
previous analysis.
5.3.5 Summary
What I find in this section is broadly fitting with the predictions of the the-
ory.15 First, accumulated EHC seems to matter above and beyond one’s innate
15The results have been further checked for robustness, such as to sample selection. In addi-
tion, quantile regression estimates of these same results, stratifying across the earnings distri-
bution, provide further confirmation for the main results. These results were available in the
working paper version of this chapter.
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stock of ability. Proxies for accumulated EHC have statistically and econom-
ically significant effects on the key measure of performance, net profit, even
after controlling for the role of innate ability and other non-observable factors
through panel fixed effects. Second, as hypothesized, the quality of enterprise
experience seems to matter. Third, endogenously-accumulated EHC matters
above and beyond generalized forms of human capital such as life experience
and education.16 The coefficients on the variables measuring accumulated en-
trepreneurial experience are generally significantly larger than those for age and
education. Fourth, it seems that firm-specific EHC (tenure) is relatively more
important than one’s total accumulated EHC in outcomes. This is supportive
of arguments in the literature on entrepreneurship on how entrepreneurial ex-
perience and the firm are fundamentally intertwined and provides alternative
support for idea that EHC is not easily tradable in the market. Finally, I find
that the ”convex” relationship between EHC and returns, particularly in more
complex enterprises, seems to be supported in the data. The fits with the nature
of the learning specification in the model.
It should additionally be noted that these patterns are only partially sup-
ported by additional analysis focusing on what might be described as more
committed entrepreneurs – those with relatively more enterprise experience, or
those who started running a business earlier in life. Even individuals in these
sub-groups running relatively less complex enterprises tend to look more like
those individuals running more complex enterprises in the full sample.
16This is not to argue by any means that education is of little value for entrepreneurship.
Education may very well be the crucial variable explaining levels of entrepreneurial performance
across countries, for example. However, in a relatively homogenous population it appears that
relative entrepreneurial experience plays a more important role than education in outcomes.
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5.3.6 Additional Evidence
The Role of EHC versus Financial Capital
A natural way to bring the analysis back to the original motivation is to look
at the question: what matters relatively more for enterprise outcomes, en-
trepreneurial human capital or financial capital? In this subsection I test this
question by looking at a different unit of observation–the household. This is be-
cause it is difficult to robustly allocate household assets to each individual with
the household. Instead, I look at the choice to startup and invest in enterprises
at the level of the household, measuring the EHC stock of the household by the
EHC measures of the household head. My approach is to regress the propensity
to engage in self-employment on various community and household-level char-
acteristics (most critically, household wealth) in a probit framework, and then
in a second stage add in measures of accumulated EHC of the household head
through experience measures as used extensively in this chapter.17
As baseline explanatory variables, I employ: age and age-squared of the
household head, measures of available household labor (adult male, adult fe-
male, child), wealth in 2000 and the square, and various measures of financial
access–dummy variables for the presence of a number of financial institutions,
including Bank Rakyat Indonesia, People’s Credit Bank, and a Village Credit
Union, a dummy variable for whether or not the location’s province is in Java,
and a dummy for whether the enterprise is in an urban area or not. The EHC
17A natural bridge between the flexible non-parametric approach and the linearized approach
is a semi-parametric model in which key variables (e.g., wealth) can be specified to have a
flexible relationship with the propensity to start an enterprise. I have conducted such analysis
(not reported), analogous to the parametric evidence below, using a spline-based approach in
the mgcv package in R, and find qualitatively similar results to the non-parametric evidence,
inserting additional linear controls on the startup decision.
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variables are calculated as described above: enterprise experience of the house-
hold head in current enterprise activity, household head’s experience in prior
enterprises with no employees, household/unpaid employees and waged em-
ployees, respectively, then the same distinction regarding the household head’s
first occupation (dummy for whether the head ran a business in each of the three
categories). At this time I simply report coefficients and not marginal effects; the
purpose here is mainly to illustrate the importance of the EHC measures for the
decision to start an enterprise.
The results are reported in Table D.7. To be clear, these are cross-sectional es-
timates. What we see is that the experience measures are generally statistically-
significant, with signs fitting with the theory. While the direct first-order co-
efficient on current experience is negative, this is probably a mechanical rela-
tion due to the fact that the household head most often runs the household
enterprise (and hence in already running an enterprise, would be less likely to
start running a new enterprise, which is what the dependent variable measures).
More interesting are the coefficients on the prior experience variables–we see
that the largest effect seems to be from prior experience running an enterprise
with waged employees. The marginal insignificance of enterprise experience
in one’s first occupation is probably mainly due to the low propensity of peo-
ple to have their first occupation be in running an enterprise in general. Most
importantly, the coefficients on the wealth and wealthˆ2 terms are statistically
significant only in the first-order term, and only marginally significant in the
first specification. In addition, I find that the inclusion of a term capturing the
lag of number of enterprises owned, which I interpret as a measure of accumu-
lated entrepreneurial capital within the household, leads household wealth to
go insignificant in its in influence on the propensity to start a new enterprise.
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In light of my model, which incorporates the role of both financial con-
straints and EHC, I interpret this as fitting with the prediction that EHC and
wealth should be correlated. There we see that EHC is the fundamental driver
of both wealth and enterprise outcomes, and hence would be expected to sig-
nificantly ”wash out” the role of wealth in enterprise behavior once included.
This (positive) relation between wealth and EHC obtains because higher-ability
individuals have greater incentive to save, and they obtain higher returns due
to their higher ability.
However, what these results also point to is significant omitted-variable bias
involved from running financial measures and omitting the role of EHC. We
will over-estimate the role of financing in enterprise activity and outcomes if
we omit the role of unobserved entrepreneurial ability, which according to the
theory actually drives both wealth and entrepreneurial dynamics.
As a form of robustness check I have conducted similar analysis looking
at enterprise returns, and also controlling for the physical capital stock of the
enterprise. These further results are consistent with the results I have enclosed
herein.
5.4 Conclusion
In this paper I develop and test a microeconomic theory of life-cycle
entrepreneurial human capital (EHC) accumulation. I hypothesize that
endogenously-accumulated EHC is an important factor in entrepreneurial per-
formance. The key channels for acquiring EHC are through direct learning-by-
doing and familial transmission. I further posit that the quality of EHC accu-
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mulation matters – namely, the complexity of the enterprise to which one is ex-
posed affects how rapidly EHC is accumulated. Given that EHC is not tradable
in the market, dynamic occupational selection incentives and market frictions
can inhibit its accumulation. Building on complementary work in fields such
as management and psychology that emphasize the role of dynamic experience
effects in the accumulation of EHC, I formalize the theory in a natural, dynamic
setup. I show that the model captures the possibility of an endogenous EHC
poverty trap, whereby low-ability self-employed start up relatively simple en-
terprises and hence accumulate little EHC.
The theory is tested through exploiting rich information on occupational
histories in the data, which allows the accumulation of entrepreneurial hu-
man capital to be modeled while controlling for innate ability, and an alterna-
tive empirical strategy exploiting significant occupational churning during the
1997-98 East Asian crisis. I present additional evidence on familial effects, the
connection between financing and latent EHC, and the correlation of a num-
ber of common behavioral measures to entrepreneurial activity. I show that
endogenously-accumulated entrepreneurial human capital is a statistically and
economically-important factor in enterprise outcomes, above and beyond in-
nate ability and generalized forms of human capital. Hence I show that the
omission of EHC constitutes an important omitted variables bias in studies re-
garding the sources and performance of entrepreneurs. The results support
the argument that the crucial constraint to most microenterprises is not financ-
ing, but rather entrepreneurial ability. Furthermore, even for higher-potential
entrepreneurs, the results highlight the nature of the entrepreneurial learning
curve, which seems to require years of direct experience with and exposure to
enterprise activity before one reaches significantly diminishing returns.
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These results have a number of implications for policies regarding enterprise
and entrepreneurship promotion in developing countries. First, they highlight
the importance of the accumulation of entrepreneurial skill in enterprise out-
comes, which suggests greater care be taken in determining the optimal timing
of financing access. The evidence from this paper, and from field tests of fi-
nancing provision, seem to suggest that relatively few individuals are ready to
make good use of financial transfers for enterprise activity. The policy impli-
cation from a model in which ability is fixed is that it is the financier’s job to
identify the ex ante higher-ability types as soon as possible and provide them
with financing. The results in this paper suggest that there is a life cycle process
of entrepreneurial development, requiring a mix of learning, increased access to
financing, and perhaps even the freedom to fail. This is not to say that policy
approaches such as microfinance are not useful in general, but that we should
not be surprised if relatively few individuals see much more than incremental
improvement to their enterprise outcomes due to increased access to financing.
The results highlight the need for financing policies to be much more focused on
identifying entrepreneurs in the ”take-off” stage, once they have accumulated
sufficient entrepreneurial skill and are ready for significant scale-up in the scope
of their enterprise. On this see, e.g., Beck (2007) and Beck et al. (2008).
Second, the results pertain to institutions for the transfer of entrepreneurial
skill. In most countries the primary institution for the formation of skills for the
waged-sector is formal education, which can last twelve or more years. While
some writers, notably Schultz, have suggested that education might be an im-
portant venue for the formation of entrepreneurial skill, such a hypothesis is
not supported by the evidence in this paper. Instead, the results suggest that
entrepreneurial skills are more specific and require more focused and sustained
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exposure to enterprise activity.18 Hence this suggests the potential for special-
ized institutions for the transfer of entrepreneurial skill. In most developing
countries, the existing institution seems to be the family unit, at least those
households in which the parents have a significant stock of entrepreneurial skill
that can be transferred to their children. While there have been broad attempts
at various forms of entrepreneurial training, based on the results in this pa-
per it is not so surprising that the results from short-term training have been
fairly mixed. It may be that a more intensive, sustained mix of direct experience
and perhaps mentorship from more experienced and successful entrepreneurs
is needed to enable the emergence of higher-potential entrepreneurs.
18This is not to suggest that education is not useful in general, particularly for pushing up
the overall level of human capital in the population. However, the evidence herein, based on
within-population variation in education and EHC, suggests that EHC is a more important rel-
ative factor in enterprise outcomes.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
A.1 Overview of Data Available in the IFLS
I summarize the main variables available in the IFLS, at the individual, house-
hold, and community level.
A.1.1 Individual-level data
The individual survey component of the IFLS includes the following booklets:1
• Book IIIA contains detailed information on education (including on lan-
guage and literacy, detailed school educational history, record of stan-
dardized test scores at various levels, education expenditure), subjective
well-being (including qualitative rankings relative to society and one’s
and one’s family’s own needs), household assets (details on homeown-
ership, land, animals, vehicles, appliances and household durables, sav-
ings, receivables, household), non-labor income (from government, in-
surance, prizes), marital history, household decision-making, pregnancy
summary, migration activity, employment and labor activity (including
details of work history regarding first job, present primary and secondary
job, and detailed retrospective information on prior employment going
back to previous round of the survey), retirement, elicitation of risk and
1In this subsection I summarize the questionnaires from IFLS4, which generally has the rich-
est data, though much of these variables are contained in IFLS3, and a good amount is in IFLS2
and IFLS1.
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time preferences, expectations and trust (i.e., community social norms, re-
ligiosity).
• Book IIIB contains detailed information on health, such as smoking behav-
ior, detailed questions about current and recent health condition, chronic
medical conditions, mental health, cognitive capacity (i.e., ability to recall
date, memorize lists), acute morbidity, health insurance, self-treatment,
outpatient care, frequency of various food consumption, inpatient care,
participation in community activities, detailed information about non-
coresident parents, siblings and children, giving and receiving transfers
(of some value, including loans and borrowing),2 and expectations for
children.
• Book IV is specifically for an ever-married woman age 15-49, asking about
marital history, pregnancy, non-coresident children, and expectations.
• Book V is for children less than 15 years old, asking about the child’s ed-
ucation, acute morbidity, out-patient care, food frequency, inpatient care,
and information on the parent.
• There is a Proxy Book, which appears to be a shorter version of the over-
all individual survey, perhaps for situations in which there is not time to
administer all of the questionnaires.
A.1.2 Household-level data (including enterprise data)
The household survey component of the IFLS includes the following booklets:
2There were detailed questions about borrowing behavior in IFLS3, but that may have been
largely removed for IFLS4.
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• Book T is a tracking book that briefly records basic information about the
household (mostly on location). There are additional books that also re-
gard the tracking purpose.
• Book K is a control book, which records the household roster and a num-
ber of basic characteristics of household members.
• Book I is answered by the female head of the household. It asks about de-
tails of consumption (and expenditure), assistance received from the gov-
ernment (for food), and knowledge of health and family planning services.
• Book II is about the ”household economy.” It asks about features of the
household (status of the house (owned, rented, etc), water sources and
use, sewage and garbage, household language, details of assistance re-
ceived from the community, a number of pages of information on house-
hold farm businesses, a number of pages on non-farm enterprise, house-
hold assets (with breakdown into numerous categories)), household non-
labor income, and shocks and hardships to the household in the past 5
years.
• Books US I and US II take health measurements on all of the household
members.
A.1.3 Community and facility-level data
The IFLS involves data collection in 312 communities. The community survey
component of the IFLS includes the following booklets:
• Book I gets at transportation and infrastructure (including nearest trans-
port terminals, nearest market, nearest telephone, nearest bank or finan-
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cial institution, public motor vehicle service, road quality), availability
and quality of electricity (including on providers), water sources and san-
itation, agriculture and industry (including main crops in the commu-
nity, types of irrigation, information campaigns, current wages for vari-
ous forms of farm laborers, factories and their outputs in the community,
public works projects), history and climate of the community (including
important events such as infrastructure construction projects), natural dis-
asters, savings and borrowing (i.e., details on various financial institutions
in the village), history of the presence of schools, history of the presence
of health facilities, citizen participation in the community, subjective well-
being across the village according to the informant, poverty alleviation
programs, perceptions of public services and infrastructure, government
and decentralization, and trust within the community.
• Book OL is based on direct observations of characteristics of the commu-
nity such as air quality, security, shopping, etc, and also environmental
conditions, land certification, housing, types of employment, and village
finances.
• There are additional booklets including: Book PKK for women’s groups,
Book ADAT for traditional law and community customs, a Book for Com-
munity Health Centers, a Book for private health practices, a Book for
Integrated Community Health Posts, a Book for traditional health practi-
tioners, a Book on Public Perception on Government Programs and Public
Services, a Book on community and facility people characteristics, and fi-
nally 3 Books on various prices in the village.
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A.2 Figures
Figure A.1: Map of Indonesia, highlighting IFLS provinces
Note: The map of Indonesia highlights the provinces in which the Indonesia Family
Life Survey has been conducted, in a darker shade.
Note: Image from <http://www.rand.org/labor/FLS/IFLS/<.
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(a) Field of work of business, 2000
(b) Field of work of business, 2008
Figure A.2: The distribution of firms by industry, 2000 and 2008
Note: The IFLS uses the following industry codes: 1=Ag, Forest, Fish, 2=Mining, Quar-
rying, 4=Elec, Gas, Water, 5=Construction, 7=Transport and Comm, 8=Fin, Ins, Real
Estate, 21=Restaurant, Food Sales, 22=Industry: food processing, 23=Industry: cloth-
ing, 24=Industry: other, 25=Sales: non-food, 31=Serv: govt, 32=Serv: teacher, 33=Serv:
professional, 34=Serv: Transport, 35=Serv: Other, 95=Other.
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Figure A.3: Household wealth distribution, in logs, year 2000
Note: Wealth converted into US dollars in the year 2000. Wealth taken as a sum of
reported wealth values in a broad range of asset categories, as described elsewhere in
the Chapter.
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(a) 0-50th percentile (b) 0-75th percentile
(c) 0-99th percentile
Figure A.4: The relationship between wealth and the propensity to engage
in enterprise activity, urban households parsed by wealth percentile.
Note: In each sub-figure, the x-axis records household wealth (in terms of US dollars
in 2008) in year 2000, while the y-axis records the propensity to engage in enterprise
activity in 2001-2008. Non-parametric graphs generated by a tri-cube smoother, which
overweights local observations in placing fitted curve. In all cases a bandwidth of 0.8 is
used.
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(a) 0-50th percentile (b) 0-75th percentile
(c) 0-99th percentile
Figure A.5: The relationship between wealth and the propensity to engage
in enterprise activity, rural households parsed by wealth percentile.
Note: In each sub-figure, the x-axis records household wealth (in terms of US dollars
in 2008) in year 2000, while the y-axis records the propensity to engage in enterprise
activity in 2001-2008. Non-parametric graphs generated by a tri-cube smoother, which
overweights local observations in placing fitted curve. In all cases a bandwidth of 0.8 is
used.
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(a) Self-employed (b) Unpaid/family
(c) Wage employees
Figure A.6: The relationship between years of experience and the propen-
sity to engage in enterprise activity, 0-50th percentile of wealth distribu-
tion
Note: In each sub-figure, the x-axis records years of experience of the household head
in a given enterprise activity, while the y-axis records the propensity to engage in en-
terprise activity. Non-parametric graphs generated by a tri-cube smoother, which over-
weights local observations in placing fitted curve. In all cases a bandwidth of 0.8 is
used. Self-employed refers to enterprises with no employees, Unpaid/family refers to
enterprises with only unpaid/family employees, while Wage employees refers to en-
terprises that may have waged employee(s).
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(a) Self-employed (b) Unpaid/family
(c) Wage employees
Figure A.7: The relationship between years of experience and the propen-
sity to engage in enterprise activity, 0-99th percentile of wealth distribu-
tion
Note: In each sub-figure, the x-axis records years of experience of the household head
in a given enterprise activity, while the y-axis records the propensity to engage in en-
terprise activity. Non-parametric graphs generated by a tri-cube smoother, which over-
weights local observations in placing fitted curve. In all cases a bandwidth of 0.8 is
used. Self-employed refers to enterprises with no employees, Unpaid/family refers to
enterprises with only unpaid/family employees, while Wage employees refers to en-
terprises that may have waged employee(s).
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A.3 Tables
Table A.1: Summary Statistics on IFLS Rounds
Survey Round Year Individuals Households Household Communities
enterprises
IFLS4 2007-08 44103 (50580) 13536 6186 313
IFLS3 2000 38433 (43649) 10435 5452 311
IFLS2 1997 22019 (33081) 7619 2625* 313
IFLS1 1993-94 22019 (33081) 7224 2439* 312
Overall 66784 (unique)
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Table A.2: Geographic distribution of firms in the IFLS
IFLS3 IFLS4
Provinces All >= 5 Empl. >= $1000 All >= 5 Empl. >= $1000
13 core provinces
North Sumatra 344 27 44 374 39 78
West Sumatra 261 35 40 348 40 90
South Sumatra 234 26 18 235 23 50
Lampung 181 11 12 155 10 45
DKI Jakarta 603 46 79 507 33 126
West Java 1,029 55 103 779 54 137
Central Java 884 63 118 882 49 151
Yogyakarta 413 50 90 396 30 102
East Java 1,006 64 100 892 50 157
Bali 296 22 75 340 35 105
West Nusa Tenggara 456 29 18 303 25 46
South Kalimantan 288 11 28 269 11 50
South Sulawesi 308 18 38 311 30 75
Subtotal 6303 457 763 5791 429 1212
Tracking provinces
Riau 52 3 6 51 1 16
Bangka-Belitung 45 5 7 50 5 17
Banten 204 8 25 126 13 24
West Kalimantan 1
Central Kalimantan 1 3 2
East Kalimantan 11 5 9 3 5
North Sulawesi 1
Subtotal 314 16 43 240 22 64
Total 6617 473 806 6031 451 1276
Note: The Table records counts of non-farm enterprises by province for the two most
recent IFLS rounds, IFLS3 (2000) and IFLS4 (2007-08). I distinguish the 13 original sur-
vey target provinces from provinces that were added to the survey through tracking
of household split-offs. For each round I report total numbers, along with the subset
of firms with more than 5 employees (including the entrepreneur, summing over paid
and unpaid employees), and firms with more than 1000 USD equivalent in reported
business capital stock (all values converted to 2005 dollars).
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Table A.3: Summary statistics on firms, 2008, firms with no employees
Enterprises with no employees
N Mean SD P25 P50 P75 P95
Bus owned by household 2711 1.0 0.1 1 1 1 1
Pct owned by household 41 38.2 22.1 25.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Bus. operated out. home 2711 0.8 0.4 1 1 1 1
Applied for permit 2711 0.0 0.2 0 0 0 0
Permit issued 100 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 1
Cost obtain permit 100 13014.2 35310.1 2.7 11.9 78.4 1081000.0
Unpaid labor startup 2711 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Wage labor startup 2711 0.1 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total labor startup 2711 1.3 1.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0
Startup capital 2251 409.9 2816.6 10.8 54.1 216.3 1406.0
Current unpaid labor 2711 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Current wage labor 2711 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Current total labor 2711 0.9 0.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Current land assets 2711 324.2 3720.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 216.3
Current building assets 2711 182.6 1329.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 432.6
Current 4-wheel vehicle 2711 122.4 885.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 324.5
Current other vehicles 2711 101.2 301.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 757.1
Curr. other non-farm eq. 2711 84.3 414.0 0.0 8.7 43.3 324.5
Current total capital 2711 814.7 4467.1 5.4 37.9 346.1 2379.4
Unpaid labor shutdown 151 0.6 0.9 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.0
Wage labor shutdown 151 0.3 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0
Total labor shutdown 151 2.0 1.3 1.0 2.0 2.0 4.0
Net profit 2637 679.2 1958.3 146.0 389.4 778.7 1946.8
Total revenue 48 448.5 515.5 108.2 324.5 648.9 1081.6
Total expense 43 251.4 266.8 108.2 108.2 324.5 648.9
Ent. products consumed 2660 92.9 254.9 0.0 13.0 75.2 389.4
Ent returns used by HH 2649 448.6 681.3 86.5 259.6 584.0 1349.8
Ent returns left over 2643 119.9 727.4 0.0 0.0 54.1 540.8
Total procure. of goods 643 188.0 556.0 5.4 21.6 86.5 1081.6
Total sales 88 410.1 711.2 13.5 64.9 405.6 2163.1
Total shared profit 54 304.8 394.2 2.7 64.9 584.0 1092.4
Unit returns to capital (%) 2259 983.6 45179.7 0.9 4.5 20.6 133.3
Unit returns to labor (USD) 2496 693.8 2005.1 155.7 389.4 778.7 1952.2
Net ch. labor since start 2711 -0.2 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Net ch. capital since start 2251 450.1 5100.0 -21.6 0.0 135.2 1676.4
Note: Monetary values converted to 2008 US dollars. Dummy variables have decimal
values removed.
Note: The three enterprise categories are mutually exclusive; in 2008 there are 6186
firms reported by IFLS households.
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Table A.4: Summary statistics on firms, 2008, firms with only fam-
ily/unpaid employees
Enterprises with family/unpaid employees
N Mean SD P25 P50 P75 P95
Bus owned by household 2326 1.0 0.2 1 1 1 1
Pct owned by household 56 39.8 23.4 25.0 50.0 50.0 90.0
Bus. operated out. home 2326 0.7 0.5 0 1 1 1
Applied for permit 2326 0.1 0.2 0 0 0 1
Permit issued 135 1.0 0.7 1 1 1 1
Cost obtain permit 135 12853.3 35075.4 3.0 21.6 54.1 1081000.0
Unpaid labor startup 2326 1.3 0.9 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
Wage labor startup 2326 0.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total labor startup 2326 2.4 1.4 2.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
Startup capital 2091 432.1 3544.3 10.8 48.7 216.3 1297.9
Current unpaid labor 2326 1.5 0.9 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
Current wage labor 2326 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Current total labor 2326 2.5 0.9 2.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
Current land assets 2326 234.3 1763.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 540.8
Current building assets 2326 298.4 1617.5 0.0 0.0 32.5 1081.6
Current 4-wheel vehicle 2326 120.1 831.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 324.5
Current other vehicles 2326 84.3 273.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 757.1
Curr. other non-farm eq. 2326 130.9 401.1 5.4 21.6 108.2 540.8
Current total capital 2326 867.9 3057.9 13.0 84.4 562.4 3785.4
Unpaid labor shutdown
Wage labor shutdown
Total labor shutdown
Net profit 2270 739.8 1102.9 162.2 389.4 908.5 2258.3
Total revenue 45 428.3 468.6 108.2 324.5 648.9 1297.9
Total expense 43 278.1 384.9 108.2 108.2 324.5 1081.6
Ent. products consumed 2283 137.9 264.0 3.8 38.9 129.8 648.9
Ent returns used by HH 2283 457.7 652.3 97.3 259.6 594.9 1557.4
Ent returns left over 2282 119.8 551.5 0.0 0.0 64.9 540.8
Total procure. of goods 704 275.1 1618.1 5.4 21.6 108.2 973.4
Total sales 98 2304.0 11956.4 8.1 70.3 757.1 5191.4
Total shared profit 33 286.0 581.9 0.0 54.1 216.3 1622.3
Unit returns to capital (%) 2089 20.6 64.9 0.8 3.2 15.0 84.0
Unit returns to labor (USD) 2270 309.4 434.3 64.9 194.7 389.4 973.4
Net ch. labor since start 2326 0.1 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0
Net ch. capital since start 2091 447.4 4192.6 -14.1 11.9 324.5 2920.2
Note: Monetary values converted to 2008 US dollars. Dummy variables have decimal
values removed.
Note: The three enterprise categories are mutually exclusive; in 2008 there are 6186
firms reported by IFLS households.
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Table A.5: Summary statistics on firms, 2008, firms with waged employees
Enterprises with waged employees
N Mean SD P25 P50 P75 P95
Bus owned by household 1149 0.9 0.2 1 1 1 1
Pct owned by household 72 44.6 17.8 33.0 50.0 50.0 75.0
Bus. operated out. home 1149 0.8 0.4 1 1 1 1
Applied for permit 1149 0.3 0.5 0 0 1 1
Permit issued 340 1.0 0.2 1 1 1 1
Cost obtain permit 340 8763.2 29239.7 10.8 54.1 216.3 1081000.0
Unpaid labor startup 1149 0.7 1.2 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.0
Wage labor startup 1149 2.2 6.3 0.0 1.0 2.0 6.0
Total labor startup 1149 3.8 6.4 2.0 3.0 4.0 9.0
Startup capital 1024 2021.4 7684.3 54.1 324.5 1622.3 6489.3
Current unpaid labor 1149 0.6 1.2 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.0
Current wage labor 1149 3.5 8.9 1.0 2.0 3.0 10.0
Current total labor 1149 5.1 8.9 3.0 3.0 5.0 12.0
Current land assets 1149 1519.9 8200.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 5407.7
Current building assets 1149 1534.9 7019.0 0.0 0.0 216.3 6489.3
Current 4-wheel vehicle 1149 1556.1 6032.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 8652.4
Current other vehicles 1149 277.3 768.7 0.0 0.0 32.5 1406.0
Curr. other non-farm eq. 1149 898.2 4066.3 10.8 108.2 540.8 3244.7
Current total capital 1149 5786.5 15666.2 119.0 1081.6 4326.2 26005.8
Unpaid labor shutdown
Wage labor shutdown
Total labor shutdown
Net profit 1108 2749.0 6432.8 519.1 1297.9 2595.7 10123.3
Total revenue 30 1087.5 969.5 648.9 1081.6 1081.6 3893.6
Total expense 31 646.6 457.0 216.3 648.9 1081.6 1297.9
Ent. products consumed 1133 223.4 692.7 0.0 32.5 173.1 986.4
Ent returns used by HH 1129 1194.8 1838.5 259.6 648.9 1297.9 3893.6
Ent returns left over 1110 782.9 3263.5 0.0 64.9 540.8 2595.7
Total procure. of goods 457 1696.5 8365.4 27.0 108.2 540.8 6489.3
Total sales 72 4579.2 14121.5 39.2 200.1 2974.3 27038.7
Total shared profit 40 1442.8 4516.8 41.1 384.0 1081.6 3839.5
Unit returns to capital (%) 1037 13.2 100.7 0.3 1.0 4.5 60.0
Unit returns to labor (USD) 1108 614.3 1121.6 144.2 324.5 648.9 1946.8
Net ch. labor since start 1149 1.3 7.9 0.0 0.0 2.0 6.0
Net ch. capital since start 1024 3848.7 14910.6 -45.4 216.3 2109.0 22496.2
Note: Monetary values converted to 2008 US dollars. Dummy variables have decimal
values removed.
Note: The three enterprise categories are mutually exclusive; in 2008 there are 6186
firms reported by IFLS households.
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Table A.6: Summary statistics on enterprise experience
Individuals running enterprises with no employees
N Mean SD P25 Median P75 P95
Exp. 1 curr. ent. 17622 6.01 3.88 3.5 5 8 13.5
Total exp. 1 19683 10.77 9.69 4 7 14 31
Total exp. 2 2389 7.36 6.32 5 6 6 19
Total exp. 3 91 5.39 5.11 3 5 6 8.5
Individual running enterprises with only household/unpaid empl.
N Mean SD P25 Median P75 P95
Exp. 2 curr. ent. 14348 6.28 4.11 3.5 5 8.5 14
Total exp. 1 2915 7.09 6.36 4 6 7 17
Total exp. 2 15738 11.15 9.98 4 7 14 33
Total exp. 3 101 5.27 3.48 4 5 6 13
Individual running enterprises with waged employees
N Mean SD P25 Median P75 P95
Exp. 3 curr. ent. 625 4.86 2.55 3 4.5 6 10.5
Total exp. 1 169 7.02 5.86 3 6 8.5 15
Total exp. 2 160 8.37 5.89 6 6 12 15.5
Total exp. 3 676 7.2 6.55 3.5 5 8 22
Note: Exp and exp refer to ’experience’. ’curr’ refers to current enterprise–namely en-
terprise individual is running in a given survey year. ’Total’ refers to total cumulative
experience, whether in current or prior enterprise. Use enterprise category labels: 1=no
employees, 2=only household/unpaid labor, 3=hiring outside labor.
Note: each observation is a person-year observation from the panel (1988-2008), where
enterprise experience is recorded only if it is reported as the primary occupation.
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Table A.7: Summary statistics on individuals who are self-employed in the
panel
Individuals running enterprises with no employees
N Mean SD P25 Median P75 P95
Age 34538 41.94 14.1 31 40 52 67
Education (years) 34538 2.01 4.57 0 0 0 12
Gender (male=1) 34538 0.59 0.49
Marriage (married=1) 34538 0.57 0.49
Net profit 34538 257999 322620 15 151057 389864 970874
Individual running enterprises with only household/unpaid empl.
N Mean SD P25 Median P75 P95
Age 25961 45.11 13.9 34 44 55 69
Education (years) 25971 2.03 4.35 0 0 0 12
Gender (male=1) 25971 0.68 0.47
Marriage (married=1) 25971 0.58 0.49
Net profit 25971 238910 339253 6 88582 354610 984246
Individual running enterprises with waged employees
N Mean SD P25 Median P75 P95
Age 1529 41.07 12.77 32 39 49 66
Education (years) 1534 4.75 6.28 0 0 12 19
Gender (male=1) 1534 0.7 0.46
Marriage (married=1) 1534 0.65 0.48
Net profit 1534 495473 482890 14 381723 831255 1461988
Note: The table only summarizes statistics from individual-year observations in which
the individual is active in the given self-employment category. Monetary values are
expressed in Indonesian Rupiah, deflated relative to 2005 value. In 2008 10,000 Rph. 1
USD. Net profits are monthly returns.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
B.1 Figures
Figure B.1: Plot of net profit against experience in three enterprise types
Note: The Figure records net profits of enterprises that startup in the three employ-
ment categories ((i) no employees, (ii) only family/unpaid workers, (iii) having waged
employees) against years of experience of the individual entrepreneur running the en-
terprise.
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(a) 0-50th percentile (b) 0-75th percentile
(c) Full distribution
Figure B.2: The relationship between (lagged) wealth and the propensity
to engage in enterprise activity
Note: In each figure the x-axis (household wealth) is scaled in terms of year 2000 US
dollars, while the y-axis is scaled in terms of the influence of wealth on the propensity
to engage in enterprise activity.
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(a) 0-50th percentile (b) 0-75th percentile
(c) Full distribution
Figure B.3: The relationship between (lagged) wealth per head and the
propensity to engage in enterprise activity
Note: In each figure the x-axis (household wealth per head, using total adult labor)
is scaled in terms of year 2000 US dollars, while the y-axis is scaled in terms of the
influence of wealth per head on the propensity to engage in enterprise activity.
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(a) 0-50th percentile (b) 0-75th percentile
(c) Full distribution
Figure B.4: The relationship between (lagged) wealth in logs and the
propensity to engage in enterprise activity
Note: In each figure the x-axis (household wealth) is scaled in terms of year 2000 US
dollars, while the y-axis is scaled in terms of the influence of wealth on the propensity
to engage in enterprise activity.
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(a) 0-50th percentile (b) 0-75th percentile
(c) Full distribution
Figure B.5: The relationship between (lagged) wealth per head in logs and
the propensity to engage in enterprise activity
Note: In each figure the x-axis (household wealth per head, using total adult labor)
is scaled in terms of year 2000 US dollars, while the y-axis is scaled in terms of the
influence of wealth per head on the propensity to engage in enterprise activity.
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(a) 0-50th percentile (b) 0-75th percentile
(c) Full distribution
Figure B.6: The relationship between (lagged) wealth and startup capital
Note: In each figure the x-axis (household wealth) is scaled in terms of year 2000 US
dollars, while the y-axis is scaled in terms of dollars, again, representing startup capital.
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(a) 0-50th percentile (b) 0-75th percentile
(c) Full distribution
Figure B.7: The relationship between (lagged) wealth per head and startup
capital
Note: In each figure the x-axis (household wealth per head, using total adult labor) is
scaled in terms of year 2000 US dollars, while the y-axis is scaled in terms of dollars,
again, representing startup capital.
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(a) 0-50th percentile (b) 0-75th percentile
(c) Full distribution
Figure B.8: The relationship between (lagged) wealth and current capital
Note: In each figure the x-axis (household wealth) is scaled using year 2000 US dollars,
while the y-axis is scaled in terms of dollars, again, representing current capital.
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(a) 0-50th percentile (b) 0-75th percentile
(c) Full distribution
Figure B.9: The relationship between (lagged) wealth per head and current
capital
Note: In each figure the x-axis (household wealth per head, using total adult labor) is
scaled in terms of year 2000 US dollars, while the y-axis is scaled in terms of dollars,
again, representing current capital.
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B.2 Tables
Table B.1: Percentiles of wage- and self-employment returns, IFLS, 2008
10th 25th 50th 90th 95th 99th
Net Profit 0 6 32 162 270 540
Wage 10 21 48 162 216 302
Note: Values converted to 2008 USD terms.
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Table B.2: Wealth and propensity to start enterprise
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr
Intercept -1.4289 0.1045 -13.67 0.0000 ***
Age Head 0.0171 0.0043 3.97 0.0001 ***
Age Head2 -0.0002 0.0000 -4.62 0.0000 ***
Education head 0.0106 0.0023 4.65 0.0000 ***
Number adult females 0.0132 0.0115 1.14 0.2538
Number adult males 0.0221 0.0110 2.01 0.0448 *
Number children 0.0638 0.0097 6.57 0.0000 ***
Bank BRI 0.0147 0.0664 0.22 0.8253
Ppl Credit Bank -0.0630 0.0437 -1.44 0.1493
Village Credit Union 0.0323 0.0388 0.83 0.4057
Village Unit Coop. -0.0368 0.0374 -0.98 0.3258
Other Formal Coop. -0.0617 0.0347 -1.78 0.0752 .
State Priv. Bank -0.0234 0.0459 -0.51 0.6109
BMT 0.0193 0.0426 0.45 0.6499
Urban dummy 0.2430 0.0353 6.89 0.0000 ***
Province dummies YES
Observations 13422
R-squared (adj.) 0.0199
UBRE 0.0173
Significance of smooth terms:
edf 248.00
Ref. df. 3727.00
Chi. Sq. 23.86
p 0.0001 ***
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, . p <0.1
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Table B.3: Wealth per head and propensity to start enterprise
Estimate Std. Error z value P
Intercept -1.2520 0.1097 -11.41 <2e-16 ***
Age Head 0.0100 0.0045 2.23 0.0259 *
Age Head2 -0.0001 0.0000 -2.96 0.0030 **
Education head 0.0106 0.0023 4.63 0.0000 ***
Number adult females 0.0185 0.0115 1.61 0.1074
Number adult males 0.0269 0.0111 2.42 0.0156 *
Number children 0.0648 0.0098 6.65 0.0000 ***
Bank BRI 0.0122 0.0664 0.18 0.8544
Ppl Credit Bank -0.0654 0.0437 -1.50 0.1343
Village Credit Union 0.0359 0.0389 0.92 0.3558
Village Unit Coop. -0.0415 0.0374 -1.11 0.2676
Other Formal Coop. -0.0645 0.0347 -1.86 0.0631 .
State Priv. Bank -0.0233 0.0459 -0.51 0.6119
BMT 0.0188 0.0426 0.44 0.6586
Urban dummy 0.2519 0.0353 7.14 0.0000 ***
Province dummies YES
Observations 13246
R-squared (adj.) 0.0188
UBRE 0.0255
Significance of smooth terms:
edf 7.77
Ref. df. 8.32
Chi. Sq. 29.36
p 0.0003 ***
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, . p <0.1
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Table B.4: Wealth (in logs) and propensity to start enterprise
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr
Intercept -1.4377 0.1062 -13.54 <2e-16 ***
Age Head 0.0182 0.0044 4.13 0.0000 ***
Age Head2 -0.0002 0.0000 -4.82 0.0000 ***
Education head 0.0106 0.0023 4.59 0.0000 ***
Number adult females 0.0179 0.0118 1.52 0.1286
Number adult males 0.0235 0.0113 2.08 0.0375 *
Number children 0.0590 0.0099 5.99 0.0000 ***
Bank BRI 0.0084 0.0670 0.13 0.8999
Ppl Credit Bank -0.0612 0.0442 -1.39 0.1656
Village Credit Union 0.0293 0.0391 0.75 0.4543
Village Unit Coop. -0.0442 0.0377 -1.17 0.2406
Other Formal Coop. -0.0593 0.0350 -1.70 0.0896 .
State Priv. Bank -0.0245 0.0462 -0.53 0.5953
BMT 0.0219 0.0429 0.51 0.6095
Urban dummy 0.2445 0.0356 6.87 0.0000 ***
Province dummies YES
Observations 12983
R-squared (adj.) 0.0194
UBRE 0.0250
Significance of smooth terms:
edf 4.5720
Ref. df. 5.4470
Chi. Sq. 20.6700
p 0.0000 **
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, . p <0.1
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Table B.5: Wealth per head (in logs) and propensity to start enterprise
Estimate Std. Error z value P
Intercept -1.2660 0.1115 -11.36 <2e-16 ***
Age Head 0.0113 0.0046 2.46 0.0138 *
Age Head2 -0.0001 0.0000 -3.22 0.0013 **
Education head 0.0107 0.0023 4.60 0.0000 ***
Number adult females 0.0221 0.0117 1.89 0.0584 .
Number adult males 0.0279 0.0114 2.45 0.0142 *
Number children 0.0606 0.0099 6.13 0.0000 ***
Bank BRI 0.0061 0.0669 0.09 0.9273
Ppl Credit Bank -0.0626 0.0441 -1.42 0.1559
Village Credit Union 0.0321 0.0391 0.82 0.4118
Village Unit Coop. -0.0480 0.0377 -1.27 0.2033
Other Formal Coop. -0.0615 0.0350 -1.76 0.0786 .
State Priv. Bank -0.0247 0.0462 -0.53 0.5930
BMT 0.0213 0.0429 0.50 0.6193
Urban dummy 0.2523 0.0355 7.11 0.0000 ***
Province dummies YES
Observations 12809
R-squared (adj.) 0.0179
UBRE 0.0334
Significance of smooth terms:
edf 4.2390
Ref. df. 5.1370
Chi. Sq. 17.2900
p 0.0044 **
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, . p <0.1
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Table B.6: Wealth and startup capital
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>t)
Intercept 1244.1296 936.7108 1.33 0.1843
Age Head -36.4415 38.0083 -0.96 0.3378
Age Head2 0.2464 0.3409 0.72 0.4698
Education head 64.8418 18.3574 3.53 0.0004 ***
Number adult females 113.7766 99.6981 1.14 0.2539
Number adult males 234.2174 99.4955 2.35 0.0187 *
Number children -50.7645 84.0007 -0.60 0.5457
Bank BRI -43.9789 547.5146 -0.08 0.9360
Ppl Credit Bank -521.2357 358.5536 -1.45 0.1462
Village Credit Union -55.4262 314.6766 -0.18 0.8602
Village Unit Coop. -325.8137 304.7241 -1.07 0.2851
Other Formal Coop. 107.3569 283.3204 0.38 0.7048
State Priv. Bank -397.8533 373.3023 -1.07 0.2866
BMT 396.8833 340.5205 1.17 0.2439
Urban dummy 149.1028 282.2210 0.53 0.5973
Province dummies YES
Observations 2356
R-squared (adj.) 0.0170
GVC-score 23684000
Significance of smooth terms:
edf 4.0010
Ref. df. 4.5170
F 3.7080
p 0.0035 **
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, . p <0.1
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Table B.7: Wealth per head and startup capital
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>t)
Intercept 983.8943 937.2849 1.05 0.2940
Age Head -33.3477 38.1955 -0.87 0.3827
Age Head2 0.2223 0.3428 0.65 0.5166
Education head 64.5312 18.4332 3.50 0.0005 ***
Number adult females 158.6860 99.6565 1.59 0.1114
Number adult males 286.3323 99.9409 2.87 0.0042 **
Number children -50.7850 84.1816 -0.60 0.5464
Bank BRI -9.9225 549.0813 -0.02 0.9856
Ppl Credit Bank -551.0652 358.7398 -1.54 0.1246
Village Credit Union -50.6642 315.0150 -0.16 0.8722
Village Unit Coop. -329.3952 305.3299 -1.08 0.2808
Other Formal Coop. 109.5967 283.9963 0.39 0.6996
State Priv. Bank -421.4492 373.8881 -1.13 0.2598
BMT 402.6586 340.6742 1.18 0.2373
Urban dummy 171.4895 282.3445 0.61 0.5437
Province dummies YES
Observations 2353
R-squared (adj.) 0.0138
GVC-score 23785000
Significance of smooth terms:
edf 4.2590
Ref. df. 4.7670
F 2.0420
p 0.0733 .
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, . p <0.1
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Table B.8: Wealth and current capital
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>t)
Intercept 320.5724 905.2269 0.35 0.7233
Age Head 32.6240 35.1632 0.93 0.3536
Age Head2 -0.2662 0.3082 -0.86 0.3878
Education head 89.2555 17.0866 5.22 0.0000 ***
Number adult females 16.3150 86.1882 0.19 0.8499
Number adult males 67.7213 81.3886 0.83 0.4054
Number children 175.8264 71.6203 2.46 0.0141 *
Bank BRI -948.7519 489.7230 -1.94 0.0528 .
Ppl Credit Bank -156.9668 316.5865 -0.50 0.6201
Village Credit Union -360.6211 272.7296 -1.32 0.1861
Village Unit Coop. -13.7800 267.9794 -0.05 0.9590
Other Formal Coop. 188.0882 247.6476 0.76 0.4476
State Priv. Bank 151.3047 329.4934 0.46 0.6461
BMT -21.5436 294.7214 -0.07 0.9417
Urban dummy 70.2687 246.8394 0.29 0.7759
Province dummies YES
Observations 4870
R-squared (adj.) 0.0763
GVC-score 40635000
Significance of smooth terms:
edf 0.9999
Ref. df. 1.0000
F 254.20
p 0.0000 ***
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, . p <0.1
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Table B.9: Wealth per head and current capital
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>t)
Intercept -759.7484 913.6841 -0.83 0.4057
Age Head 42.4202 35.5974 1.19 0.2335
Age Head2 -0.3407 0.3118 -1.09 0.2746
Education head 88.9570 17.4200 5.11 0.0000 ***
Number adult females 238.1930 86.5871 2.75 0.0060 **
Number adult males 259.2176 82.6373 3.14 0.0017 **
Number children 162.0976 72.1922 2.25 0.0248 *
Bank BRI -969.2448 493.6695 -1.96 0.0497 *
Ppl Credit Bank -229.7799 319.0855 -0.72 0.4715
Village Credit Union -330.8110 274.9154 -1.20 0.2289
Village Unit Coop. -23.7473 270.2024 -0.09 0.9300
Other Formal Coop. 205.5699 249.6711 0.82 0.4103
State Priv. Bank 146.5955 332.2187 0.44 0.6590
BMT 4.7869 297.1347 0.02 0.9872
Urban dummy 116.9098 248.8866 0.47 0.6386
Province dummies YES
Observations 4866
R-squared (adj.) 0.0623
GVC-score 41296000
Significance of smooth terms:
edf 2.4710
Ref. df. 2.8380
F 61.2100
p 0.0000 ***
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, . p <0.1
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Table B.10: Probit: Effects of income flows on post-2000 startup
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES M. effects M. effects M. effects
Gov. trans. pre-2000 -0.2325 -0.0602 -0.1478 -0.0401 -0.1716 -0.0458
(0.4236) (0.0979) (0.4289) (0.1087) (0.4345) (0.1070)
Non-gov. trans. pre-2000 0.5468 0.1868 0.5674 0.1955 0.4536 0.1516
(0.5333) (0.2055) (0.5368) (0.2084) (0.5400) (0.2022)
Uncond. cash trans. pre-2000 1.4615** 0.5335** 1.4475* 0.5292** 1.4450* 0.5282**
(0.7447) (0.2411) (0.7551) (0.2454) (0.7677) (0.2509)
Exog. trans. pre-2000 -0.1297* -0.0354* -0.1110 -0.0307 -0.1792** -0.0480**
(0.0774) (0.0200) (0.0780) (0.0207) (0.0788) (0.0196)
Gov. trans. pre-2000*wealth 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Gov. trans. pre-2000*wealth2 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Non-gov. trans. pre-2000*wealth -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0001
(0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0003)
Non-gov. trans. pre-2000*wealth2 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
UC. cash trans. pre-2000*wealth -0.0013 -0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0004 -0.0014 -0.0004
(0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0003)
UC. cash trans. pre-2000*wealth2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Exog. trans. pre-2000*wealth 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Exog. trans. pre-2000*wealth2 -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Wealth 2000 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000* 0.0000*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Wealth 20002 -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Age hhold head 0.0177*** 0.0051*** 0.0185*** 0.0053***
(0.0060) (0.0017) (0.0060) (0.0017)
Age hhold head2 -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0001***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Education hhold head 0.0054*** 0.0016*** 0.0063*** 0.0018***
(0.0019) (0.0006) (0.0020) (0.0006)
Java dummy 0.0070 0.0020
(0.0470) (0.0135)
Urban dummy 0.2382*** 0.0708***
(0.0328) (0.0101)
Location effects YES YES
Constant -0.8126*** -0.9063*** -0.9978***
(0.0124) (0.0339) (0.0384)
Observations 13818 13818 13536 13536 13536 13536
Chi-squared 17.287 17.287 113.61 113.61 230.67 230.67
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Table B.11: Probit: Effects of income flows on post-2000 startup, Part 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES M. effects M. effects M. effects
Gov. trans. pre-2000 -0.2297 -0.0588 -0.1462 -0.0392 -0.1705 -0.0450
(0.4226) (0.0966) (0.4273) (0.1072) (0.4336) (0.1056)
Non-gov. trans. pre-2000 0.5244 0.1769 0.5419 0.1844 0.4253 0.1400
(0.5383) (0.2053) (0.5422) (0.2084) (0.5470) (0.2017)
Uncond. cash trans. pre-2000 1.4782** 0.5383** 1.4623* 0.5336** 1.4595* 0.5324**
(0.7441) (0.2404) (0.7540) (0.2447) (0.7668) (0.2503)
Exog. trans. pre-2000 -0.1447* -0.0388** -0.1276 -0.0347* -0.1946** -0.0512***
(0.0781) (0.0197) (0.0787) (0.0203) (0.0795) (0.0192)
Gov. trans. pre-2000*wealth 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Gov. trans. pre-2000*wealth2 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Non-gov. trans. pre-2000*wealth -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0001
(0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0003)
Non-gov. trans. pre-2000*wealth2 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
UC. cash trans. pre-2000*wealth -0.0013 -0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0004 -0.0014 -0.0004
(0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0003)
UC. cash trans. pre-2000*wealth2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Exog. trans. pre-2000*wealth 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Exog. trans. pre-2000*wealth2 -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Gov. trans. ’07-’08 0.7750 0.2742 0.8336 0.2985 0.7934 0.2819
(0.5441) (0.2160) (0.5521) (0.2196) (0.5565) (0.2212)
Non-gov. trans. ’07-’08 0.2330* 0.0720* 0.2391* 0.0745* 0.2474** 0.0769*
(0.1248) (0.0416) (0.1253) (0.0421) (0.1260) (0.0424)
Uncond. cash trans. ’07-’08 -0.8970 -0.1634*** -0.8619 -0.1617*** -0.8155 -0.1558**
(0.5689) (0.0531) (0.5769) (0.0579) (0.5811) (0.0622)
Exog. trans. ’07-’08 0.3054** 0.0966** 0.2696* 0.0848* 0.2510* 0.0782*
(0.1386) (0.0481) (0.1390) (0.0475) (0.1392) (0.0469)
Gov. trans. ’07-’08*wealth -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0002)
Non-gov. trans. ’07-’08*wealth -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Uncond. cash trans. ’07-’08*wealth 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0002)
Exog. trans. ’07-’08*wealth -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Gov. trans. ’07-’08*wealth2 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Non-gov. trans. ’07-’08*wealth2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Uncond. cash trans. ’07-’08*wealth2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Exog. trans. ’07-’08*wealth2 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Wealth 2000 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000* 0.0000*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Wealth 20002 -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Table B.12: Probit: Effects of income flows on post-2000 startup, Part 2
Age hhold head YES YES YES YES
Education hhold head YES YES YES YES
Java dummy YES YES YES YES
Urban dummy YES YES YES YES
Location YES YES YES YES
Constant -0.8321*** -0.9218*** -1.0141***
(0.0127) (0.0342) (0.0387)
Observations 13818 13818 13536 13536 13536 13536
Chi-squared 42.698 42.698 129.49 129.49 240.85 240.85
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Table B.13: Probit: Effects of income flows on post-2000 startup
(3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES M.effect M.effect
Exog. trans. ent. 1 1.1637*** 0.4234*** 1.1738*** 0.4266***
(0.3078) (0.1161) (0.3067) (0.1156)
Exog. trans. ent. 2 -1.2155*** -0.1994*** -1.2858*** -0.2025***
(0.3005) (0.0206) (0.2990) (0.0184)
Exog. trans. ent. 1*wealth -0.0001** -0.0000** -0.0001** -0.0000**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Exog. trans. ent. 1*wealth2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Exog. trans. ent. 2*wealth 0.0001** 0.0000** 0.0001** 0.0000**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Exog. trans. ent. 2*wealth2 -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Exog. trans. ’07-’08 0.2676* 0.0840* 0.2489* 0.0774*
(0.1391) (0.0474) (0.1393) (0.0469)
Exog. trans. ’07-’08*wealth -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Exog. trans. ’07-’08*wealth2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Wealth 2000 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Wealth 20002 -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Age hhold head 0.0164*** 0.0047*** 0.0173*** 0.0049***
(0.0060) (0.0017) (0.0061) (0.0017)
Age hhold head2 -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0001***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Education hhold head 0.0051*** 0.0014*** 0.0060*** 0.0017***
(0.0019) (0.0006) (0.0020) (0.0006)
Java dummy 0.0199 0.0056
(0.0472) (0.0134)
Urban dummy 0.2337*** 0.0687***
(0.0329) (0.0100)
Location dummy YES YES
Constant -0.9134*** -1.0078***
(0.0340) (0.0385)
Observations 13536 13536 13536 13536
Chi-squared 124.04 124.04 238.04 238.04
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Table B.14: Probit: Exogenous shocks
(3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES M. effects M. effects
Exog. trans. ent. 1 1.1871*** 0.4338*** 1.1983*** 0.4373***
-0.3074 -0.1147 -0.3062 -0.1141
Exog. trans. ent. 2 -1.2361*** -0.2045*** -1.3029*** -0.2071***
-0.3000 -0.0205 -0.2984 -0.0183
Exog. trans. ent. 1*wealth -0.0001** -0.0000** -0.0001** -0.0000**
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Exog. trans. ent. 1*wealth2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Exog. trans. ent. 2*wealth 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0001** 0.0000**
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Exog. trans. ent. 2*wealth2 -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000* -0.0000*
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Age hhold head 0.0179*** 0.0052*** 0.0184*** 0.0053***
-0.0060 -0.0017 -0.0060 -0.0017
Age hhold head2 -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0001***
-0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000
Education hhold head 0.0063*** 0.0018*** 0.0068*** 0.0020***
-0.0019 -0.0005 -0.0019 -0.0006
Java dummy 0.0058 0.0017
-0.0470 -0.0135
Urban dummy 0.2457*** 0.0731***
-0.0326 -0.0100
Location controls YES YES
Observations 13536 13536 13536 13536
Chi-squared 115.53 115.53 240.25 240.25
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Table B.15: Effects of income flows on post-2000 startup capital
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Gov. trans. pre-2000 -569.0904 93.7502 111.3354
(1,845.1878) (1,824.3425) (1,829.4691)
Non-gov. trans. pre-2000 -539.7361 -179.6838 -136.5810
(2,083.1740) (2,058.5838) (2,062.8880)
Uncond. cash trans. pre-2000 -51.5571 -403.0299 -334.5148
(4,166.1678) (4,116.3869) (4,123.6399)
Exog. trans. pre-2000 -204.0281 108.0891 164.0060
(381.9870) (379.1201) (382.3471)
Gov. trans. pre-2000*wealth 0.0946 -0.2305 -0.1529
(1.2003) (1.1866) (1.1917)
Gov. trans. pre-2000*wealth2 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Non-gov. trans. pre-2000*wealth -0.0699 -0.0270 0.0550
(2.3172) (2.2893) (2.2921)
Non-gov. trans. pre-2000*wealth2 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Uncond. cash trans. pre-2000*wealth 0.0230 0.0714 -0.1943
(8.9067) (8.7987) (8.8070)
Uncond. cash trans. pre-2000*wealth2 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Exog. trans. pre-2000*wealth 0.0420 -0.0273 -0.0288
(0.0406) (0.0411) (0.0411)
Exog. trans. pre-2000*wealth2 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Wealth 2000 0.0621*** 0.0639***
(0.0092) (0.0093)
Wealth 20002 -0.0000*** -0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Age hhold head 24.9057 19.2492
(29.0486) (29.2669)
Age hhold head2 -0.2509 -0.1929
(0.2879) (0.2901)
Education hhold head 49.8499*** 47.5468***
(9.9066) (10.0689)
Java dummy -475.1471
(313.5889)
Urban dummy -12.3024
(150.4702)
Constant 649.3994*** 19.3900 236.7383
(60.9343) (165.3383) (190.8061)
Location YES
Observations 4303 4303 4303
R-squared 0.001 0.026 0.029
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Table B.16: Effects of exogenous income flows on post-2000 startup capital
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Exog. trans. ent. 1 119.4913 164.0438 169.0928
(493.6262) (491.0313) (493.6417)
Exog. trans. ent. 1*wealth 0.0190 0.0117 0.0102
(0.0498) (0.0496) (0.0497)
Exog. trans. ent. 1*wealth2 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Age hhold head 29.3749 21.9457
(29.1925) (29.4181)
Age hhold head2 -0.3029 -0.2261
(0.2893) (0.2916)
Education hhold head 63.8283*** 60.9842***
(9.7786) (9.9629)
Java dummy -449.6798
(315.4871)
Urban dummy 87.3300
(150.2264)
Constant 648.3066*** 207.0042 433.2426**
(60.0066) (163.7399) (189.7490)
Location YES
Observations 4303 4303 4303
R-squared 0.000 0.012 0.014
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Table B.17: Effects of income flows on post-2000 startup capital, quantile
reg.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES 25th perc. 50th perc. 75th perc.
Gov. trans. pre-2000 -1.5658 13.2634 9.9258
(10.2957) (34.8987) (102.0795)
Non-gov. trans. pre-2000 11.4076 21.0190 110.7548
(15.9063) (38.8980) (162.8232)
Uncond. cash trans. pre-2000 9.6019 -12.1742 -38.8697
(13.9381) (39.4937) (147.5160)
Exog. trans. pre-2000 13.7657*** 2.1961 53.4300
(3.0836) (8.1149) (34.7475)
Gov. trans. pre-2000*wealth 0.0213*** 0.0050 -0.0227
(0.0050) (0.0218) (0.0633)
Gov. trans. pre-2000*wealth2 -0.0000*** -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Non-gov. trans. pre-2000*wealth -0.0108 -0.0266 -0.1139
(0.0114) (0.0464) (0.1086)
Non-gov. trans. pre-2000*wealth2 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Uncond. cash trans. pre-2000*wealth -0.0741*** 0.0308 0.3698
(0.0246) (0.1342) (0.2652)
Uncond. cash trans. pre-2000*wealth2 0.0000*** -0.0000 -0.0001*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Exog. trans. pre-2000*wealth -0.0049*** -0.0014 -0.0146***
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0035)
Exog. trans. pre-2000*wealth2 0.0000*** 0.0000*** -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Wealth 2000 0.0023*** 0.0108*** 0.0445***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0009)
Wealth 20002 -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Age hhold head 0.6856*** 2.0373*** 9.3668***
(0.2353) (0.6306) (2.7296)
Age hhold head2 -0.0072*** -0.0213*** -0.0968***
(0.0023) (0.0063) (0.0271)
Education hhold head 1.2517*** 6.0077*** 22.5216***
(0.0784) (0.2176) (0.9710)
Java dummy -0.2643 -14.5499** -72.4292***
(2.3598) (6.3679) (27.5023)
Urban dummy -3.8289*** -10.4580*** -31.0491**
(1.2016) (3.2462) (14.0529)
Location YES YES YES
Constant 6.5214*** 25.4176*** 115.5045***
(1.5399) (4.1154) (17.4912)
Observations 4303 4303 4303
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Table B.18: Effects of exogenous income flows on post-2000 startup capital,
quantile reg.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES 25th perc. 50th perc. 75th perc.
Exog. trans. ent. 1 13.0740*** 17.0518 152.9946***
(3.5903) (12.5829) (43.5792)
Exog. trans. ent. 1*wealth 0.0003 0.0071*** 0.0089**
(0.0003) (0.0012) (0.0040)
Exog. trans. ent. 1*wealth2 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Age hhold head 1.0730*** 3.7174*** 13.7805***
(0.2070) (0.7593) (2.7751)
Age hhold head2 -0.0113*** -0.0388*** -0.1453***
(0.0021) (0.0075) (0.0275)
Education hhold head 1.3760*** 8.3490*** 31.0752***
(0.0675) (0.2566) (0.9755)
Java dummy -2.5170 -20.4398** -62.3638**
(2.2252) (8.1385) (29.7314)
Urban dummy -3.1795*** -4.7920 -8.2275
(1.0586) (3.8702) (13.9139)
Constant 9.2668*** 33.5599*** 189.3299***
(1.3536) (4.9023) (17.6483)
Location YES YES YES
Observations 4303 4303 4303
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Table B.19: Effects from Unconditional Cash Transfers (UCT), without se-
lection controls
Without Selection Controls
VARIABLES Coef. Std. Err. z P >|z|
Constant -0.9971 0.0383 -26.05 0.000
Wealth 2000 USD (/million) 3.2517 1.9703 1.65 0.099
Wealth 2000 USD2(/million) 0.0000 0.0000 -1.62 0.104
Age hhold head 0.0180 0.0060 2.98 0.003
Age hhold head2 -0.0002 0.0001 -3.55 0.000
Education hhold head 0.0065 0.0020 3.31 0.001
Java dummy 0.0084 0.0470 0.18 0.859
Urban dummy 0.2352 0.0327 7.20 0.000
Province dummy YES
Variables controlling for selection into UCT
Yearly rent on house (*1000)
House electricity (dummy)
Health card (dummy)
Health program
Ent. Exp. Hhold Head
Number of children
Number of adult female
Number of adult male
Water source
Toilet type
Fuel source
Household assets
Household head occupation
Observations 13536
Chi-sq. 213.64
Prob >Chi-sq. 0.0000
Log likelihood -6902.01
Pseudo R2 0.02
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Table B.20: Effects from Unconditional Cash Transfers (UCT), with selec-
tion controls
With Selection Controls
VARIABLES Coef. Std. Err. z P >|z|
Constant 4.5100 175.6875 0.03 0.980
Wealth 2000 USD (/million) 3.5538 3.0702 1.16 0.247
Wealth 2000 USD2(/million) 0.0000 0.0000 -1.07 0.283
Age hhold head -0.0011 0.0083 -0.14 0.890
Age hhold head2 0.0000 0.0001 -0.13 0.900
Education hhold head 0.0025 0.0032 0.77 0.439
Java dummy -0.0875 0.0661 -1.32 0.186
Urban dummy 0.2531 0.0465 5.44 0.000
Province dummy YES
Variables controlling for selection into UCT
Yearly rent on house (*1000) 0.0000 0.0000 2.08 0.037
House electricity (dummy) 0.1569 0.1021 1.54 0.124
Health card (dummy) 0.0123 0.0483 0.25 0.799
Health program 0.0927 0.0588 1.58 0.115
Ent. Exp. Hhold Head -0.0254 0.0016 -15.67 0.000
Number of children 0.0396 0.0138 2.86 0.004
Number of adult female 0.0416 0.0176 2.37 0.018
Number of adult male 0.0385 0.0165 2.34 0.019
Water source YES
Toilet type YES
Fuel source YES
Household assets YES
Household head occupation YES
Observations 8003
Chi-sq. 1189.55
Prob >Chi-sq. 0.0000
Log likelihood -3851.24
Pseudo R2 0.13
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Table B.21: Parent Cross Tab
0 1 2 3 Total
0 9,286 898 682 419 11,285
82.29 7.96 6.04 3.71 100
90.52 85.93 86.55 84.99 89.68
1 515 75 62 44 696
73.99 10.78 8.91 6.32 100
5.02 7.18 7.87 8.92 5.53
2 394 64 36 28 522
75.48 12.26 6.9 5.36 100
3.84 6.12 4.57 5.68 4.15
3 63 8 8 2 81
77.78 9.88 9.88 2.47 100
0.61 0.77 1.02 0.41 0.64
Total 10,258 1,045 788 493 12,584
81.52 8.3 6.26 3.92 100
100 100 100 100 100
Note: Values in first column are enterprise father ran (0 is father was not self-employed).
Values in top row same, for mother. Within each box, first value is total number of chil-
dren falling under observation, second is cross-tab frequency for father, third is cross-
tab frequency for mother.
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Table B.22: Parent Effect
(1) (2)
VARIABLES M. effects
Father self-empl no employees 0.1677** 0.0328**
(0.0688) (0.0146)
Father self-empl hhold/unpaid employees 0.2891*** 0.0602***
(0.0630) (0.0150)
Father self-empl waged employees 0.2429 0.0501
(0.1922) (0.0452)
Mother self-empl no employees 0.2050*** 0.0409**
(0.0725) (0.0160)
Mother self-empl hhold/unpaid employees 0.2162*** 0.0435***
(0.0751) (0.0168)
Mother self-empl waged employees 0.0362 0.0066
(0.3181) (0.0593)
Both parents self-employed -0.1563 -0.0254*
(0.1030) (0.0152)
Constant -1.3120***
(0.0171)
Observations 12584 12584
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Table B.23: Parent Return Effect
(1)
VARIABLES
Father self-empl no employees -10.1411
(14.6023)
Father self-empl hhold/unpaid employees -19.4735
(12.7695)
Father self-empl waged employees 127.3198***
(43.6096)
Mother self-empl no employees 3.5335
(15.9017)
Mother self-empl hhold/unpaid employees 9.0751
(15.3417)
Mother self-empl waged employees -12.1912
(68.6272)
Both parents self-employed -13.1895
(21.6882)
Constant 78.8867***
(3.8770)
Observations 1253
R-squared 0.011
F 1.9758
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
C.1 Tables
Table C.1: Summary statistics on individual entrants
1998 Entrants
N Mean SD P25 Median P75 P95 P99
Age 684 33.81 12.78 25 30 40 60 73
Marriage (married=1) 684 0.87 0.34 1 1 1 1 1
Gender (male=1) 684 0.71 0.46 0 1 1 1 1
Education (years) 684 5.58 6.04 0 0.5 12 15 19
1999 Entrants
N Mean SD P25 Median P75 P95 P99
Age 1355 27.67 10.72 20 25 33 49 59
Marriage (married=1) 1355 0.87 0.33 1 1 1 1 1
Gender (male=1) 1355 0.68 0.46 0 1 1 1 1
Education (years) 1355 7.14 6.15 0 9 12 19 19
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Table C.2: Summary statistics on community-level sources of variation
Year 1998
Variable N Mean SD P25 Median P75 P95 P99
Avg. change formal 1998 573 -0.35 1.03 -1.00 -0.75 0.00 2.00 3.00
Growth employment 1998 631 1.09 2.23 -0.25 0.33 1.75 5.50 9.00
Comm unemployment rate 1998 625 0.13 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.50 0.73
Year 1999
Variable N Mean SD P25 Median P75 P95 P99
Avg. change formal 1999 526 0.03 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00
Growth employment 1999 829 0.12 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.50 1.00
Comm unemployment rate 1999 1245 0.29 0.33 0.00 0.17 0.50 1.00 1.00
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Table C.3: Panel wage regression
(1)
VARIABLES
Age -729.6043
(970.2945)
Age 2 219.4695***
(11.0449)
Education (years) 17,743.6683***
(328.4670)
Marriage (married=1) 233,807.5485***
(5,274.8745)
1989 year dummy -15,202.2139**
(6,129.3431)
1990 year dummy -29,255.7173***
(6,002.8286)
1991 year dummy -43,050.8011***
(5,913.6615)
1992 year dummy -7,592.2594
(5,578.9516)
1993 year dummy 308,289.2601***
(12,759.3060)
1994 year dummy 471,856.2062***
(5,852.7692)
1995 year dummy 423,124.5305***
(5,578.6388)
1996 year dummy 365,138.9674***
(5,215.6677)
1997 year dummy 334,528.8544***
(5,050.2212)
1998 year dummy 151,353.3406***
(4,807.7177)
1999 year dummy 142,859.3440***
(4,393.3809)
2000 year dummy 156,652.8447***
(4,177.0906)
Constant -152094.1954***
(20,436.4606)
Observations 75843
R-squared 0.490
R-squared adjusted 0.3515
F 3583.5
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Note: Observations restricted to 4.6 Rph. <= wage <= 1872075 Rph.
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Table C.4: Change in propensity to stay in self-employment after Asian
Financial Crisis, 1998 entrants
Using 1998 New Entrants Into Self-Employment
Using Year-by-Year Choice Estimates
Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. t-test
1999 477 0.37 0.27 29.75 ***
2000 477 0.33 0.28 26.19 ***
2001 477 0.22 0.21 23.18 ***
2002 477 0.22 0.23 20.76 ***
2003 477 0.22 0.23 20.71 ***
2004 477 0.24 0.23 22.89 ***
2005 477 0.24 0.22 23.98 ***
2006 477 0.24 0.22 23.23 ***
2007 477 0.26 0.25 22.44 ***
2008 477 0.32 0.25 27.67 ***
Using Pooled Choice Estimates
Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. t-test
1999 477 0.34 0.26 28.64 ***
2000 477 0.36 0.26 30.07 ***
Using 1999, 2000 Choice Estimates
Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. t-test
1999 477 0.37 0.27 29.90 ***
2000 477 0.33 0.28 26.22 ***
Using Pooled Estimates Pooled Across 1999-2008
Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. t-test
1999-2008 954 0.35 0.26 154.16 ***
Using 1999-2000 Pooled Across 1999-2000
Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. t-test
1999-2000 954 0.35 0.27 39.58 ***
Note: Reports on the mean change in propensity to remain in self-employment for those
who enter self-employment during 1998, with various methods of measuring propen-
sity to persist and couterfactual. t-tests reported testing for differences in means of
distributions.
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Table C.5: Change in propensity to stay in self-employment after Asian
Financial Crisis, 1999 entrants
Using 1999 New Entrants Into Self-Employment
Using Year-by-Year Choice Estimates
Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. t-test
2000 514 0.90 0.11 191.95 ***
2001 514 0.42 0.15 63.44 ***
2002 514 0.44 0.17 57.48 ***
2003 514 0.45 0.16 62.64 ***
2004 514 0.48 0.17 64.91 ***
2005 514 0.52 0.17 68.29 ***
2006 514 0.57 0.18 73.41 ***
2007 514 0.66 0.18 83.30 ***
2008 514 0.75 0.16 108.56 ***
Using Pooled Choice Estimates
Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. t-test
2000 514 0.89 0.09 217.80 ***
Using Pooled Estimates Pooled Across 2000-2008
Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. t-test
2000-2008 514 0.89 0.09 307.73 ***
Note: Reports on the mean change in propensity to remain in self-employment for those
who enter self-employment during 1999, with various methods of measuring propen-
sity to persist and couterfactual. t-tests reported testing for differences in means of
distributions.
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Table C.6: Returns to experience, individuals entering self-employment
during 1998
Coefficient Bootstrap
Std. Err. z P >|z|
Exp. 1 curr. ent. 122053.6 ** 60520.25 2.02 0.04
Exp. 1 curr. ent. 2 -29698.09 * 16522.57 -1.80 0.07
Exp. 2 curr. ent. 111070.5 82077.02 1.35 0.18
Exp. 2 curr. ent. 2 -19199.98 24561.68 -0.78 0.43
Exp. 3 curr. ent. 351829.4 * 190108.40 1.85 0.06
Exp. 3 curr. ent. 2 -66646.76 52523.57 -1.27 0.20
Age 14752.11 11359.57 1.30 0.19
Age 2 -176.0679 134.49 -1.31 0.19
Gender 319052.6 *** 53910.98 5.92 0.00
Education (years) 19810.85 *** 3808.41 5.20 0.00
Marriage (married=1) -1841.24 75149.90 -0.02 0.98
Selection correction, 1998 entry -137276.9 116344.20 -1.18 0.24
Constant -17804.76 220855.60 -0.08 0.94
Observations 1220
Bootstrap replications 50
Wald Chi-sq. 110.86
Prob >Chi-sq. 0
R-squared 0.0564
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Note: Estimation by OLS with bootstraped standard errors due to projected regressor
(selection correction).
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Table C.7: Returns to Experience, Individuals Entering Self-Employment
During 1999
Coefficient Std. Err. t P >|t|
Exp. 1 curr. ent. -158.00 *** 55.99 -2.82 0.005
Exp. 1 curr. ent. 2 31.31 ** 14.55 2.15 0.032
Exp. 2 curr. ent. 316.40 ** 158.59 2 0.046
Exp. 2 curr. ent. 2 -198.14 ** 89.32 -2.22 0.027
Exp. 3 curr. ent. 1623.77 *** 532.92 3.05 0.002
Exp. 3 curr. ent. 2 -651.30 ** 299.85 -2.17 0.03
Age 5.76 39.35 0.15 0.884
Age 2 -0.17 0.36 -0.47 0.64
Gender 145.40 ** 67.60 2.15 0.032
Education (years) 26.05 ** 11.24 2.32 0.021
Marriage (married=1) -24.97 56.97 -0.44 0.661
Selection correction, 1999 entry -1213.65 1974.65 -0.61 0.539
Constant 431.39 1113.93 0.39 0.699
Observations 599
F 9.13
Prob >Chi-sq. 0.00
R-squared 0.1575
Adj R-squared 0.1402
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Note: Estimation by OLS with bootstraped standard errors due to projected regressor
(selection correction).
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APPENDIX D
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5
D.1 Additional Material
D.1.1 Evidence for labor market frictions in EHC transmission
Here I provide evidence that, if working in family enterprises is an important
source of entrepreneurship-relevant human capital, that labor market frictions
preventing people from outside the family from working in a household en-
terprise could inhibit such human capital transfer. The idea that labor mar-
ket frictions and weak contracting make household members much more likely
to work in household enterprises is not a new one in development economics,
with the fundamental hypothesis being known as the ”separation hypothesis”.1
Benjamin [Benjamin, 1992] is a seminal paper providing a test of the separation
hypothesis, with the basic idea being that if the household faces no frictions
in hiring outside labor, then the size of a household enterprise should not be
determined in any way by available household labor. The vast majority of ap-
plications of such tests have been in the context of agricultural enterprises; to
my knowledge this is one of the first applications of such a test in the context of
non-farm enterprises.
The results are summarized in Table D.1. Indeed, implementing a simple
version of the test I find that the separation hypothesis is violated. The num-
ber of adult males, adult females, and children in the household (as measures
1The term ”separation” is used to capture the question of whether we can think of a
household enterprise as being a separate, profit-maximizing entity apart from the household,
or whether enterprise-specific decisions are affected by other household characteristics and
choices, such as labor supply and consumption.
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of household labor supply) are statistically significant predictors of household
non-farm enterprise size, reflected in enterprise employment, after controlling
for the age of the household head and location. We see that each additional
male household member is correlated with an extra 0.09 labor units in the en-
terprise, with the corresponding figures being 0.05 for women and 0.07 for chil-
dren. These figures are economically significant given that the average enter-
prise has less than 2 additional employees beyond the entrepreneur.2
These results suggest that if exposure to enterprise activity is important for
acquiring entrepreneurship-specific human capital, labor market frictions might
inhibit such transfers.
D.1.2 Proofs: The properties of the value function
I verify the claim in Proposition 5.2.3. The stated claim is that the value function
V : S → R exists and is unique, and furthermore, that V is bounded and contin-
uous, and a stationary optimal policy ζ∗ : S → a exists. First I define a couple of
objects. First, the state space, S , which contains vectors of the form (ei,Wi, xi, ξ),
is defined as follows: S = R+ ×R+ ×Z+ ×R+. Second, the action set is defined as
A = {0, 1} × R+ × [0, λ (ei,Wi)] × [0,w (xi) + Wi] × [0,R (w, r; ei,Wi) + Wi] , (D.1)
where the first component refers to the discrete choice of occupation, the second
and third components the (potential) labor and capital allocations, respectively,
2In columns 3 & 4 of Table ??, I show that if I just run total waged labor as the dependent
variable (rather than all sources of labor), only male household labor is a statistically significant
predictor, perhaps suggesting that male household labor is most important for monitoring. This
point is also supported by the results in column 4 of the table, in which outside, hired labor is
only a function of the household’s own adult male labor supply.
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the fourth component the savings decision in wage employment, and finally
the fifth component the savings decision in self-employment. Individual action
profiles are denoted by a ∈ A.
The basic assumptions necessary for the proposition to hold are provided
in Bhattacharya and Majumdar (2007), pp. 388-390. Hence I must verify the
following conditions:
1. S is a (nonempty) Borel subset of a complete, separable metric space. Clearly
S is a subset of the complete, separable metric space R4+.
2. A is a compact metric space. Since all of the objects at hand are in Euclidean
spaces, I invoke the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, so that it is sufficient to show
that A is closed and bounded. It is immediately apparent that for given values of
(ei,Wi, xi, ξ), A is a cross product of closed and bounded sets, and hence is closed
and bounded itself.
3. U is a bounded, continuous function on S × A. U is bounded and continuous
by assumption.
4. If sn → s, an → a, then q (.|sn, an) converges weakly to q (.|s, a), where we take q
to denote the distribution of ξ. Again, this is trivial – since ξ is assumed to follow
an i.i.d. distribution with finite mean and variance any sequence q (.|sn, an) on
the state space will heap on q (.|s, a); i.e., q (.|sn, an) = q (.|s, a) for any n, so the
convergence result holds.
Next, I verify the claim in Proposition 5.2.3. Recall the statement, that for
ei, e, 1/σ2ξ , and δ sufficiently large, `
′′ sufficiently large on
(
0, e
)
, and λ (ei,Wi)
sufficiently small, there exists an optimal policy ζ∗ under which s∗ > 0 in all
states, with s∗ increasing in ei, and there exists a ratio of Wi/ei such that e′/e  1,
whereas when such a ratio is not satisfied e′/e ≈ 1.
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Recall the Bellman equation provided in equation (5.6),
V (ei, xi,Wi, ξ) (D.2)
= max
{
max
s∈[0,w(xi)+Wi]
U [Wi + w (xi) − s] + δEV (ei, xi + 1, s, ξ′) ,
max
s∈[0,R+Wi], l≥0,
k∈[0,λ(ei,Wi)/r]
U [Wi + R (k, l;w, r; ei,Wi) − s] + δEV (` (c (k, l) / (1 + ei)) , xi, s, ξ′)
 ,
First, notice that for ei and 1/σ2ξ sufficiently large, the individual will be in-
centivized to select the discrete, self-employment occupation in each period.
Given the i.i.d. shock distribution and the accumulation of EHC, the incentives
supporting this action only increase over time. Hence let us assume that self-
employment is chosen in almost all periods under an optimal policy ζ∗. Now
the only question is the optimal investment policy.
Notice that as e increases and `′′ increases on
(
0, e
)
, ` (c (k, l) / (1 + ei)) becomes
significantly greater than 1 for c (k, l) ≈ e. Given this, and with δ sufficiently
large and constraint λ (ei,Wi) sufficiently tight, it may be the case that it is opti-
mal for the agent to follow a policy of undertaking saving (s∗ > 0) for a num-
ber of periods, adding to Wi until a sufficient value of Wi is attained in order
to undertake a large investment, which generates a significant amount of EHC
accumulation. We can see the incentive tradeoff by differentiating just the self-
employment payoff with respect to saving,
U′ [Wi + R (k, l;w, r; ei,Wi) − s] = δEV2 (` (c (k, l) / (1 + ei)) ,Wi + s, xi, ξ′) . (D.3)
It may be that the marginal future expected utility captured in V2 may exceed the
moderate marginal increase in subsequent returns from immediately investing
any excess savings, if the learning function ` is sufficiently convex. Hence in the
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significant saving periods e′/e  1, while in other periods e′/e will be closer to
1.
Finally, in the savings periods, the value of s∗ is growing in ei due to the structure
of ` – successively larger investments are needed to attain the higher-return
segment of the learning function, necessitating increased investment (though of
course this becomes increasingly feasible as ei, and hence profits, increase).
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D.2 Figures
Figure D.1: EHC learning function
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D.3 Tables
Table D.1: Evidence for labor market frictions: Dependent variable labor
quantity, IFLS4 (2008), OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total labor Total labor Wage labor Wage labor
Number adult males 0.0925*** -0.0469 0.0509** -0.147***
(0.0234) (0.0467) (0.0205) (0.0410)
Number adult males2 0.0216*** 0.0307***
(0.00612) (0.00538)
Number adult females 0.0508** 0.0742 0.00250 -0.0258
(0.0238) (0.0607) (0.0209) (0.0533)
Number adult females2 -0.00218 0.00668
(0.00903) (0.00792)
Number children 0.0715*** 0.106** 0.0234 0.0298
(0.0211) (0.0472) (0.0186) (0.0415)
Number children2 -0.00773 -0.00191
(0.00923) (0.00810)
Age of head 0.0320** 0.0314** 0.0263** 0.0252**
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0118) (0.0117)
Age of head2 -0.000356*** -0.000350*** -0.000293** -0.000283**
(0.000132) (0.000132) (0.000116) (0.000116)
Urban dummy YES YES YES YES
Province dummies YES YES YES YES
Constant 1.848*** 1.944*** 0.437*** 0.669***
(0.102) (0.120) (0.0898) (0.106)
Observations 4905 4905 4905 4905
R-squared adj. 0.0265 0.0285 0.0119 0.0185
F 8.409*** 7.841*** 4.279*** 5.407***
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
257
Table D.2: Log-linear fixed effect experience regressions; dependent vari-
able monthly Net Profit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No With No With No With No exp.
controls controls controls controls controls controls measures
Exp. 1 curr. ent. 0.2381*** 0.0386*** 0.2660*** 0.1125***
(0.0131) (0.0060) (0.0181) (0.0083)
Exp. 1 curr. ent. 2 0.0182*** -0.0020*** 0.0198*** -0.0045***
(0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0005)
Exp. 2 curr. ent. 0.2597*** -0.0164** 0.3841*** 0.0572***
(0.0146) (0.0067) (0.0211) (0.0097)
Exp. 2 curr. ent. 2 0.0169*** -0.0016*** 0.0155*** -0.0042***
(0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0005)
Exp. 3 curr. ent. 0.2939*** -0.0358 0.1727 0.1190**
(0.0709) (0.0322) (0.1120) (0.0510)
Exp. 3 curr. ent. 2 0.0226*** 0.0157*** 0.0343*** 0.0100***
(0.0069) (0.0031) (0.0075) (0.0034)
Total exp. 1 0.2902*** -0.0138*** -0.0085 -0.0667***
(0.0078) (0.0035) (0.0107) (0.0050)
Total exp. 1 2 -0.0056*** 0.0002* -0.0017*** 0.0012***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001)
Total exp. 2 0.2827*** -0.0452*** -0.0913*** -0.0659***
(0.0090) (0.0040) (0.0128) (0.0059)
Total exp. 2 2 -0.0051*** 0.0006*** -0.0001 0.0012***
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Total exp. 3 0.5130*** 0.0072 0.1559* -0.1548***
(0.0512) (0.0217) (0.0842) (0.0383)
Total exp. 3 2 -0.0181*** 0.0006 -0.0107*** 0.0040***
(0.0020) (0.0009) (0.0026) (0.0012)
Age 0.0059 0.0280*** 0.0355*** 0.0059
(0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0067)
Age 2 0.0020*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0019***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Education (years) -0.0157*** -0.0121*** -0.0154*** -0.0142***
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0038)
Marriage (married=1) 8.3170*** 8.2809*** 8.2218*** 8.2659***
(0.0262) (0.0264) (0.0267) (0.0257)
Constant 7.8529*** 0.1465 7.9687*** -0.2930* 8.0381*** -0.5648*** 0.4577***
(0.0240) (0.1667) (0.0283) (0.1668) (0.0265) (0.1712) (0.1546)
Observations 60153 60138 60153 60138 60153 60138 62533
R-squared 0.191 0.833 0.061 0.833 0.200 0.835 0.827
F 1885.8 24026 522.04 24031 1003.1 15147 59854
Prob >F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Note: The experience variables measure years of experience with ’Curr.’ in current
enterprise and ’Total’ counting all years of experience. 1=enterprise with no employ-
ees, 2=enterprise with only h-hold/unpaid employees, and 3=enterprise with waged
employees.
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Table D.3: Cobb-Douglas fixed effect experience regressions; dependent
variable monthly Net Profit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No With No With No With No exp.
controls controls controls controls controls controls measure
Log exp. 1 curr. ent. 1.1863*** 0.0549*** 0.9683*** 0.2335***
(0.0277) (0.0129) (0.0516) (0.0228)
Log exp. 2 curr. ent. 1.3263*** -0.0295** 1.3703*** 0.1517***
(0.0306) (0.0141) (0.0611) (0.0270)
Log exp. 3 curr. ent. 1.1605*** 0.2173*** 0.5462* 0.4308***
(0.1371) (0.0606) (0.3088) (0.1359)
Log total exp. 1 0.9228*** -0.0290*** 0.2194*** -0.1949***
(0.0238) (0.0111) (0.0439) (0.0196)
Log total exp. 2 1.0002*** -0.0829*** -0.0381 -0.1968***
(0.0267) (0.0123) (0.0527) (0.0234)
Log total exp. 3 1.0903*** 0.1258** 0.6122** -0.2216*
(0.1236) (0.0541) (0.2756) (0.1213)
Log of (age + 1) 6.3332*** 6.6270*** 6.6265*** 6.3168***
(0.0998) (0.1022) (0.1020) (0.0907)
Log of (education + 1) -0.1347*** -0.1261*** -0.1282*** -0.1353***
(0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0176)
Marriage (married=1) 8.5386*** 8.5250*** 8.4939*** 8.4710***
(0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0270) (0.0264)
Constant 7.9312*** -19.2416*** 7.8830*** -20.2419*** 7.8836*** -20.2250*** -19.0804***
(0.0262) (0.3586) (0.0295) (0.3661) (0.0292) (0.3655) (0.3272)
Observations 60153 60041 60153 60041 60153 60041 62436
R-squared 0.079 0.821 0.061 0.821 0.079 0.822 0.815
F 1364.9 36757 1041.1 36775 687.94 24614 73509
Prob >F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Note: The experience variables measure years of experience with ’Curr.’ in current
enterprise and ’Total’ counting all years of experience. 1=enterprise with no employ-
ees, 2=enterprise with only h-hold/unpaid employees, and 3=enterprise with waged
employees.
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Table D.4: Cobb-Douglas fixed effect experience regressions; dependent
variable monthly Net Profit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No With No With No With No exp.
controls controls controls controls controls controls measure
Log exp. 1 curr. ent. 1.1863*** 0.0549*** 0.9683*** 0.2335***
(0.0277) (0.0129) (0.0516) (0.0228)
Log exp. 2 curr. ent. 1.3263*** -0.0295** 1.3703*** 0.1517***
(0.0306) (0.0141) (0.0611) (0.0270)
Log exp. 3 curr. ent. 1.1605*** 0.2173*** 0.5462* 0.4308***
(0.1371) (0.0606) (0.3088) (0.1359)
Log total exp. 1 0.9228*** -0.0290*** 0.2194*** -0.1949***
(0.0238) (0.0111) (0.0439) (0.0196)
Log total exp. 2 1.0002*** -0.0829*** -0.0381 -0.1968***
(0.0267) (0.0123) (0.0527) (0.0234)
Log total exp. 3 1.0903*** 0.1258** 0.6122** -0.2216*
(0.1236) (0.0541) (0.2756) (0.1213)
Log of (age + 1) 6.3332*** 6.6270*** 6.6265*** 6.3168***
(0.0998) (0.1022) (0.1020) (0.0907)
Log of (education + 1) -0.1347*** -0.1261*** -0.1282*** -0.1353***
(0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0176)
Marriage (married=1) 8.5386*** 8.5250*** 8.4939*** 8.4710***
(0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0270) (0.0264)
Constant 7.9312*** -19.2416*** 7.8830*** -20.2419*** 7.8836*** -20.2250*** -19.0804***
(0.0262) (0.3586) (0.0295) (0.3661) (0.0292) (0.3655) (0.3272)
Observations 60153 60041 60153 60041 60153 60041 62436
R-squared 0.079 0.821 0.061 0.821 0.079 0.822 0.815
F 1364.9 36757 1041.1 36775 687.94 24614 73509
Prob >F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Note: The experience variables measure years of experience with ’Curr.’ in current
enterprise and ’Total’ counting all years of experience. 1=enterprise with no employ-
ees, 2=enterprise with only h-hold/unpaid employees, and 3=enterprise with waged
employees.
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Table D.5: Log-linear fixed effect experience regressions, common experi-
ence; dependent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common Common Common Common
exp. exp. exp. exp.
Exp. 1 curr. ent. 0.4834*** 0.2434*** -0.6884*** 0.0319
(0.0419) (0.0200) (0.0457) (0.0252)
Exp. 1 curr. ent. 2 -0.0101*** -0.0203*** 0.1015*** 0.0093***
(0.0038) (0.0019) (0.0041) (0.0024)
Exp. 2 curr. ent. 0.5855*** 0.1617*** -0.7297*** -0.1075***
(0.0450) (0.0217) (0.0543) (0.0298)
Exp. 2 curr. ent. 2 -0.0072* -0.0155*** 0.1156*** 0.0160***
(0.0038) (0.0019) (0.0044) (0.0026)
Exp. 3 curr. ent. 1.4078*** 0.2077*** -0.5327** 0.1075
(0.1493) (0.0689) (0.2676) (0.1419)
Exp. 3 curr. ent. 2 -0.0582*** -0.0158** 0.1406*** 0.0133
(0.0171) (0.0079) (0.0222) (0.0118)
Total exp. 1 1.3193*** 0.0503
(0.0613) (0.0348)
Total exp. 1 2 -0.1122*** -0.0260***
(0.0040) (0.0022)
Total exp. 2 1.4995*** 0.1538***
(0.0659) (0.0373)
Total exp. 2 2 -0.1313*** -0.0322***
(0.0044) (0.0025)
Total exp. 3 1.6856*** -0.0392
(0.2665) (0.1423)
Total exp. 3 2 -0.1814*** -0.0298***
(0.0190) (0.0102)
Age 0.2870*** 0.3893***
(0.0226) (0.0216)
Age 2 -0.0009*** -0.0015***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Education (years) -0.0027 -0.0053
(0.0087) (0.0082)
Marriage (married=1) 7.5763*** 6.1517***
(0.0859) (0.0944)
Constant 7.2483*** -6.4288*** 6.4443*** -7.2203***
(0.1113) (0.5367) (0.2689) (0.5026)
Observations 9125 9125 9125 9125
R-squared 0.154 0.823 0.449 0.846
F 174.3 2661 388.9 1960
Prof >F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Note: The experience variables measure years of experience with ’Curr.’ in current en-
terprise and ’Total’ counting all years of experience. 1=enterprise with no employees,
2=enterprise with only h-hold/unpaid employees, and 3=enterprise with waged em-
ployees.
Note: ’Common exp.’ refers to fixed effects panel regressions only on the subsample of
individuals with 8-12 years of self-employment experience.
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Table D.6: Log-Linear fixed effect experience regressions, common start
age; dependent variable monthly net profit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common Common Common Common
age age age age
Exp. 1 curr. ent. 0.5127*** 0.0483*** 0.2669*** 0.0562***
(0.0206) (0.0097) (0.0247) (0.0115)
Exp. 1 curr. ent. 2 0.0055*** -0.0048*** -0.0152*** -0.0052***
(0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0006)
Exp. 2 curr. ent. 0.3150* 0.0695 0.1505 0.1705
(0.1857) (0.0789) (0.2578) (0.1182)
Exp. 2 curr. ent. 2 -0.0279 0.0057 -0.0045 -0.0028
(0.0415) (0.0176) (0.0420) (0.0193)
Exp. 3 curr. ent. -0.3169 -0.5604* -3.5910* -3.3290***
(0.7930) (0.3368) (1.9517) (0.8944)
Exp. 3 curr. ent. 2 0.1442 0.1147 0.7639 0.5664**
(0.1966) (0.0835) (0.5104) (0.2339)
Total exp. 1 0.2524*** -0.0141
(0.0162) (0.0100)
Total exp. 1 2 0.0120*** 0.0006*
(0.0005) (0.0004)
Total exp. 2 0.0968 -0.0822
(0.1575) (0.0723)
Total exp. 2 2 -0.0070 0.0034
(0.0085) (0.0039)
Total exp. 3 3.3251* 2.8642***
(1.8463) (0.8461)
Total exp. 3 2 -0.6133 -0.4616**
(0.4708) (0.2157)
Age -0.2266*** -0.1981***
(0.0145) (0.0221)
Age 2 0.0048*** 0.0044***
(0.0002) (0.0003)
Education (years) -0.0239*** -0.0227***
(0.0064) (0.0064)
Marriage (married=1) 9.2475*** 9.2334***
(0.0488) (0.0496)
Constant 7.1609*** 5.9775*** 4.1908*** 5.5535***
(0.0473) (0.2512) (0.0821) (0.3528)
Observations 16714 16714 16714 16714
R-squared 0.270 0.868 0.374 0.869
F 740.4 7928 599.0 4964
Prof >F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Note: The experience variables measure years of experience with ’Curr.’ in current en-
terprise and ’Total’ counting all years of experience. 1=enterprise with no employees,
2=enterprise with only h-hold/unpaid employees, and 3=enterprise with waged em-
ployees.
Note: ’Common age’ refers to fixed effects panel regressions only on the subsample of
individuals who first entered self-employment in their 20s.
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Table D.7: The propensity of the household to engage in running an enter-
prise, 2001-2008, probit
(1) (2)
Coef. Std. Err. P >|z| Coef. Std. Err. P >|z|
Age Head -0.0002 0.008 0.979 -0.0042 0.008 0.596
Age Head2 0.0000 0.000 0.662 0.0000 0.000 0.892
Head Ent Exp -0.0278 *** 0.003 0.000
Head Ent Exp2 0.0002 *** 0.000 0.000
Head Ent Exp No Empl 0.1855 *** 0.016 0.000
Head Ent Exp Fam Empl 0.0880 *** 0.018 0.000
Head Ent Exp Wage Lab 0.3891 *** 0.069 0.000
Head First Occ No Empl 0.0923 0.138 0.504
Head First Occ Fam Empl 0.0113 0.227 0.960
Head First Occ Wage Empl -0.1422 0.540 0.792
Number Adult Female 0.0393 ** 0.016 0.014 0.0839 *** 0.017 0.000
Number Adult Male 0.0222 0.015 0.147 0.0544 *** 0.016 0.001
Number Child 0.0373 *** 0.013 0.003 0.0363 *** 0.013 0.005
Wealth 2000 USD 0.0000 *** 0.000 0.005 0.0000 *** 0.000 0.001
Wealth 2000 USD2 0.0000 0.000 0.359 0.0000 0.000 0.143
Bank BRI -0.0138 0.064 0.829 0.0171 0.066 0.795
People’s Credit -0.1120 ** 0.048 0.020 -0.0823 * 0.049 0.095
Village Credit Union 0.0045 0.043 0.918 0.0302 0.045 0.497
Village Coop -0.0088 0.042 0.833 0.0016 0.043 0.970
Other form Coop -0.0840 ** 0.041 0.040 -0.0828 ** 0.042 0.048
State Private Bank 0.0051 0.050 0.920 -0.0010 0.052 0.984
BMT 0.0276 0.047 0.561 0.0345 0.049 0.479
Java Dummy -0.0188 0.041 0.647 0.0338 0.042 0.423
Urban Dummy 0.3003 *** 0.041 0.000 0.2783 *** 0.043 0.000
Constant -0.8777 *** 0.057 0.000 -0.8864 *** 0.060 0.000
N 7968 7968
LR Chi-square(2) 162.1100 635.7500
Log-likelihood -4335.9184 -4099.0964
*** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent significance.
Note: Wealth values are the lagged, year 2000 values. Monetary values converted to
USD.
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